780.00/10–1750

Paper Prepared in the Office of Greek, Turkish mid Iranian Affairs1
[Extracts]
top secret

Regional Policy Statement: Greece, Turkey and Iran

1. estimate of the situation

A. General

The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States. The maintenance of the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece, Turkey and Iran is an essential element in the security of that area.*

Greece, Turkey and Iran constitute a barrier between the Soviet world on the one hand and the vital oil lands and strategic communication routes of the Middle East on the other. Consequently, these countries which, with the exception of Turkey, are inherently weak are the object of constant Soviet pressure. Inasmuch as none of the three is capable of resisting this Soviet pressure unaided, the United States has extended to these countries political, economic and military assistance in varying degrees proportionate to their needs and absorptive capacity, and consistent with our commitments elsewhere. The growing military potential of the Balkan Soviet satellites, particularly Bulgaria, constitutes a threat to Greece and a source of concern ta Turkey. Soviet forces in the Caucasus and in Soviet Turkestan possess the capability of military domination of Iran whenever international political factors make such a development feasible from the Russian standpoint. Greece, Turkey and Iran will continue to be threatened by Soviet imperialism until the power of the anti-communist world becomes superior to that of the USSR and its satellites or until the [Page 255]aggressive policies of the USSR are changed. To date American policy has helped to prevent Soviet domination of Greece, Turkey and Iran. Greece and Turkey have adopted a militant anti-Soviet, pro-American policy. The United States, however, is faced with a serious immediate problem of reconciling United States policies, commitments and resources with the desire of Greece and particularly Turkey for full military alliance with the United States or with all of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers.

The development of internal economic resources is a primary task; in each of the three countries. Economic development is essential both, in order to improve the abilities of these countries to maintain a military force appropriate to the present lack of international security and to develop a standard of living for the indigenous populations, which will provide greater resistance to communist ideology and subversion. This problem is more critical in Greece and Iran than in, Turkey.

Greece cannot maintain its present standard of living or achieve, economic self-sufficiency without continued American economic assist ance, probably at least until 1954. Recent analysis suggests that future economic assistance to Greece should be provided in somewhat smaller annual increments in keeping with the limited capacity of Greece to provide sufficient internal investment capital, public or private, to permit a substantial increase in its productive capacity. The United States has consistently urged the adoption of political, social and administrative measures which would insure effective utilization of United States assistance and serve as a deterrent to communist subversion. These efforts have been only partially successful, and the traditional partisanship of Greek politics and the inefficiency of the Greek Government continue to constitute a grave weakness in the Greek state. The Greek army, strengthened by United States equipment and advice, has restored internal security in Greece. Nevertheless, a continuing threat to the security of Greece derives from the growing military potential of Greece’s Cominform neighbors (particularly Bulgaria), from the presence of approximately 20,000 Greek guerrillas in eastern Europe, and from the activities of the Greek Communist, Party as an agent of Soviet imperialism.

Among the principal problems regarding Greece are:

a.
The development of a stable, democratic and efficient government;
b.
The development of a viable Greek economy;
c.
The maintenance of a Greek military establishment which is capable of maintaining internal security, of defending Greece against a satellite attack, of causing maximum delay to an attack involving direct Soviet participation, and, in the event of hostilities, of conducting guerrilla warfare in Greece and contiguous areas;
d.
The encouragement of more cordial relations with Yugoslavia and the implementation of policies designed to bring about the defection of Albanian and Bulgarian elements from the Cominform;
e.
In view of the strategic considerations involving Cyprus, agitation for enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece) must be discouraged. However, continued examination of this question is essential in order to provide a long-range solution mutually satisfactory to all parties in interest.

In Turkey the principal problems are:

a.
To develop Turkish military capabilities in order to insure continued Turkish resistance to Soviet pressure and, in the event of attack, to provide maximum effective military opposition;
b.
To develop, at the same time, Turkish natural resources to the extent possible without undue inflationary effect.

