786A.022/4–2450
Memorandum by Mr. Fraser
Wilkins of the Office of African and Near Eastern
Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern,
South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) and
to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern
Affairs (Berry)
confidential
[Washington,] April 24, 1950.
Subject: April 25 Meeting with Aramco on Saudi Arabian Boundary
Problems.
Mr. Duce of Aramco has proposed a
meeting in the Department at which Aramco officers, their international law advisor, Judge
Manley O. Hudson, and officers of the Department might discuss the
following subjects:
- (1)
- British attitude on jurisdiction over the island of
Farsi;
- (2)
- British attitude toward the desire of the Saudi Arabian
Government to deal directly with the Rulers of the Persian
Gulf Sheikhdoms;
- (3)
- British attitude toward Qatar and Trucial Oman boundaries
of Saudi Arabia.
The meeting is scheduled from 11:00 a. m. to 1:00 p. m. on April 25,
1950 in Room 2180 New State. It is expected that Mr. Berry will
chair the meeting and that Mr. McGhee and Mr. Hare1
will join the group about 12 o’clock.
A brief memorandum containing background information on the three
subjects proposed for discussion has been prepared for distribution
to the Departmental officers participating in the talks for their
information only (Tab A).
The Department’s attitude toward the jurisdictional disputes of Saudi
Arabia in the Persian Gulf is set forth in the paper on this problem
prepared for the London Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (Tab B). While
carefully refraining from taking sides in the dispute or otherwise
becoming embroiled, we have consistently urged upon both sides the
need to settle these boundary issues promptly and amicably (before
the discovery of oil in the area can complicate the problem
further).
In the conduct of the meeting, it is recommended that the
Departmental officers:
- (1)
- welcome an exposition by the Aramco representatives of the problems involved
and of the company’s views on them;
- (2)
- engage in an informal discussion of the problems with the
company’s representatives;
- (3)
- adhere to our previously expressed position that we urge
the early and amicable settlement of the boundary issues by
the two parties, while avoiding any statement or commitment
which could be interpreted as involving the Department in
the dispute or as taking sides on the issues.
The Chairman, in his discretion, may wish to advise the Aramco representatives informally
along the lines of certain of our recommendations on this problem
prepared for our Delegation to the London Foreign Ministers’
Meeting, such as:
- (1)
- that a stalemate in the Persian Gulf area is not conducive
to its orderly development and tranquility, and that the
recent settlement of the Abu Dhabi–Dubai boundary by
arbitral award sets an admirable example.
- (2)
- that as stated previously, a fact-finding investigating
commission agreeable to the two governments might be able to
reduce the field of differences between the Saudi Arabian
Government and the United Kingdom acting on behalf of the
Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.
- (3)
- suggest that, as previously stated, any remaining
differences in the boundary problem might be resolved by
means of a neutral commission of arbitration.
- (4)
- that we will continue to urge both the United Kingdom and
the Saudi Arabian Government to move toward
settlement.
[Tab A]
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of
African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Officers Concerned
With Persian Gulf Boundary Problems
confidential
[Washington,] April 20,
1950.
Subject: Saudi Arabian Territorial Disputes.
Mr. Duce of Aramco has
proposed a meeting in the Department at which Aramco officers, their
international law adviser Judge Manley O. Hudson, and officers
of the Department might discuss the following subjects:
- 1)
- British attitude on jurisdiction over the island of
Farsi.
- 2)
- British attitude toward the desire of the Saudi
Arabian Government to deal directly with the Rulers of
the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.
- 3)
- British attitude toward Qatar and Trucial Oman
boundaries of Saudi Arabia.
The meeting is scheduled from 11:00 a. m. to 1:00 p. m. on April
25, 1950 in Room 2180 New State, The meeting will be chaired by
Mr. Burton Berry and it is anticipated that Mr. McGhee and Mr.
Hare will join the group at noon. After the meeting the
participants are invited to a luncheon as guests of Aramco.
[Page 38]
The following information is offered for briefing on the three
subjects to be discussed:
- (1)
- The island of Farsi lies about midway across the
Persian Gulf from the northeast coast of Saudi Arabia.
