788.5 MAP/5–950
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph J. Wolf of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State
Subject: List Discussions MDAP FY1950 for Iran1
Participants: | Mr. Aram, Chargé d’Affaires, Iranian Embassy |
Mr. C. V. Ferguson, Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs | |
Mr. P. Halla, GTI | |
Mr. J. J. Wolf |
Mr. Aram, on May 8th, had telephone [d] Mr. Wolf and said that he would like to speak with him concerning the issue of the tanks before the next session between the two delegations. He indicated at that time that he would prefer to have the U.S. state whether or not it was impossible for the U.S. to give the tanks as it was difficult for the Iranian Generals to be put in the position of having to say that they insisted on them. The appointment was made for 11:00 A. M. May 9th, but Mr. Aram called Mr. Ferguson prior thereto, said that the Generals had now received their instructions, and that there was no need for the conversation before the delegations met. At about noon on May 8th, he again called Mr. Ferguson and asked that the meeting he had originally sought be held, and it was set for 4:30 P. M.
The meeting opened with Mr. Aram stating that he had sought from his Government instructions which would permit him to accept the English phraseology of the Bilateral Agreement,2 rather than having the English text follow the Persian. Mr. Ferguson indicated that we would cable our Embassy at Tehran along similar lines.
Mr. Aram then said that with respect to the tanks he would like to know whether or not the U.S. found it impossible to include them in the list. Mr. Wolf stated that Mr. Ferguson and himself had spent many hours in conference with Defense officials in an attempt to insure that every effort was made by the U.S. to meet the last Iranian list. As a result of these conversations, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Wolf were confident that the list that would be presented at the next meeting of the delegations would go a good way toward including most of the items sought by the Iranian Government in their last list, although it was not one hundred percent in accord therewith. However, all items of armor are necessarily omitted from the FY 1950 Program. Mr. Wolf stated that although the word “impossible” could have several meanings, it could truly be said that in order to meet the Iranian desires in any other aspect, to provide a balanced program, to present a program which could stand on its own feet and not jeopardize possible future programs for Iran, and in view of fiscal limitations, it might sincerely be said that the inclusion of armor in this program was an impossibility.
Mr. Aram asked whether this included all tanks or just the medium tanks, and he was told that it included all tanks and armored vehicles. Mr. Ferguson emphasized the fact that we had to be in the position to report to Congress that we were providing a program which we ourselves believed to be sound, and we were really not able to do that if the tanks were included. Mr. Wolf referred to the fact that [Page 543] the new program which would be presented was well rounded, well balanced, and contained a good deal of infantry support and antitank weapons of the most efficient and modern type. He indicated that the new list would include some of the 3.5 bazookas which the Shah had expressly requested, and further indicated that we had broken our backs to include some of the very new and extremely powerful recoilless rifles which, subject to high level consideration, he hoped would finally be included.
Mr. Aram emphasized that the medium tanks were the particular desire of His Majesty, the Shah, and that one of their major purposes was to bolster the morale of the Iranian Army by the visible display of such heavy power. Mr. Ferguson emphasized that we had given every consideration to the psychological problem involved therein, but felt that these tanks were bound to become deadlined, and would not be a positive morale factor in such case. Mr. Wolf referred to General Duff’s statements3 with regard to the enormous expense of upkeep of these tanks, and to the fact that we could not insure that spare parts for these tanks would be available. He said that he was confident that demonstration of the anti-tank power contained in the mobile weapons we had under consideration would have a tremendous morale value amongst the Iranian troops.
Mr. Aram wondered what these tanks cost. Mr. Wolf replied that if we were to include only 50 of the medium tanks requested, together with necessary maintenance, support and recovery vehicles, we would more than exceed the value of the original list which we had tendered to Iran, and that to provide the tanks would of course mean that all anti-tank weapons would have to be dropped.
Mr. Aram indicated that he believed that if Iran had the choice, they would probably choose the tanks over the other weapons. It was stated that such an unbalanced program would be very difficult to support here, that the program we did propose would be so well balanced, so much along the lines of General Collins’ conversations when he was in Iran,4 so mobile and useful in connection with Iran’s strategic plan of withdrawal to and protection of a national redoubt, that we felt it impossible to prejudice such an excellent program.