In Iran a serious economic depression exists despite the substantial natural resources of the country. This depression has resulted from the incapacity of Iranian leadership, from crop failures, from a growing budgetary deficit, and from frustration over belated American action on Iranian requests for economic assistance. It is aggravated by external political pressures and intensified communist activity.

Among the principal problems concerning Iran are:

(a)
The need for an early settlement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company agreement, the increased income from which would do much towards stimulating a healthy development of the economy;
(b)
Increased activities of the Tudeh Party and growing support for its communist doctrines;
(c)
The attitude of certain Iranian leaders who seem to think they can successfully indulge in the dangerous game of playing off the Soviet Union against the United States and the United Kingdom.

B. US Attitudes Affecting Implementation of Our Objectives

(1)
Recognition of the vital importance to the US of maintaining the GTI barrier to Soviet expansion.
(2)
Recognition that the attainment of our objectives in these countries, especially in Greece and Turkey, requires the material support of the US Government.
(3)
Recognition that our Greek-Turkish aid programs have been highly successful elements of American foreign policy.
(4)
Strong ties of friendship between a large segment of the American population and the people of Greece, and the absence of important group animosities toward any of the three countries.
(5)
Little knowledge of Iran or of the problems confronting that country, but general appreciation of the fact that Iran has stood firm against Soviet aggression.
[Page 257]

2. statement of area objectives in terms of vital american interests

It is in the interest of the United States to achieve the following objectives in Greece, Turkey and Iran:

A.
Maintenance of the political independence and territorial integrity of each of the three countries and their continued orientation toward the West.
B.
Achievement by each country of political stability and economic viability with improved social standards.
C.
Achievement of more friendly and cooperative relationships between the three countries in all fields.
D.
Assumption by Turkey of more interest in and influence among the Near Eastern countries as a stabilizing force in the area and as a means of strengthening their orientation toward the West.
E.
Assure access by the Western democracies, and particularly the United States, to the resources of the area and, as circumstances may require, to cooperation of the countries in denying the area’s resources to the Soviet bloc.

3. united states policies

In pursuance of the foregoing objectives the following should be United States policies in the area:

A.
Maintain and strengthen the conviction of the three countries that collaboration with the Western Powers, in particular the United States, carries with it the best assurance that they will be able to maintain their independence, and at the same time will provide material and spiritual benefits in the development of their national life.
B.
Assist in building a firm foundation for the continuation of anticommunist governments in the three countries, especially through assistance in the improvement of economic, social and demographic conditions.
C.
Encourage the countries, particularly Iran and Greece, to improve government administration.
D.
Through military aid and advice, assist the countries in the maintenance of armed forces essential to assure internal security and to build confidence, and, to the extent possible in light of economic, political and other conditions prevailing in each country, to resist foreign invasion.
E.
Considering the desire of these and other friendly countries to have closer formal security arrangements with the United States, take advantage of every opportunity which tends to lead toward practical realization of this goal, recognizing that this will depend upon American capabilities to defend our vital interests, the extent of our commitments elsewhere, and the defensive strengths of our allies.
F.
Give the three countries intensive diplomatic support within and outside the United Nations against Soviet pressures, however applied, and at the same time continue to exert an active influence to prevent them from wavering in their determination to resist external pressures.
G.
In all three countries, but particularly in Iran, intensify the application of the “grass roots approach” through information and cultural activities and contact between Americans and the local peoples, endeavoring to bring about a better popular understanding of and support for United States objectives.
H.
Encourage better relations between Greece and Yugoslavia and, eventually, with Albania and Bulgaria should those countries also defect from the Cominform.
I.
So long as this policy conforms with our general trade policies, refrain from instituting impediments to the natural and normal commercial exchange of non-strategic materials between Iran and the Soviet bloc.
J.
Recognizing the interest of the British in the area and their primary responsibility for providing armed forces to the area in the event of hostilities, cooperate to the fullest possible extent with the British to assure that the objectives, policies and programs of the two powers are not in conflict and are carried out within the framework of overall western political and strategic interests.

