Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

362.00/12–1650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy)¹

top secret

[Frankfort, December 16, 1950.]

[Participants:	Commissioner McCloy
	Chancellor Adenauer
	Herbert Blankenhorn]

Having heard that German Chancellor was most anxious to see me before departing for Brussels,² I sent my train for him and he had dinner and spent evening of Saturday, 16th with me.

After dinner (Blankenhorn was with me) Chancellor stated that the pillars of his foreign policy were the rapprochement with France, good relations with the UK, and a strong attachment to the U.S—that without U.S. strongly present in Europe there was no hope for it as others were irresolute and no match for the unrelenting pressure from the East.

Secondly he stated his policy was firmly directed to a thorough integration of Germany with the West—that any thought of a neutralized Germany was unrealistic as it meant only a Germany subject to Soviet influence. He said weighing his words carefully that he felt it much wiser and better from all points of view to renounce for a time the thought of a reunited Germany rather than provide for a united Germany under Soviet influence and he made it clear that what he meant was an unarmed neutralized Germany rather [than] one thoroughly integrated with the West and capable of being defended against Eastern encroachments. His argument stated on other occasions is that the strong influence of the great magnetic mass of Russia and her satellites to the East would draw an undefended Germany as certainly to the East as would a giant magnet draw a filing to it. The only force which could hope to oppose this influence would be a wholly integrated Western force including Germany. All short of that would mean a communized Germany as the first step and a communized Europe as the rapidly succeeding second.

What Adenauer would wish to see come out of Brussels would be a decision:

(a) to open discussions with the Germans respecting their contribution to Western defense, no diktats, no propositions on which a yes or no was demanded but a series of discussions based on the Deputies thinking in the course of which German comments and counter proposals could be made.

(b) an indication that a German contribution implied the concept of equality and some change in the political status of Germany. The form, character, and time of such political developments would likewise be subject to an exchange of views with the German authorities.

(c) that the concept of a contractual relationship to succeed the present occupation statute relation while not accepted was not discarded as a possible means by which after discussion a new and satisfactory status could be achieved.

Adenauer on several occasions during the evening expressed his great fear of the results of a coming Four Power Conference.

He said he was aware of strong pressures in France for the “neutralization” of Germany coming partly from Communist strength in France, traditional Russian ties as against Germany and general lack of resolution to do anything which might appear to Russia as a serious effort to build up true Western Defense. He also referred to the elements in the Labor government in England which took the same line and also to a reported conversation which some press men in France had in Paris with Bohlen³ in which the latter was quoted as indicating that some such result might be entertained under certain contingencies.

Present situation in Germany looked less favorable than it really was. There was resolution in Germany but it looked now to strong U.S. leadership around which to rally—needed a sight of courage and action as on all other sides there was hesitation and postponement of serious action.

He indicated such action would receive considerable opinion and support from elements in the S.P.D. party who were far from satisfied with the negative attitude associated with the expressed view of their leader Schumacher. He also indicated that he might at a proper time take some steps which would lead to bipartisan consideration of this problem of a German contribution.

When asked whether he thought any steps taken now on the part of Germans to contribute to Western Defense would produce overt action by the Soviets he said he thought that while it was possible, he greatly doubted it and that even if it were more apt to do so than he thought he said he preferred to go ahead rather than to accept the principle that any attempt to defend oneself should be abandoned because someone with a motive to dominate termed it aggressive.

He said he had given serious consideration to this question as naturally if Germany were overrun he would be about the first to have his neck involved.⁴

1. At the top of the source text Clement E. Conger, Staff Assistant in the Bureau of German Affairs, had indicated that Jacques J. Reinstein, Director of the Office of German Economic Affairs, had brought a copy of the memorandum back with him from Germany. McCloy transmitted an almost identical record in telegram 980, December 18, from Brussels, not printed (762A.00/12–1850).
2. For documentation on the North Atlantic Treaty Council meeting in Brussels, December 18–19. see vol. iii. pp. 582 ff.
3. Charles E. Bohlen, United States Minister at Paris.
4. Attached to the source text was a three-page outline, not printed, on positions which the United States should take at Brussels on further steps as to Germany.