It is one of a group of five islands (Harkus, Karan,
Kurain, Arabi and Farsi), which are claimed by the
United Kingdom for Kuwait. Saudi Arabia also claims it,
and so does Iran. Farsi is uninhabited. Its value lies
in the fact that jurisdiction over it will advance the
seabed rights of the owner state, and the sub-seabed is
a potential source of petroleum. In order to
substantiate its claim to Farsi, the Saudi Arabian
Government erected a marker on the island last November.
The British Government in behalf of Kuwait, has
requested the Saudi Arabian Government to remove the
marker, or the United Kingdom will do so unless the
Saudi Arabian basis for its claim is submitted. The
Saudi Arabian Government has replied that it would be
glad to discuss all boundary disputes with the United
Kingdom whenever it is ready to do so.
- (2)
- The Saudi Arabian Government has made claims to
territories in the southeastern part of the Peninsula
which lie in the hinterland of the Trucial Coast and the
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. It has offered to discuss
with the United Kingdom the conflicting territorial
claims between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial Sheikhdoms,
but it stated that it preferred to discuss directly with
the minor independent Sheikhs of the Buraimi area its
boundary problems with them. The Saudi Arabian
Government took the same position in regard to its
boundary problems with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.
This position was taken in view of the fact that the
United Kingdom did not have the special treaty relations
with Muscat and Oman that it enjoyed with the other
Persian Gulf principalities. The Saudi Arabian
Government position was correct in that the United
Kingdom does not have the treaty right to control the
foreign relations of the Sultanate, but the United
Kingdom has recently received from the Sultan authority
to negotiate in his behalf the boundary dispute with
Saudi Arabia.
- The British Government considers the Saudi Arabian
attitude “impertinent” and appears to attribute the
desire of the Saudi Arabian Government to deal with the
Sultan directly as indicative of a similar intent to do
likewise with Rulers of the Sheikhdoms. There is no
evidence of such an intent in the Saudi Arabian
Government note, except for its claim that the Sheikhs
of the Buraimi area are not under British jurisdiction.
The King did address a letter directly to the Sheikh of
Bahrein in November of last year when the jurisdiction
over Abu Saafa shoals came into dispute, and another one
to the Sheikh of Kuwait over the conflicting claims to
the island of Arabi. Both letters suggested direct
negotiation of all territorial disputes.
- (3)
- The boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar
and Abu Dhabi (one of the Trucial Sheikhdoms) date back
to the 1913–14: inconclusive negotiations between the
United Kingdom and Turkey. Negotiations between Saudi
Arabia and the United Kingdom took place in 1934 and
again in 1937–38, but both failed to reach agreement.
The disputed areas are little known and have importance
now only because of their potential sub-soil resources.
The governments [Page 39]
concerned and their concessionary oil companies, whose
concessions follow national boundaries, are of course
eager to advance territorial claims as far as possible
and negotiations were begun last year between the United
Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to settle the Saudi
Arabian-Qatar and Abu Dhabi boundaries. Conversations
were desultory until the Saudi Arabian Government set
forth claims going somewhat further than had previously
been considered. In effect these claims included a good
part of the southern Qatar Peninsula and a long sweep of
coast between Qatar and the Trucial Coast which the
United Kingdom considers to be Abu Dhabi’s. The British
reply was a threat to return to the old 1913–14 line
drawn during the United Kingdom–Turkish negotiations.
This line is at least as extreme as the United Kingdom
considers the Saudi position to be. The Saudi Arabian
Government rejected that basis for negotiation and
offered to undertake a joint study of the facts, but the
United Kingdom has not replied. No further progress has
therefore been made.
[Tab B]
Paper Prepared in the Department of State for
the London Foreign Ministers Meeting in May
restricted
[Washington,] April 20,
1950.