4. lines op action

On the assumption that the threat of aggression from the Soviet-controlled world may continue for several years, the lines of action listed below are suggested:

I. Political

1.
Support vigorously the GTI countries, with the cooperation of British and other western powers as appropriate, in their efforts to resist Soviet and satellite pressures and assist in building up their prestige at the United Nations.
2.
As appropriate from time to time, encourage better Greek-Turkish and Irano-Turkish relations.
3.
By appropriate means, exert constant pressure to replace in Greece and Iran ineffective and often corrupt officials with progressive and competent elements.
4.
Encourage as may be appropriate the GTI countries to strengthen their diplomatic representation and develop closer ties with all Middle East countries.
5.
Encourage a higher standard of public service by appealing to and carefully cultivating men who are disposed to devote their lives to their countries.
6.
Encourage GTI countries to continue to adhere to the policy of Civil Air Containment of Soviet Russia and the satellite states.
7.
Work in closest cooperation with the British at key levels in Washington, London, and GTI countries and strive for a consistent though separate approach to local GTI economic, political and security problems. In this connection we might in a frank and friendly manner urge the British to drop the remaining vestiges of 19th century colonialism in Iran.

Political—Greece

A. Internal

1.
Continue the policy of encouraging the development of a strong and united political center group.
2.
Attempt to influence the King to “reign and not rule”, to eschew a partisan approach to political matters, and to depend upon more mature and impartial advisers than is now the case.
3.
Support the monarchy and discourage the raising in any form the question of the regime, which has previously plagued Greek political life. In this connection, obtain an invitation for the Greek King and Queen to make an official visit to the United States as soon as practicable.
4.
Press the Greek Government to carry out administrative reform measures and encourage the development of an efficient professional and non-political civil service.
5.
Urge the Greek Government to carry out its announced plans for the decentralization of government responsibility, emphasizing the element of giving adequate authority to local officials to make final disposition of purely local matters.
6.
Encourage the Greek Government to adopt the majority system in future Greek national elections and continue the holding of free and honest elections.
7.
Encourage the Government to provide for the selection of mayors by elected councils in an attempt to prevent the election of a communist or a fellow-traveling mayor in some municipality where this might occur through (a) concentration on one candidate by a fairly strong leftist element and (b) dispersal of strength among rival candidates by the non-communist elements.
8.
Encourage American labor unions and the ICFTU to develop closer relationships with the Greek Panhellenic labor movement and assume a more active effort further to reorganize and eliminate political interference in the Greek labor movement.
9.
Continue the present efforts of the Labor Attachés to give close cooperation to the Greek labor movement to prevent the rise of either communist or extreme rightist domination in the unions.
[Page 260]

B. External

1.
So long as the situation in Greece requires, urge continuation of UNSCOB to report any threats to Greek political independence and territorial integrity.
2.
Continue to emphasize to the Greeks on appropriate occasions the advantages of strengthening relations with Yugoslavia and developing closer ties with Turkey.
3.
Utilize whenever practicable the United Nations to improve diplomatic relations between Greece and her neighboring states.
4.
Encourage more extensive United Nations welfare assistance in Greece upon the diminution of United States aid to that country.
5.
Cyprus enosis problem:
(a)
Urge the Greeks at least to maintain their announced official attitude, namely that while they support Cypriot claims for enosis, they believe that the problem can be settled within the framework of British-Greek relations but that the time is not now propitious for such negotiations.
(b)
Discourage consideration of this problem in international bodies; discourage Greek and Cypriot agitation and conspicuous discussion of this problem.
(c)
As a means of removing the pressures for enosis, encourage the British to undertake further economic improvements in Cyprus, to make further approaches to the Cypriots to assume self-government, and in general, without affecting the question of Cyprus’ sovereignty, to take such action as is feasible to create closer ties between Cyprus and Greece.