Mr. Aram repeated several times throughout the conversation that of course we would have to convince his Generals of the military aspects of this program. He also asked whether we would provide all of the bazookas and recoilless rifles which Iran had requested. He was [Page 544] informed that there would be delays on delivery of these items, which were so new and modern that there were none available on hand for immediate delivery. He was also told that for this first fiscal year 50 program, only a beginning was made to meet the net Iranian requirement, but that our people believed that there was sufficient numbers included to permit thorough training in the applied tactical use of this weapon.
Mr. Aram then asked about the fiscal year 51 program and whether armored vehicles might not be included therein, particularly medium tanks, but not them, at least more light tanks which we appeared to approve. He was told that it was impossible to make a commitment in view of the fact that Congress had not yet approved any figure for 1951 and in view of our increasing world-wide commitments. He then indicated a concern on the part of Iran with respect to our increasing commitments elsewhere, referring to the press report that it has been indicated in London that we would be sending arms to Indochina.5 Mr. Wolf noted that the situation in Indochina was one of active warfare which fortunately was not the case in Iran. Mr. Aram repeated his concern at the share the other nations were getting and was reminded that a quick reading of the MDAA indicated that Iran was one of the most preferred nations of the whole world, inasmuch as all of the nations were seeking grant aid from us and very few were receiving it. He asked whether Pakistan had, as reported in the press, requested us to sell arms,6 and was informed that we were not sure, but that almost every nation in the world had presented such a request to us.
Mr. Aram then indicated that he would cable this general information to Mr. Ala in Paris so that Mr. Ala would be in a position to discuss it with the Shah on his arrival in Iran. A meeting was arranged for May 11th at 3:00 P.M. of the Iranian-United States delegations,7 and a further meeting with Mr. Aram at 10:00 A. M. on May 10th, concerning the Bilateral.8
Comment:
It was apparent that Mr. Aram was seriously concerned at the absence of armor in the FY 1950 Program; but his reaction was not, [Page 545] at that time, indicative of the presence of a major obstacle to a successful conclusion of the discussions on the proposed basis.9
- The terms of reference of these discussions, held at Washington, March 24–May 16, by representatives of the Governments of the United States and Iran are given in the aide-mémoire, March 24, p. 502.↩
- Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Iran, effected by exchange of notes at Washington, May 23; see the editorial note, p. 551.↩
- For a statement by Maj. Gen. Robinson Earl Duff, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, on the question of supplying medium tanks to Iran, see the minutes of the United States-Iranian meeting, April 25 in ISA/MDAP Files, Lot 52–26, MDAP—Iran.↩
- See Annex 5 to the memorandum, April 10, by General Collins to the Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray, p. 507.↩
- For documentation on the extension of U.S. military assistance to French Union Forces, see vol. vi, pp. 690 ff.↩
- For documentation on Pakistan’s interest in obtaining military equipment from the United States, see the policy statement, April 3, with respect to Pakistan, p. 1490; telegram 629, May 5, from New Delhi; telegram 460, May 9, to New Delhi; and the memorandum of conversation, June 15, by Secretary Acheson, pp. 1408, 1410, and 1412.↩
- The editors have not found a record of this meeting in Department of State Files.↩
- For documentation on the meeting of May 10, see the memorandum of conversation, May 12, by Mr. Wolf in Department of State file 788.5–MAP/5–1250.↩
- At the United States-Iranian meeting of May 16 on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Iran for fiscal year 1950, Mr. Aram expressed “the formal gratitude of the Government of Iran at the equipment list proposed by the United States at the meeting of May 11, 1950, and stated that, under instructions from the Iranian General Staff, General Mazhari would be able to advise the United States that the list was acceptable to the Iranian General Staff. General Mazhari then read a short prepared statement, repeating the position stated by Mr. Aram and setting forth certain general concepts of the Government of Iran with respect to the Program.” (Minutes of the United States-Iranian Negotiations, May 16, 1950; ISA/MDAP Files, Lot 52–26, MDAP—Iran). A copy of the agreed equipment list is attached to the memorandum of May 18 by Mr. Only to Major General Lemnitzer, neither printed (788.5 MAP/5–1850).↩