Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762A.0221/12–1550: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Bonn, December 15, 1950—2 a. m.

391. Department for Byroade. AGSec from Slater. Following is summary report Executive session HICOM Council with Chancellor Adenauer held Bonn, Petersberg 14 December with Poncet (France), Kirkpatrick (UK) and McCloy (US) present.

1. Grotewohl letter:

(Refer to Berlin sent Department 811, repeated Frankfort 915, Paris 175, London 95, Moscow 104 of 7 December and Bonn sent Department 388, repeated London 91, Paris 92, Moscow 10, Frankfort 436 of 13 December 1950.¹)

Adenauer informed Council that he had had confidential meeting with his cabinet and chairmen of all Bundestag political parties (with exception of KPD and extreme right) in which great diversity of view was manifest. (Ollenhauer represented SPD at Schumacher’s request as latter stated he was not in good health.)

Adenauer stated Grotewohl letter was being used as part of well-designed propaganda program which he briefly described as follows: (a) copies of Grotewohl letter, accompanied by rather moderate comments, were being sent to leading West German intellectuals, doctors, lawyers, et cetera; (b) businessmen have been approached with rumor that Red China is willing to buy 5 billion dollars worth of industrial products, raw materials and armaments from Federal Republic; (c) politicians and statesmen were being approached with liberal explanations and clarifying statements re Grotewohl’s letter and GDR intentions, e.g. “parity” in constituent body did not mean 50 percent Federal Republic and 50 percent GDR but rather basis calculation of population which would result in ratio of between 1 to 3 and 3.5; GDR legislation would be brought into harmony with Federal Republic legislation, et cetera. (Adenauer mentioned in passing that a rather well-known Communist had recently offered his services as a confidential intermediary with GDR.)

Adenauer stated he was not so sure that all of the persons approached realized purpose of campaign as well as he did, and that he had concluded that letter must be taken more seriously than was originally assumed. He ventured thought that letter may be preparing ground for proposal which Soviets desired to introduce at projected Four Power Conference. Adenauer concluded his opening remarks with request that HICOM release full text of its letter to Chuikov which transmitted Chancellor’s letter containing Bundestag request for free elections as part of extended counter program which would exploit this theme.

During course of general discussion re form, timing and substance of reply to Grotewohl, Adenauer made following points: (a) That inasmuch as Federal Republic had been recognized by Foreign Ministers as sole representative of German people pending peace settlement, he would not address reply to GDR or to Grotewohl as Minister-President but rather would send emissary to Grotewohl to deliver oral statement plus an aide-mémoire which would not contain any address or signature; (b) that he intended to delay his reply until German opinion settled down somewhat. However, he did not agree with Schumacher that reply should wait until results of projected Four Power Conference were known, (c) That he intended to submit to HICOM text of his reply before dispatch and he would attach greatest importance to receipt of HICOM’s comments and concurrence. Council expressed agreement with points a, b and c above.

In reply to Adenauer query, we informed him that none of his conditions for restoration of German unity should not [sic] at this time be linked with return of territory beyond Oder-Neisse line.

Kirkpatrick stressed that if West Germans realized acceptance of Grotewohl proposals and most recent Soviet line at Prague would mean restoration of Potsdam declaration regime, Allied Control Council and Soviet veto, they would appear less attractive to them. Adenauer agreed and indicated he would make this fact clear to German public.

In conclusion, I stressed that Adenauer should be most careful to include in his reply all of the conditions, stated in strongest terms, which he would require (including safeguards) to insure absolute freedom of elections inasmuch as Soviets have indicated that they were prepared to go to some lengths in order to achieve German unity. Soviets have launched an offensive to separate Federal Republic from Western community and to distract West Germans from secure position vis-à-vis the East by “the bait of unity”. Soviets have recognized that association of Germany with Western and European army would be formidable block to their ambitions, and would promise almost anything in return for any stoppage of German contribution to Western defense. I then asked Adenauer what he would do if Grotewohl promised to meet all of the conditions set forth by him requesting that in return the Federal Republic in the interim would not take any action to line itself up with the West either by alliance or armaments. Adenauer answered that he could not at the moment set forth details or terms of a reply as he would have to know the situation existing at that particular moment. However, if the question were asked “do the West Germans want immediate unity of Germany under Soviet influence, or do they want to forego unity and remain free in the Federal area?”, then in his opinion “the large majority of the German people would answer that they would rather be free even though the unity of Germany would not be restored immediately.”

[Here follow parts 2–5, dealing with implementation of the decisions of the Foreign Ministers at New York, the financing of the Berlin police, implementation of High Commission Law 27 on the liquidation of certain coal enterprises, and the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council at Brussels, December 18–19.]

Department pass Moscow. Sent Department 391, repeated information Frankfort 440 for King and Gerhardt, Paris 95 for Bruce, London 94 for Holmes, Moscow 11.

McCloy

1. Telegram 811, supra. Telegram 388, not printed, reported the recommendations agreed to by the Political Advisers at their meeting on December 13 which would serve as a basis for the discussion with Adenauer of the Grotewohl letter (762A.0221/12–1350).