788.5–MAP/5–2250: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State 1 to the Embassy in Iran
594. Deptel 539 May 5.2 Eyes only Wiley and Richards. Dept’s prospective program for Iran contemplated, if necessary to secure essential cooperation and reforms on part IranGov, suggestion to Shah he bring to power Govt capable of fulfilling these requirements. No such action however was envisaged until sufficient time had passed evaluate situation fol arrival survey mission.
However, recent reports including urtels 873 May 15 and 884 May 163 have given rise to serious concern over Mansur Govt. Further, danger exists that he will be pictured in US press as Sov appeaser at very moment US aid to Iran is announced, and added consideration is that announcement US aid while Mansur in power wld in all probability strengthen his position considerably and econ and finan control Iran by Ebtehaj-Mansur-Naficy family group wld be tightened.
While Dept wld leave to ur judgment any US action which might influence Mansur’s removal, it may be that mere hint of US attitude in proper palace quarters wld be sufficient. If not, suggestion cld be made that repeated requests for US aid made by Shah and Amb Ala are difficult to consider while IranGov has reputation of association with vested interests and with seeking arrangement with Sovs, and has shown no signs whatsoever of attempting either correct present econ situation or proceed with Seven Year Plan. Surprise cld be expressed Mansur shld undertake undermine Shah’s attempts explore Iran situation with US and UK (urtel 873) and hope put forward that PriMin can be found who, fully aware of great issues at stake [Page 550] in present situation, can proceed with efficiency, honesty, and vigor. If such action is taken, it shld be made entirely clear US has with greatest reluctance reached decision to make its views known on such a question but its serious concern over recent events in Iran and its desire see Iran prosperous and strong in face of Commie threat have brought it to conclusion Iran is in all fairness entitled to frank opinion of US Govt.
To have free hand in future, Dept wld prefer not to be pinned down by specific indication preferred successor to Mansur but if direct question is asked re Ardalan or Razmara, you might reply US has no objection to either.
Tel immed whether you perceive objection to foregoing course and views concerning timing of approach. Do not proceed with plan pending further word.
- Following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Secretary Acheson had remained in London for the fourth session of the NATO Council; for documentation on this session, see vol. iii, pp. 100 ff.↩
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Not printed; this telegram read as follows:
“On basis ur reports and recommendations, Dept has formulated program for Iran which it is hoped will be fully approved in near future. Program contemplates survey and advisory mission to Iran, extension under US control of loan assistance for selected development projects, somewhat increased military aid, intensification informational activities, and more direct US advice in political and administrative fields. Upon completion arrangement for Eximbank commitment Dept plans informally suggest Iran Govt it request despatch mission to Iran to look into economic situation and (a) recommend measures which Irans shld take themselves and (b) consider extent to which US aid needed. Pending further word this shld not be discussed with Irans.” (888.00TA/5–550)
↩ - Neither printed; the former reported that although the Shah had made a firm decision to “resist any orientation by Iran toward Soviet Union”, Mansur gave the impression that he still believed it was “possible to get along with USSR;” while the latter indicated that an Associated Press correspondent who had just left Tehran appeared convinced after an interview with the Prime Minister that Mansur was a “dangerous Soviet appeaser.” (788.00/5–1550 and 5–1650)↩