Jurisdictional Dispute of Saudi Arabia
problem
To persuade the British Government, acting on behalf of the
Sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, and Trucial Oman, and of
the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, of the desirability of
progress in the settlement of boundary issues in eastern Arabia
and of conflicting claims to islands and adjacent sea-bed areas
in the Persian Gulf.
background
Saudi Arabia has land boundary disputes with the Sheikhdoms of
Qatar and Abu Dhabi. A large area in the southeastern corner of
the Peninsula has never been delimited between Saudi Arabia,
some of the Trucial Sheikhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and
Oman. The unratified Anglo–Turkish Convention of 1913–14 had
delineated the area between Nejd (eastern region of Saudia
Arabia) and the coastal area under British protection. In 1934,
and again in 1937–38, negotiations were entered into between
Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom in which compromise
proposals by both sides suggested a frontier to the east of the
1913–14 line. This compromise proved unacceptable. In 1949
conversations on the subject were renewed. Potential oil
resources in the area had, however, prompted Saudi Arabia to
extend its claims into the Qatar Peninsula, and to large areas
of the hinterland of Trucial Oman. In view of this extreme
claim, the [Page 40] United
Kingdom has threatened to return to the 1913–14 line as a basis
of negotiation. Although the Saudi Arabian Government has been
unwilling to accept this line as a basis for negotiation, it has
suggested the creation of an investigating commission to
determine the facts. Thus far the U.K. has not replied.
Saudi Arabia claims 18 islands in the Persian Gulf. Of these, the
U.K. claims 5 for Kuwait (Harkus, Karan, Kurani, Arabi and
Farsi). In addition to these claims, Iran asserts sovereignty to
one of them (Farsi) and the island lying between Saudi Arabia
and Qatar may be claimed by the latter (Anaibar). Furthermore,
if Saudi Arabia is able to establish its claim to the coastal
areas between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, other islands lying off these
coasts may be involved (Natta, Ghara, Kafai, Makhasib, and
Shuraveh).
The Saudi Arabian Government began erecting markers on the
above-mentioned 18 islands last November in order to
substantiate its claim to them. The British Government took
issue with Saudi Arabia over the marker on Farsi Island and has
asked that it be removed or that Saudi Arabia submit the basis
for its claim to Farsi. The Saudi Arabian Government has replied
that it would be glad to discuss all boundary disputes with the
U.K. whenever the latter is ready to do so. Thus far the British
Government has not accepted this offer.
discussion
The United States is involved in this general question because of
the substantial American investment in Saudi Arabia through
Aramco on the one hand,
and the similar American investment in the Persian Gulf
Sheikhdoms through Bapco,
IPC, Superior, and Kuoco on
the other. The potential value of untapped petroleum in the
areas under dispute has focused attention upon them by claimant
governments and by rival concessionary oil companies. The U.S.
believes that claims can best be settled before oil is
discovered and has endeavored to impress upon both sides the
desirability of early settlement.
During recent weeks British Foreign Office spokesmen have
indicated that the U.K. was content to let the boundary question
drift and have even suggested that American and British oil
companies could work out a practical arrangement as to units of
concessions without reference to the governments concerned. We
do not believe that this thorny problem should be handled in
this way because such practical arrangements, even if desirable,
would not be binding on either the concessionary companies or
the governments of the areas in which the concessions are
situated. The U.S. has pursued a policy of strict impartiality
on these boundary questions. It has at the same time, as
occasion warranted, urged both the U.K. and the Saudi Arabian
Government to adopt a conciliatory attitude and to make [Page 41] strenuous efforts to
reach a settlement through utilization of investigating
commissions and, if necessary, by means of a neutral commission
of arbitration.
An early settlement would, in addition, reap rich dividends in
the attitude of King Ibn Saud toward the British. During the
past few years the King has become convinced that the British
are endeavoring to encircle him through their control of the
Hashemites of Iraq and Jordan and through their special treaty
relationships with the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. It may,
therefore, be seen that an amicable arrangement regarding
boundaries would remove an irritating factor In U.K.–SAG relationships.
recommendations
- 1.
- The Delegation should point out to the British
Delegation that the U.K. threat to return to the 1913–14
proposed line of demarcation appears as extreme as the
Saudi Arabian claim.
- 2.
- The Delegation should suggest to the British
Delegation that a stalemate in the Persian Gulf area is
not conducive to its orderly development and
tranquility, and that the recent settlement of the Abu
Dhabi-Dubai boundary by arbitral award sets an admirable
example.
- 3.
- The Delegation should suggest that a fact-finding
investigating commission agreeable to the two
governments might be able to reduce the field of
differences between the Saudi Arabian Government and the
United Kingdom acting on behalf of the Persian Gulf
Sheikhdoms.
- 4.
- The Delegation should also suggest that any remaining
differences in the boundary problem might be resolved by
means of a neutral commission of arbitration.
