Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762A.00/12–750: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Berlin, December 7, 1950—midnight.

811. AGSec from Slater.¹ For Acheson and Byroade. Following summary report secret session HICOM Council held Berlin with Poncet (France) McCloy (US) and Kirkpatrick (UK) present re Grotewohl² letter to Adenauer proposing all German constitutional assembly (text of which sent HICOG Berlin to Department 786, Frankfort 886, Bonn 183, London 90, Paris 166 and Moscow unnumbered and HICOG Bonn sent Frankfort 397 repeated information Department 354³).

1. Grotewohl letter:

Kirkpatrick opened meeting with statement that UK intelligence had concluded Grotewohl letter part determined attack “Anglo-US imperialism” and attacks Adenauer would cease. Concentration this theme borne out recent poster campaign throughout Germany.

Poncet expressed opinion Soviets serious their desire meeting four powers in the hope such meeting would place them better moral position to overcome feeling world public opinion they were aggressors. If West Allies refused such meeting Soviet aim would be still furthered. In his opinion primary Soviet objective to avoid rearmament in and neutralization of Germany. Present feelings Germans follow Noack’s line⁴ and desire avoid “scorched earth” situation Germany, pleased and encouraged Soviets. Soviets were anxious extend guarantee German neutrality and neutralization plus status quo re Oder Neisse border in order calm present worries satellites. In view above Poncet believed necessary give greatest care concerning Adenauer reply Grotewohl letter.

We took note of fact that Grotewohl addressed letter to “Federal Government of FedRep of Germany for attention of Dr. Adenauer, Fed Chancellor” and signed letter as “Minister-President of GDR”. Both Poncet and Kirkpatrick inclined view it would be wise for Adenauer reply directly Grotewohl and pointed out significance form of address. In their opinion if HICOM replied or dictated terms of reply to Adenauer, Communists would claim in propaganda campaign that Adenauer was puppet West Allies and would not fail point out that Grotewohl wrote direct to Adenauer on his own.

I stressed that I would like give matter another 72 hours thought before communicating any HICOM advice to Adenauer. I agreed that method, form and channel of reply was most important in order avoid pitfalls inherent [in] the situation and that it could serve as propaganda vehicle in support the case of West Allies. (Personally I do not agree with Poncet that Grotewohl letter represented serious Soviet move but rather feel it was merely part of propaganda campaign.) I recommended that any reply should urge free elections according West concept.

We all agreed since Chinese success in Korea there was general disposition among certain elements in West Germany to examine the Grotewohl letter most carefully rather than turn it down flat.

There seemed to be general agreement that the Germans to whom letter has appeal do not fully comprehend that the reactivation Control Council would again bring into operation Soviet veto which would involve continuation Allied controls. Thus interim period to which Grotewohl referred might be an indefinite extension control period.

Kirkpatrick informed us that Schumacher told him that he was “of two minds” concerning note. He did not know whether outright refusal should be given or more general approach be adopted.

In conclusion we agreed HICOM political advisors should commence at once formulation of proposed line which HICOM could communicate Adenauer. Adenauer will be notified tomorrow by Poncet of Council’s first reaction and that the Council would do its best consult with him and keep him up to date with its thinking. In general we agreed that we should be in position by next Thursday to give Adenauer our thoughts this matter. In meantime I hope Reber can bring from Paris the thinking of group drafting reply to Soviet note.⁵

2. Deteriorating German and European morale:

I took occasion underline rapidly deteriorating German and European morale resulting from the present period of indecision which was further aggravated by Korean reverses. I stated it was HICOM’s responsibility come forward at once with constructive solution whole German problem and not wait upon action of the governments. I predicted the collapse of the Schuman Plan, frustration all efforts build reasonable defense, greater success in the Communist infiltration program and growth of “neutralism” unless something done rapidly. I continued that if no other forum was presently available deal effectively with these matters it was obviously my responsibility to do so. (I had in mind that something along lines our “package program” should be put forward by HICOM, although I did not refer to it specifically.) Kirkpatrick enthusiastically agreed but Poncet’s attitude indicated he was not disposed or in position to take such “free flight”.

Kirkpatrick urged me join him in recommendation that Spofford and Millar (if not Alphand)⁶ come Germany during December recess as he felt it was essential they gain more direct impression the atmosphere here. He continued that any group which could seriously entertain Dutch proposal⁷ was far wide of mark and therefore it was essential that they be reoriented.

Both Kirkpatrick and Poncet also extremely critical the announcement out of London which stated the agreement reached re German rearmament took form of series of restrictions to be imposed on German participation. It is fatal in my judgment, to approach Germany with announcement of what she can’t do. What must be done, if we are to be successful, is merely to announce general understandings have been reached on range of German contributions and that further decisions can only be made after consultation with Germans. If the idea grows that all we do is transmit through Germans a predetermined set of restrictions, Adenauer can never be expected carry out affirmative program.

Department pass Moscow; sent Department 811, repeated priority information Frankfort 915, Paris 175, London 95, Moscow 104.

Frankfort eyes only King (no distribution); Paris for Bruce, please pass Reber; London for Holmes, please pass Colonel Gerhardt; Moscow for Kirk.⁸

McCloy

1. Joseph E. Slater, U.S. Secretary on the Secretariat of the Allied High Commission for Germany.
2. Otto Grotewohl, Minister-President of the “German Democratic Republic”.
3. Neither printed; for the text of Grotewohl’s letter, see Documents on German Unity (Frankfort, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1951), p. 166 or Margaret Carlyle, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950 (London, Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 178–179.
4. Professor Ulrich Noack, head of the so-called Nauheimer Circle, which advocated German neutrality.
5. For further documentation on the Soviet note of November 3, proposing the convocation of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see pp. 902 ff.
6. Charles M. Spofford, Sir Frederick R. Hoyer-Millar, and Hervé Alphand, United States, United Kingdom, and French Deputy Representatives on the North Atlantic Council.
7. For documentation on the Dutch proposal for German participation in the European defense structure, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
8. James E. King, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany; David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador to France; Samuel Reber, U.S. Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers; Alan G. Kirk, Ambassador to the Soviet Union.