Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance (Ohly)

top secret

[Washington,] August 10, 1950.

Subject: Reexamination of the Greek Mutual Defense Assistance Program

We have examined the memorandum dated August 2 from the Department of Defense on the above subject.¹ We have also noted cable L–612 from General Jenkins in Athens, subject: “Policy Review in Greece in Light of Recent World Developments”.²

It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination (NSC 42/1).³ We continue to believe that the USSR may consider that Greece affords a suitable opportunity for attack by Soviet satellite forces without the direct participation of the USSR. Grave strategic results would ensue if Greece, or even the northern Greek provinces of Macedonia and Thrace, were to fail under the control of the USSR. Yugoslavia would be virtually encircled, the Turkish Straits would be flanked and the USSR would have gained an access to the Mediterranean. In light of the vigorous and unequivocal support which the United States and the United Nations have accorded Greece, a successful attack there would undermine the confidence of the non-communist world in the United States and the United Nations and would tend to isolate the United States from its present and potential allies. The implications of this situation, particularly in Western Europe, would be extremely dangerous.

We have noted that the Department of Defense concludes that the Greek Army is extremely vulnerable to a formal Bulgarian armored attack. We have also noted that General Jenkins has reported the Greek Army could be raised to the strength of 200,000 within seven days and has an ultimate potential mobilization strength of 400,000. We are under the impression that the Greek forces, although limited in size, are among the best trained and most effective in Europe. So long as Yugoslavia and Greece remain outside the Iron Curtain, a potential anti-Soviet military force of a least a million men (exclusive of the Turks) will remain in the Balkans. In the event of an attack against Western Europe, this force would have to be neutralized by the Soviets in order to deny a possible avenue of approach through the Balkans to the Western powers.

In light of the already considerable United States investment in the Greek armed forces, the estimated high potential effectiveness of the Greek armed forces and the possibility that the USSR will further exploit opportunities for the extension of Soviet power through the use of satellite forces, we believe that the Greek armed forces should be strengthened to enable them successfully to resist such satellite forces as are likely to be thrown against them.

This would, in effect, establish an additional objective for the Military Assistance Program in Greece. Objective (c), cited in paragraph 3 of the Department of Defense memorandum, i.e., “causing some delay to Soviet and/or satellite state advance, and assisting, within its capabilities, in the overall war effort”, would seem to obtain only in the event of a general war. In March 1950 military estimates concluded that Greece was able successfully to defend an attack from Bulgaria. It is considered unlikely that the language cited above, framed as it was before the attack on Korea, was intended to apply in a situation in which Bulgaria, without overt USSR participation, possessed the capability of executing a successful attack upon Greece.

It seems to us, therefore, that both political and military considerations justify the following actions which we strongly recommend:

1. Minimum essential equipment to resist satellite armored attack (such as tanks, bazookas, mines, demolition and engineering equipment) should be provided to the Greek forces as a matter of urgency.

2. Action should be taken immediately to establish the Greek Military Assistance Program on the basis of a mobilization force of 200,000.

3. An estimate should be made to determine, for planning purposes, the additional equipment and supplies needed to expand the Greek Army to a force of 400,000.

1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. See telegram L–612, July 26, p. 387.
3. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, p. 269.