Political—Turkey

1.
Encourage Turkey to play an increasingly active and responsible role in international organizations, and, to this end, support its membership, whenever feasible, on important United Nations committees and commissions.
2.
Encourage Turkey, which is able to understand and interpret western views, to take a more active interest in promoting closer relations with the Middle East neighbors and to assume a role of leadership among the Moslem states.
3.
As soon as practicable after the Greek King and Queen visit the United States, invite the Turkish President to visit this country.
4.
Support the growth of sound democratic institutions in Turkey and the development of efficient and honest government.

Political—Iran

1.
Give such support as may be possible to Iranian leaders who initiate and execute reform measures designed to develop political stability and economic viability.
2.
In supporting reform measures, attempt to make the Iranians realize that totally aside from the threat of Soviet aggression Iran’s [Page 261]chronic misery can only be relieved by basic social and economic reforms.
3.
Gradually and carefully encourage the development of real political parties in Iran based on ideas rather than individuals. Only then can really free and honest elections be expected.
4.
Support Iranian administrative reforms, particularly decentralization.
5.
Encourage Iranian leaders to work out a fair land reform, including land owned by institutions, though recognizing that this is a problem which will require many years to solve.
6.
Encourage the Iranians to combat illiteracy. The Latinization of the alphabet would help greatly.
7.
Urge the Iranian Government to relax its present rigid regulations governing the movement of official United States personnel. This is essential for our Eximbank, Point IV, etc., officials and most desirable for our regular Embassy staff.
8.
Should the Iranians raise their claim to Bahrein Island, urge them to drop it and if necessary to accomplish this, advise them that the United States believes their claim totally unfounded.

II. Economic Planning—General

1.
Continue ECA economic assistance programs in Greece and Turkey, and initiate grant assistance to Iran.
2.
Support, as may be required to supplement direct aid, well justified Greek, Turkish and Iranian requests for IBRD loans and Eximbank credits to the extent their economies can effectively use and service such loans and credits.
3.
Assure that Greece and Turkey have access to expanded United States technical assistance upon the conclusion of the ECA program, under which such assistance is now being received; continue Point IV aid to Iran in such fields as needed and to the maximum extent possible.
4.
Finalize with Greece and negotiate with Turkey and Iran treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation with such revisions in the standard text as local conditions may require and as will not nullify the effectiveness of our treaty program.
5.
Encourage American investment in the GTI countries; as circumstances warrant attempt to induce GTI government leaders to take economic and financial measures, including passage of appropriate legislation designed to stimulate private American investments in private and public enterprises of the countries concerned.
6.
Encourage GTI governments to explore with each other the means by which a greater degree of economic collaboration can be developed, consistent with their international commitments as a means of developing closer economic ties.
7.
Urge Turkey and Greece to participate fully in the European Payments Union and to collaborate with the OEEC in its efforts to promote among the member countries the multilateralization of payments and the liberalization of trade.2
8.
Support ECA efforts in Greece and Turkey to relate Near East petroleum prices to Near East costs. Emphasize to oil companies at home and abroad the role played by the Gulf basing point system in arousing antipathy against Anglo-American oil companies, the incentive for governments to enter the oil business provided by such exaggerated prices, and the contribution to the viability of Greece which prices connected to Persian Gulf costs can make.
9.
Consider the desirability of requesting the assignment of a Treasury representative in one of the GTI countries to cover financial intelligence and reporting for the GTI area.
10.
Maintain existing US civil and military air rights in Greece and Turkey, the gateway for air transport operations between Europe, the Near and Middle East and Asia.

