Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

S/P–NSC Fites: Lot 61D167: Greece, U.S. Position with Respect to NSC 103, 103/1¹

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy under Secretary of State (Matthews)²

top secret

[Washington,] July 22, 1950.

Problem: To determine United States action in the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet satellite forces.

Discussion

Attached hereto is a paper setting forth our analysis of a possibility of attack by Soviet satellite forces against Greece. It is our conclusion that, in the event of an attack against Greece, the United States should initiate and support United Nations police action to the maximum extent consistent with the overall demands against United States military resources.

Recommendation

That this paper be processed for ultimate consideration by the National Security Council.

[Attachment]

Problem: To determine United States action in the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet satellite forces.

Analysis

1. Greece is one of the areas on the perimeter of the Soviet world in which the Kremlin might consider that an aggression on the Korean pattern (an attack involving only satellite troops) might be successfully repeated. It is impossible to determine at this time whether the Soviet satellite forces will resort to hostilities in the Balkans or, whether, in the event hostilities do occur, they will be directed against Yugoslavia, Greece or both. Known troop dispositions in Bulgaria do not appear to indicate an imminent attack against Greece. However, available information is fragmentary and it is recognized that a dangerous situation could exist or develop without adequate warning to the United States. This paper is limited to a consideration of the situation which would result from an attack on Greece by Bulgarian forces, possibly in conjunction with other Soviet satellite forces. Participation of Soviet forces in such an attack would involve consequences which are outside the scope of this paper.

2. Since June 30 Cominform propaganda agencies have vehemently charged that the “Athens–Belgrade Axis”, under American and British direction, is preparing for aggressive action against Albania and Bulgaria and is menacing the peace of the Balkans.³ This Cominform propaganda line taken in conjunction with the unsatisfactory internal situation in Bulgaria and the fact that the USSR may be prepared to accept the possibility of general war, has produced a very disturbing situation.

3. On the one hand, the alleged threat to Bulgaria resulting from the “Athens–Belgrade Axis”, may serve as a pretext for a request from the Bulgarian Government to the USSR to send Soviet troops into Bulgaria. No Soviet combat troops are known to be located in Bulgaria at this time. It may be that the Kremlin is genuinely disturbed at the prospect of Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement which would provide a significant anti-Soviet force in the Balkans and, in the event of war, a possible avenue of approach to eastern Europe. There are increasing signs of dissension within the Bulgarian Communist Party, while Bulgarian Government officials openly acknowledge the hostility of the peasant population. The presence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria would serve to stabilize conditions within the country and would constitute an imminent threat to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, thus intensifying present anxieties and unrest.

4. On the other hand, the present Cominform propaganda campaign may also represent an attempt to prepare a foundation for a Bulgarian attack against Greece. Such an attack might perhaps occur in support of some action by the Greek guerrillas presently in Bulgaria who are estimated to number between 5–15,000. Bulgarian forces are estimated to be the best trained and best equipped among the Soviet satellite forces. The Soviets have for some months been stockpiling war materials in the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria, in excess of the needs of the indigenous forces. It is estimated that Bulgaria has more than 600,000 men who have received “complete” military training. Reports indicate that Bulgaria has completed plans for mobilization in the event of an emergency. Estimates of Bulgarian military strength remain at approximately 90–100,000, but it is impossible to determine to what extent this figure may have been augmented. Estimates of the reliability of Bulgarian troops vary, although it is clear that the Bulgarian Government has been developing a war psychology among the population and it is believed that some enthusiasm could be whipped up for an attack on Greece, particularly in view of Bulgarian irredentism in western Thrace and Macedonia.

5. The USSR would, without involving Soviet troops, place an additional demand on the already strained military resources of the United States by sanctioning an attack against Greece by Bulgarian forces alone or in conjunction with other satellite troops. Nowhere outside the North Atlantic Treaty is United States prestige more deeply committed than in Greece. Failure of the United States to provide adequate support to prevent Greece failing within the Soviet orbit would produce a tremendous impact on the will to resist of the non-Communist world. The position of Yugoslavia would be made extremely dangerous and probably untenable. Under these circumstances the USSR might also expect that subsequent threats of direct Soviet action against Turkey and/or Iran would find the United States powerless to respond and that those Governments and the Governments of western Europe would in time be forced to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union.

6. In few areas of the world have the aggressive aims of international communism been more clearly revealed than in Greece. The United Nations has been seized of the problem of the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece continuously since 1946. On July 18, 1950 the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) took cognizance of the current Cominform propaganda campaign and informed the United Nations that the Greek Army represents only a legitimate defense force and that there has been no evidence of aggressive intent or preparation by Greece.⁴ The United States will advocate the retention of UNSCOB in Greece in order to deter aggression and to authenticate to world opinion the true nature of the aggression should it occur.

7. In the event of an attack by the satellites, the Greek Army, strengthened by American advice and equipment, could be expected to respond sharply. Assuming the continuation of the status of Yugoslavia as an independent anti-Soviet nation, and that it is not attacked, the present estimate is that, with continuation of United States and United Kingdom assistance and appropriate support from the United Nations in the form of supplies, air and sea cover and specialized weapons, the Greek Army is capable of resisting such Bulgarian and Albanian forces as are likely to be thrown against it. This estimate must, of course, be revised if appreciable numbers of other satellite or Russian troops are involved.

8. In view of the extent to which United States prestige has been committed in the maintenance of a free and independent Greece, and of the far-reaching consequences of a communist domination of that country, it is considered that the United States must, in event of invasion by satellite forces, strongly support United Nations’ action in Greece similar to that in Korea, and furnish such military assistance in support of such action as is available in the light of other commitments. Failure to do so would undermine the confidence of the noncommunist world in the United States and tend to isolate the United States from its present and potential allies.

Conclusions

9. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination (NSC 42/1).⁵

10. In the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet satellite forces, the United States should urge United Nations action similar to that taken against North Korea, and should, to the maximum extent consistent with the overall demands against its military resources, provide support for such action.

11. If the United Nations action requires non-Greek ground forces, the United Kingdom and Turkey should be requested to provide a major part of such forces in view of (a)the direct interest of these countries in the security of the area involved and (b) the proximity of their forces to Greece.

12. The United States and United Kingdom should at the earliest possible moment come to an agreement upon the question of primary responsibility as between themselves for assistance to the Greek government in the event of an invasion of Greece.

13. The United States should promptly develop tentative plans for participation in a possible United Nations police action in the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet satellite forces, and should coordinate these plans with the United Kingdom.

1. Lot 61 D 167 is a serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.
2. H. Freeman Matthews. On this paper there appears a note which states that it was sent to the NSC staff on August 3, 1950.
3. Reference is to an article by Nicholas (Nikos) Zachariades, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), in the Cominform weekly newspaper, For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy!, June 30, 1950, p. 6, extracts in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Margaret Carlyle (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950 (London, Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 239, and to a KKE Politbureau announcement of July 5, mentioned in Department’s telegram Bagen 4, July 13, to the U.S. Representative on the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, Jefferson Patterson, at Geneva, not printed, 357.AE/7–1350.
4. The Department of State opposition to, and the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans refutation of the Cominform propaganda campaign are respectively set forth in telegram Bagen 4, July 13, to the U.S. Representative on the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, Jefferson Patterson, at Geneva, not printed (357.AE/7–1350), and in despatch Genoa 14, July 19, from Jefferson Patterson, at Geneva, not printed (357.AE/7–1950). The Special Committee’s resolution of July 18 refuting the propaganda campaign was issued as U.N. doc. SCA.142/01.
5. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, p. 269.