Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

396.1–LO/5–1650: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the London Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Acting Secretary of State

secret

London, May 16, 1950—6 p. m.

Secto 276. Further discussions Iran held at meeting this morning between Hare and Palmer for US and Wright, Furlonge and Leavett for UK.¹

Referring to our previous talks on this subject (Secto 186, May 6²) Furlonge said Foreign Office had asked for comments British Ambassador Tehran on proposed line of action.

Re suggestion economic mission, British Ambassador thought Iran already over-surveyed and doubted wisdom tying any proposed statement on Iran to announcement of economic mission. Hare explained we did not regard this as just another economic mission, but one which would be headed by well known personage and would concentrate on immediate concrete achievement.

British Ambassador did not think step-up in informational activities would do very much good. What Iranians need is not more information but general “gingering up”. Hare said not our intention merely concentrate on conventional informational activity but to develop new tactics which would have real impact on existing situation.

Re AIOC supplementary agreement, Foreign Office representatives stated they had given careful consideration our suggestions. Agreement had been reached with Iranian Government after much careful preparation, during course of which Mr. Bevin had talked to AIOC officials to emphasize from political standpoint necessity reaching equitable agreement. Foreign Office feels present supplemental agreement is fair one. From standpoint of positive assistance to help Iran thru her present difficulties, Foreign Office feels ratification agreement in present form would be big contribution. Everything therefore seems to point to desirability early ratification in present form. If, on other hand, parties start tinkering with agreement at present time, it may take months before matter can be sewed up and Iran receive increased benefits which it needs so badly to undertake developmental program.

Hare said there seemed to be differences in UK and US assessment of possibility of agreement getting thru Majlis. We had doubts re prospects ratification in present form and have been somewhat worried by UK take it or leave it attitude. We recognize that agreement offers good deal, but we wondered if it had not gotten into too rigid framework.

Wright said Foreign Office appreciated force our arguments. UK has considered question very carefully from all points of view, including political and is sure it is taking right stand in pressing for ratification in present form. He would draw up for our information list of points in agreement which UK considers strong and beneficial to Iran. In light our joint appraisal Iranian situation and need proffer economic assistance, he felt it would be to benefit of everyone concerned to bend our efforts toward getting present supplemental agreement thru Majlis. In order assist in this, he suggested our Ambassador in Tehran might, in informal conversations with Iranians, take line that we feel that supplemental agreement contains very solid benefits for Iran and that after talking to UK, we are convinced that there is no chance of UK agreeing to increase those benefits.

UK representatives noted that we were both in agreement re desirability economic assistance to Iran in order bolster morale, give us peg on which to hang statement and create favorable atmosphere for urging reforms. They were somewhat apprehensive, however, that, if we proffered Eximbank loan prior ratification AIOC supplemental agreement, Iranians might be less anxious proceed with ratification. Hare emphasized critical nature of Iranian situation and need for speedy action. If AIOC difficulty could be ironed out soon it would be great help but, since immediate prospect not encouraging, we should endeavor press on with many other practicable steps. Wright agreed re urgency and wondered whether there was any way in which two forms of financial assistance might be linked together in order to bring maximum combined contribution to bear on Iran’s present problems. Specifically, would UK find it possible take line with Iranians that we were studying possibility financial assistance to Iran, but that meanwhile Iran has prospect obtaining substantial benefits from AIOC agreement and that we feel they should go ahead with this form of self help immediately. Moreover, he wondered whether it would be preferable to approach Shah re desired reforms after announcement financial assistance or whether it would be preferable to make such financial assistance conditional on compliance with reform suggestions.

We agreed put these points to Department and to Embassy Tehran. UK is also putting them to their Embassy Tehran and it was agreed that it would be useful if two Ambassadors Tehran could, after consulting together, give us their views on following two points:

1. Desirability linking together questions Eximbank loan to ratification AIOC agreement; and

2. Question of linking two forms of financial assistance to question social and financial reform.

Suggest Department repeat this telegram to Tehran together with section on Iran contained Secto 186 and any other appropriate background material. Also suggest Tehran’s reply should be reviewed by Department prior discussion with Foreign Office.

Sent Department Secto 276, repeated Tehran 18.

1. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Joseph Palmer 2d, Second Secretary of Embassy London; Michael: R. Wright, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Geoffrey W. Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office: and Alan Leavett of the same Department.
2. For text, see vol. iii, p. 986.