Economic Planning—Greece

1.
Consider the extent to which United States economic aid to Greece will be required after termination of ECA, and lay the basis for any program which might be needed.
2.
Continue to emphasize to the Greek Government the need to utilize fully American aid by frequent and public review of Greek action taken, both praising accomplishments and pointing out shortcomings.
3.
Continue to urge Greek Government action in the fields listed below leading to economic development:
a.
Increase exports;
b.
Development of light industry;
c.
Conservation of foreign exchange;
d.
To the fullest practicable extent, restriction of imports to essential items;
e.
Increasing the contribution of the Greek merchant marine to Greek economy;
f.
Preventing rises in the cost of living;
g.
Instituting a more efficient taxation system and shifting emphasis from indirect to direct taxation;
h.
Pressing for expansion of the tourist industry;
i.
Vigorous execution of ECA development projects under way;
j.
Eliminate unnecessary budgetary expenditures.
4.
Press for increased trade between Greece and Yugoslavia as a means of benefiting the economies of both, in which there is a strong United States interest.
5.
Encourage the Greek Government to adopt a more suitable educational system in Greece in which secondary schools would offer an increased proportion of instruction devoted to trade and skill education and decreased instruction in classical education; and encourage the strengthening of American schools in Greece as experimental centers for better methods of training.
6.
Emphasize the Greek overpopulation problem in any United Nations consideration of demographic matters as a problem requiring international attention.
7.
When appropriate encourage the establishment of semi-autonomous national agencies free from political interference, such as those envisaged for the projected power program, to supervise development and operations of public utilities.
8.
Encourage the formulation and adoption of a rational internal air transport policy and technical development adequate to maintain essential domestic and international air transport facilities.
9.
Encourage the Greek Government to eliminate overlapping surface transportation services and develop a well-coordinated system.

Economic Planning—Turkey

1.
Encourage the Government in Turkey in its efforts to stimulate the development of private enterprise.
2.
Extend such further support as is feasible to make possible the economic development of Turkey along sound lines to the end that Turkey can finance its own further development without recourse to extraordinary financial assistance.
3.
Urge the Turks to establish a Governmental body to coordinate economic planning.
4.
Encourage the Turks to revise the present rigid civil service system to provide greater incentive to civil servants to take initiative and responsibility, particularly in state economic enterprises.
5.
Emphasize to the Turks the necessity of limiting their economic development program to one of such magnitude as can be accomplished without harmful inflationary effects.
6.
Continue to impress on the Turks the necessity of maintenance of their plants and equipment, and the development of skilled and technical personnel.
7.
Encourage the Turks to participate actively in international economic organizations, particularly the GATT and ICAO.
8.
Support reasonable requests by the Turkish Government to United Nations specialized agencies for technical assistance in the fields of public health and education.
9.
Encourage, whenever appropriate, the Turkish Government to take necessary steps to turn the exploration and development of Turkish petroleum resources over to private companies. Encourage the adoption of liberal petroleum legislation designed for this end.
10.
Encourage and continue to assist the Turks, to the extent feasible, to develop their civil aviation facilities, including the completion in accordance with ICAO standards of the international airport now under construction in Istanbul, and to improve civil air operations.

Economic Planning—Iran

1.
Seek legislative authority to extend grant economic assistance to Iran.
2.
Encourage an economic program which will create such conditions as would stimulate the investment of Iranian capital in Iranian projects.
3.
Use our influence in every practicable way, upon the Iranians as well as the British, to effect early agreement upon the AIOC concession problem.
4.
Press the Iranian Government when appropriate to introduce fiscal reforms, and to implement with the least possible delay specific projects to increase the productivity of the country.
5.
Encourage the Iranian Government to join GATT and FAO, adhere to the International Wheat Agreements, and participate actively in the ICAO which it has recently joined.
6.
When the Helmand River Commission3 submits its report, urge the Iranian and Afghanistan Governments to reach an agreement upon an equitable distribution of the waters of that River.
7.
In the field of public relations, caution AIOC, whenever appropriate, against concentrating public relations efforts on high government officials alone and encourage the company to continue to direct such approaches to the public. Encourage, whenever appropriate, fullest company use of press and public relations staffs in the field to assure fullest local understanding of benefits received from company operations. Endeavor to minimize publicity of Anglo-American collusion on oil in the Middle East while at the same time avoiding Anglo-American conflicts over oil, i.e., no oil publicity mentioning the US and UK together.
8.
In the field of intelligence, help posts maintain and increase contact with public opinion media affecting oil companies. Exchange information with UK officials on all phases of oil operations except commercial secrets on all levels. Complement company sources of information by increasing efforts to make direct contact with Iranian oil officials.
9.
Regarding labor, encourage AIOC whenever appropriate to identify their oil operations with the people of the area concerned by increased Iranization of management and dismissal of non-Iranian workers. Encourage AIOC to train at home and abroad, employ at [Page 265]staff and working levels, promote as quickly as possible the maximum number of locals.
10.
Regarding relations with Iranian Government, continue endeavoring to dissuade governments from making unreasonable demands on AIOC, continue to assist operations of government oil organization, continue to press for early settlement of Persian Gulf boundary and delimitation of Persian Gulf submerged area.
11.
Regarding management, encourage AIOC whenever appropriate to place key officials in the field and decentralize authority. Continue emphasizing United States view that Middle East oil companies must increasingly accommodate oil operations to rising nationalism in area and that great profitability of Middle East oil operations makes increasing liberality essential.
12.
Regarding security, maintain closest liaison with British and AIOC officials connected with security and defense plans.

