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  4. Document 231

780.5/4–1750

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army ( Collins ), to the Secretary of the Army ( Gray )

top secret
[ Washington ,] 10 April 1950.

Annex 51

iran

1.
Upon arrival in Iran2 General Collins was briefed on the economic and political situation by Ambassador Wiley and on the military situation by General Evans, Chief of the US Military Mission [Page 508] with the Iranian Army (ARMISH); Colonel Pierce,3 Chief of the US Military Mission with the Iranian Gendarmerie (GENMISH); and Colonel Drury, Senior Military Attaché. In addition, he conferred with the persons indicated below. Records of these latter conversations are attached as appendices:4
a.
Audience with the Shah of Iran, 29 March 1950—Appendix 1.
b.
Conference with General Razmara, Chief of Staff, Iranian Army, 30 March 1950—Appendix 2.
c.
Second Conference with the Shah of Iran, 30 March 1950—Appendix 3.
d.
Reconnaissance Flight to Azerbaijan with the Shah of Iran, 31 March 1950—Appendix 4.
e.
Final Conference with Ambassador Wiley and Members of his Staff, 31 March 1950—Appendix 5.
2.
Ambassador Wiley expressed serious concern over the current economic condition in Iran and the consequent instability of the Iranian Government. He feels that there is an immediate threat of communist infiltration unless prompt steps are taken to aid Iran. Both economic aid, possibly through ECA, and continued military aid are essential if the country is to be saved from communist domination.
3.
The Iranian Army of 10 divisions and 4 brigades, totalling 150,000 troops, is disposed generally along the borders with its weight principally in the north and west. About one third of its strength is necessarily engaged as frontier guards to prevent the infiltration of foreign agents and to control the movement of the nomadic tribes some of which are common to two or three countries and hence of dubious loyalty to the central government of Iran.
4.
The Army is also responsible for internal security of the country. To accomplish this, General Razmara, the Chief of Staff, has taken over a large part of the Gendarmerie and organized it into a special force, the Neghabani. He firmly believes that the entire Gendarmerie, including the 5000 which presently remain under the Minister of Interior, should be under the Army’s control. Ambassador Wiley feels as strongly that the entire Gendarmerie, including that portion now organized as the Neghabani, should be under the Minister of Interior.
5.
The plan of defense for Iran outlined by General Razmara and the Shah envisages a delaying action, making maximum use of mines, demolitions and other defensive means, with a final withdrawal to a defensive area in the rugged mountains in the southwest. The plan appears basically sound though much remains to be done in the way of refinement. In discussing their plans, both General Razmara and the Shah expressed a strong desire to have General Evans’ Mission assist them in their war planning. General Evans is now restricted, [Page 509] through the terms of the contract with the Iranian Government, from discussing the subject of Iranian war plans. General Collins made it clear that it would be impossible, in any case, to discuss American war plans but that he would endeavor to obtain a relaxation of the restrictions which prohibit General Evans from assisting in Iranian planning. Both the Shah and General Razmara accepted the fact that the US could not divulge its plans stating that they wished primarily to be certain that their plans are sound and would contribute to overall allied strategy. They were gratified with the possibility of General Evans’ assistance in their planning which likewise had the full approval of Ambassador Wiley.
6.
Ambassador Wiley, General Evans, Colonel Pierce, and Colonel Drury agreed with General Collins that, in the event of an emergency, all US military personnel in Iran, other than Military Attachés, should be under the control and direction of the Chief of ARMISH and should take to the mountains with the Iranian Army; and that only US civilians and dependents of US military personnel should be evacuated.
7.
The principal current problems are the necessity for:
a.
Economic as well as continued military aid in order to stabilize the government and prevent communist domination.
b.
Relaxation of the restrictions which prevent the Chief of ARMISH from assisting the Iranians in their war planning.
c.
A decision by the Iranian Government as to the disposition of the Gendarmerie (under the Minister of Interior or Minister of War) and the resulting disposition of GENMISH.
d.
An agreed State–Defense decision that, in the event of emergency, only US civilians and dependents of military personnel would be evacuated from Iran; that military personnel would remain, under the direction of the Chief of ARMISH, to assist the Iranian Army.
  1. This is Annex 5 to the memorandum of April 10, by General Collins to the Secretary of the Army on the subject, “Inspection by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, of the Middle East Covering the Period 20 March to 8 April 1950,” not printed, a copy of which was transmitted to Mr. McGhee by memorandum, April 17, from Lt. Col. S. W. Downey, Assistant Secretary, General Staff, Department of the Army. An editorial note with references to information on General Collins’ trip is printed, p. 124. For an excerpt of his report, see p. 1158.↩
  2. On March 28.↩
  3. Col. James R. Pierce, USA, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie.↩
  4. Appendices not printed.↩