S/ISA Files, Lot 52–26, MDAP–Iran
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) to the Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State (Bruce)
Subject: Iranian Program
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. John H. Ohly, dated 14 December 1949,1 subject “Iranian Program,” regarding the provision of medium tanks to Iran.
2. The points raised in the reference memorandum have been carefully considered and it is the view of the Department of Defense that [Page 476] from the military point of view, medium tanks should not be furnished under the MDAP to Iran because:
- a.
- The Iranian Army now experiences great difficulty in maintaining and supplying the armored cars, light tanks, and tank destroyers which have already been received from the United States. The furnishing of heavier and even more complicated combat vehicles at this time would therefore be providing equipment beyond Iranian capability to operate and maintain.
- b.
- In the event of war, it would be feasible and highly desirable for the Iranian Army to utilize light tanks for hit-and-run operations to delay a Soviet advance. The medium tank is not as suitable as the light tank for this type of operation.
- c.
- The materials to be provided the Iranian Army in the immediate future should be such as to improve the present organization in order that it may more effectively accomplish its primary mission of maintaining internal security.
3. If it is determined by the Department of State that, for political reasons, medium tanks are to be furnished to Iran, the Department of Defense will accept such a political decision and could provide fifty medium tanks mounting 76 mm guns. Such an undertaking would necessitate a major revision of the proposed Iranian program and the deletion of items indicated in paragraph 5 below, unless additional funds are made available for the Iranian program.
4. With specific reference to your memorandum of 14 December 1949, the Department of Defense capabilities are as follows:
a. Provision of medium tanks with 75 mm gun. Fifty tanks are available from excess at estimated costs as follows:
| Rehabilitation | $600,000 |
| PHC&T | 382,500 |
| Spare Parts | 500,000 |
| Ammunition | 200,000 |
| Total— | $1,682,500 |
b. Provision of medium tanks with 76 mm gun.
(1) These tanks could not be furnished from new procurement since to tool up for so small a number would make the cost per tank prohibitive. No new U.S. procurement is contemplated.
(2) If modification is undertaken to convert fifty tanks from the 75 mm gun to 76 mm gun, the cost would be between $60,000 and $90,000 per tank. Total cost of fifty as follows:
| Rehabilitation | $600,000 |
| Conversion at $75,000 | 3,750,000 |
| PHC&T | 382,500 |
| Spare Parts | 500,000 |
| Ammunition | 1,050,760 |
| Total— | $6,283,260 |
(3) If these tanks are supplied from below minimum requirement level at rehabilitation cost, the cost of fifty is as follows:
| Rehabilitation | $600,000 |
| PHC&T | 467,000 |
| Spare Parts | 500,000 |
| Ammunition | 1,050,760 |
| Total— | $2,617,760 |
c. Spare parts can be provided for delivery with the tanks and will cost approximately $10,000 per tank for one year’s supply. The future supply of spare parts will depend on whether other countries are supplied with the same type tank supplied Iran. If not, the cost of supplying spare parts for only fifty tanks of one type will be extremely high.
d. To decide appropriately what support equipment would be required for fifty tanks requires a detailed knowledge of the contemplated organization and employment of such a tank unit (dispersion into small groups or employment as a unit). The minimum heavy support equipment for a modified battalion of fifty tanks or less is believed to be:
| Item | Delivered Cost |
| 2 Heavy wreckers | $60,543 |
| 4 Tank transporters | 90,944 |
| 10 Personnel carriers, HT, M3 or M3A1 | 101,540 |
| 30 Special tool sets (armored command, separate battalion, general mechanics, welders, artillery mechanics, etc.) | 9,000 |
| Total— | $262,027 |
e. It is not considered advisable to provide Iran with additional tank destroyers or light tanks. They already have available 160 light tanks and 55 tank destroyers received from the U.S. supplemented with 9 heavy wrecking trucks which are deemed adequate for their requirements.
f. Although it is possible to make off-shore purchases for MDAP requirements, it is considered desirable to push local manufacture of the 7.9 mm ammunition since adequate facilities for such manufacture exist in Iran. It is felt that assistance to Canada, by purchase of ammunition for Iran, is of doubtful value to the U.S. in view of the small quantities entailed. The Department of Defense does not contemplate standardizing small arms weapons in Iran with U.S. weapons.
g. It is not considered practical to provide the suggested 6 recoilless 75 mm rifles to the Iranian Army.
5. If the decision is taken by the Department of State, from the political point of view, to provide medium tanks, it is believed that medium tanks equipped with the 76 mm gun should be provided and the estimated cost would be as indicated in paragraph 4(b) (2) or (4) [Page 478] (b) (3) above. It should be realized that the total cost ($2,617,760 for tanks and ammunition, plus $262,027 for supporting equipment) amounting to $2.88 million is over one-third of the $8.6 million programmed for Iran. If the procedure in paragraph 4 (b) (3) is followed, the cost of this additional equipment cannot be met from the $8.6 million without unbalancing the presently planned program for Iran. The Department of Defense considers that the only items which can be deducted from the Iranian program to offset the cost of the tanks and related equipment are 424 2½-ton trucks, and this substitution is not recommended from the military point of view.
6. Since discussions with the Iranians are planned for a date in the near future, it is essential that the Department of Defense be advised as a matter of urgency of the political decision made by the Department of State on this matter in order that the necessary reprogramming may be accomplished.
Major General, U.S. Army
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, p. 590.↩