III. Military Programs—General

In consonance with recommendations of US military authorities:

1.
Continue military assistance to Greece, Turkey and Iran to assure no weakening in their determination to resist communist aggression, and to improve to the extent feasible their ability to do so.
2.
Maintain military missions in Greece, Turkey and Iran for the purpose of supervising the employment of military assistance, and advising the local military authorities with regard to plans and training.
3.
Encourage the fullest possible participation by Greece and Turkey in appropriate phases of military planning in the NATO relating to the defense of the Mediterranean; consider periodically whether development of the NATO and the defensive capability of the western powers has progressed to the point where Greece and Turkey can be invited to participate as full members of the Organization.
4.
Encourage the British to maintain military missions in Greece and Turkey.
5.
Encourage and assist, within the limit of authority of the military missions, in revision and improvement of war plans of the three countries.
6.
Continue to encourage Greece, Turkey and Iran to modernize and keep under review their mobilization plans and maintain intensive military training in the armed forces.
7.
Under military assistance programs, support, and whenever feasible help in the development of projects of strategic importance and of possible future use to the US, such as airports, docking and repair facuities, etc.
8.
Continue to encourage the Turks to enter into staff talks with the Greeks and Iranians.
9.
Consider the desirability of encouraging an exchange of military officers between the Greek, Turkish and Iranian armed forces in order to increase the effectiveness of any military collaboration that may become necessary.
10.
Develop with the British strategic plans for possible allied military action in the area in the event of Soviet aggression or subversion.

Military Program—Greece

1.
To the extent possible, attain a level of equipment in Greece adequate for an immediate and effective mobilization of Greek armed forces reserves in case of an emergency.
2.
Support continuation of the British Police and Prisons Mission to help develop an efficient and non-political gendarmerie system in Greece.
3.
Continue to exert pressure on the Greek Government to assume the widest measure of responsibility for the production of items used by the Greek military forces, in order to reduce the foreign exchange cost of the maintenance of these forces.

Military Program—Turkey

1.
Determine the cost and time required to complete the modernization of the Turkish armed forces on the scale now contemplated and take the necessary action to complete such part of this program as the JCS may consider desirable.
2.
Urge the Turks to continue to devote no less than the present percentage of their over-all budgetary expenditure to national defense so long as the Soviet threat continues and so long as Turkey receives US military assistance.
3.
If Turkey’s essential defense requirements exceed the above budgetary percentage, find some formula to enable the Turkish Government to finance such requirements. (For example, the US might finance the NCO4 program by providing Turkey’s military requirements of POL, thereby releasing budgeted funds to the NCO program.)
4.
Initiate a study of the annual local and foreign exchange cost of maintaining the Turkish military establishment upon completion of the modernization program. Initiate subsequently a study to determine (a) whether Turkey can ultimately bear these costs without external assistance, or (b) whether its military establishment can safely be reduced to a level which it can support.
5.
Encourage the Turks, at such time as our Military Mission feels they are competent to do so, to supply, on a small scale, military training groups to other Middle Eastern states which may request them. (The Turks now have a military mission in Afghanistan.)
[Page 267]

Military Program—Iran

1.
Encourage the Government to improve the fighting qualities of its troops by providing them with more incentive through better food, perquisites, etc.
2.
Endeavor in cooperation with the British to develop a practicable plan for arming the tribes against enemy occupation of Iran.
3.
Make sure that the present advice and equipment we are giving the Iranians to effect proper demolitions in the event of a Soviet invasion are adequate. Demolitions are of the utmost importance in any delaying action the Iranians may fight and, if necessary, the American or British Government should be prepared to send demolition teams into Iran in advance of hostilities.
4.
Consult as appropriate with the British to arrive at an agreed position in relation to the circumstances under which British troops would be sent to Southern Iran.
5.
Offer the British such help in the form of equipment and technicians as they may require to ensure the proper destruction of AIOC facilities should that become necessary.

IV. Intelligence

1.
Using available counterpart funds in Greece and Turkey under an intelligence program already designed for this purpose, conduct appropriate studies of United States propaganda opportunities.
2.
Analyze the strength of pro-Soviet groups and individuals in the GTI area and the attitude of the respective national governments toward them.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

V. Informational and Cultured—General

1.
Continue and expand as necessary informational and cultural programs through news bulletins, libraries, visual media, VOA programs, and exchange of persons.
2.
Continue to design our informational programs in Greece, Turkey and Iran to support and further United States political, economic and military objectives in those countries.
3.
Develop more effective means for reaching the “grass roots” by dissemination of information in simplest form possible. Publish booklets, pamphlets and magazines in local languages, using to the fullest possible extent material produced, adapted and edited in the field.
4.
Vary the program adequately in each of the countries to appeal to the entrenched and sophisticated intellectual elite as well as to the illiterate mass concerned with little beyond the struggle for bare existence.
5.
Emphasize to the Greeks, Turks and Iranians American determination to achieve world peace through the cooperation of freedom-loving people and within the UN framework.
6.
Expose the cynical mendacity of Cominform propaganda and demonstrate the evil effects of the Soviet brand of communism elsewhere.
7.
Select leader grantees to cover as varied fields as possible, and utilize these contacts to obtain the most benefit for US interests.
8.
When appropriate, show the strong and increasing industrial and military strength of the United States.
9.
Render all practicable assistance to worthy American educational and philanthropic institutions in Greece, Turkey and Iran.
10.
Strengthen cultural ties between the United States and Greece, Turkey, and Iran.
11.
Foster the teaching of the English language in Greece, Turkey, and Iran through the creation of bi-national cultural societies for which the USIE program would provide teachers and equipment.
12.
Spread useful technical knowledge as widely as possible among the people throughout the area.
13.
In putting into effect its program, USIE should endeavor to make maximum use of indigenous channels and should emphasize matters of tangible benefit to the local population. Direct contact between the USIE American staffs and the peoples of the countries should be emphasized. Further integration of the cultural aspects of the program with media such as press, radio, and films should also guide USIE activity. Care should be taken, however, not to arouse the deeply ingrained distrust and suspicion of foreign influence.
14.
Continue the policy of informing the American public to the fullest extent possible by speeches, statements, press releases, etc., of problems and actions being taken regarding these countries.
15.
Encourage official and non-official Americans who go to GTI countries for extended periods to make an effort to learn languages, political history, economic and cultural affairs of countries involved. When appropriate opportunities arise, encourage American schools of higher learning to establish or expand courses in such subjects.
16.
Take pictures and movies of “before and after” projects in which American aid and personnel are rendering important assistance. Commentaries and titles should be made by natives in the principal languages of the areas involved.

Informatiorial and Cultural—Greece

1.
USIE activity in Greece should continue at a high level as long as the international situation remains critical and reconstruction and economic recovery move further along.
2.
Efforts should be directed toward influencing the following “priority target groups”:
a.
Publishers, editors and government officials, civilian and military.
b.
Organized labor.
c.
Intellectual leaders in educational, religious and other fields.
d.
Doctors, scientists, technicians, specialists.
e.
Refugees and inhabitants of areas formerly occupied by guerrillas.
f.
Industrialists, businessmen and bankers.
g.
The population of rural areas.
3.
Urge the Greeks to balance sound military preparedness with determined social and economic reconstruction.
4.
Wherever possible, Fulbright grants should be used to promote instruction in English teaching techniques and actual language classes.
5.
USIE should assist in the establishment of an information center at Piraeus to reach the pro-Left laboring groups, and a dozen branch reading rooms in provincial centers.
6.
ECA counterpart funds should carry an increasing share of the costs of general press work, motion picture distribution and exhibits so that USIE can concentrate more effort on cultural fields, on contacts with Greek institutions and Greek channels and on the preparation of materials for the particularized needs of Greece.

Informational and Cultural—Turkey

1.
Show the extent, firmness and effectiveness of US support of the security and independence of Turkey.
2.
Reassure Turkey of the wisdom of its Western orientation and show that the US provides sincere, firm and determined leadership in the cooperative effort of free nations to halt Soviet aggression.
3.
Efforts should be directed toward influencing the following “priority target groups”:
a.
The upper classes of the 25 to 40-year age group.
b.
The older generation of politicians and officials.
c.
The army.
d.
Provincial population centers with 5,000 to 50,000 inhabitants.
e.
Larger villages.
f.
The various minority groups in the Istanbul area.
4.
Upon implementation of the present expanded USIE program, consider the feasibility of further expansion, such as opening new outposts, in addition to the presently contemplated outposts in Adana and Trabzon.
5.
Continue US participation in the annual Izmir Fair.

Informational and Cultural—Iran

1.
Make clear US support for Iran’s security and independence—“Iran does not stand alone”.
2.
Encourage firmness toward the USSR by public realization of the United States’ determination to prevent encroachments on free nations.
3.
Encourage belief in the economic potential of Iran and in the ability of Iran to develop this potential and to improve social conditions through its own efforts and particularly through practical and basic rather than pretentious and showy projects.
4.
Efforts should be directed toward influencing the following “priority target groups”:
a.
The Shah, the Court, and the few hundred families who dominate economic life and control the government.
b.
Leaders of the illiterate masses—mullahs (priests), village headmen and tribal chiefs.
e.
The army.
d.
Labor.
e.
Intellectuals, particularly those in the educational field, and civil servants of potential prominence.
f.
Men and women of western education.
g.
Literate ten percent as a whole.
h.
Leaders of Turkish and other linguistic and religious minorities.
5.
Combat the concept of Anglo-American rivalry in Iran without identifying the United States with British policy, oil or other commercial interests in Iran.
6.
Create in the Iranian people an attitude toward the United States which will make them want to be aligned with the United States, determined to resist communism and, in the event of war, friendly and cooperative toward the United States.
7.
Give fullest publicity to the work of American technicians in Iran and to visits of Iranians to the United States, particularly in fields of agriculture, health, sanitation and education.
8.
When circumstances warrant, assist and strengthen the Iranian radio network by providing technical personnel and facilities to the limit of available funds.

VI. Administrative—General

1.
Continue our strong and aggressive representation in the GTI countries.
2.
Consider in the selection of personnel for key positions in GTI missions their capacity and ability to work in harmony with the British.
3.
Encourage political and economic officers of the embassies and consulates to travel extensively in their districts, and provide adequate funds for this purpose.
4.
Encourage officers assigned to the GTI missions to acquire a speaking knowledge of French during their tour of duty, and encourage the study of the local languages.
5.
Build up a reservoir of GTI area specialists through continuance of the FSI program.
  1. Authorship not indicated in source text.
  2. Approved policy: NSC decision of November 24, 1947. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NSC decision and explanatory material, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 575 and 623.]
  3. For documentation on United States involvement in the formation of the European Payments Union and in the decisions of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, see vol. iii, pp. 611 ff.
  4. See the editorial note, p. 1459.
  5. Noncommissioned officer.