Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 38 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)¹

top secret

Washington, 2 May 1950.

Subject: Future Course of U.S. Action with Respect to Austria.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed NSC 38/5, dated 27 April 1950, entitled “Future Courses of United States Action with Respect to Austria,” and perceive no objection, from the military point of view, to the Conclusions thereof except the Conclusions in subparagraph 20a(2) (b) and the Department of State position as stated in subparagraph 20a(4).

Subparagraph 20a(2) (b) contains a provision for inclusion in the proposed Four-Power Declaration to reestablish Austrian independence that all occupation forces are to be withdrawn within ninety days after the coming into force of the agreement. This is an agreed article of the treaty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have grave fears that failure to provide adequate Western-oriented indigenous security forces in Austria prior to the withdrawal of occupation forces may create a military vacuum in that country in which the Communists, following their usual practice, may be able to seize power and dominate Austria. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore suggest that subparagraph 20a(2) be revised as follows (changes indicated in usual manner):

“(2) … A Declaration of this type might contain the following provisions to acccomplish the following, provided that an appropriate provision is also made therein to assure that Austrian security forces will, prior to the initiation of the withdrawal of Western occupation forces from Austria be reasonably adequate to maintain internal security:”

The fundamental difference between the position taken by the Department of Defense and that taken by the Department of State in subparagraph 20a(4) is that the Department of State disagrees with the views of the Department of Defense which are that:

a. Present security conditions do not permit the change from a military to a civilian United States High Commissioner for Austria at this time; and

b. Security conditions satisfactory to the United States must be a condition precedent to this change.

With respect to worldwide security conditions, the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. The threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on 24 November 1948),² but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. The cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. In addition, the confidence of the Soviets in the strength of their power position compared to the non-Soviet world is increasing, and, in fact, at no time during the past two years has the USSR been in such a relatively strong position for the extension of its influence by means short of involvement in armed conflict. Further, recent Soviet actions in dealing with the Western Powers have indicated increasing Soviet arrogance. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are firmly of the opinion that any United States actions which involve relations with the USSR should have as their primary aim the strengthening of the United States security position.

The military implications involved in the present worldwide Soviet aggression actions, particularly with respect to Germany, especially Berlin,³ and the Free Territory of Trieste,⁴ indicate the gravity of the security risks involved in any change in United States administration in Austria at a time when freedom of choice for opportunist tactics rests with the USSR. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that any change resulting in a diminution of military authority would:

a. Interfere with, if not break, the continuity of authority and operations of the High Commissioners in the present quadripartite Allied Council organization;

b. Indicate decreased military interest and authority by the Western Powers in Austria which would, among other things, result in a lessening of Austrian confidence in the protection offered by the Western Powers; and

c. Undoubtedly lessen, at least to some extent, present capability for immediate military counteraction in that area.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully considered the matter of changing from a military to a civilian United States High Commissioner in Austria at the present time in light of the current world conditions generally and of the conditions in Austria in particular. They feel strongly, from the military viewpoint, that present security conditions do not warrant and, in fact, do not permit this change and that this viewpoint should be overriding. If considerations other than security should be considered overriding, however, and this step be taken, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that serious impairment of United States security interests would result therefrom.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that, although the United States initially proposed the change from military to civilian High Commissioners in Austria, the British and the French are independently contemplating such a step without concerting with the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that any action taken on this matter by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France should be in concert but that, regardless of the action which may be taken by the British and the French, the United States should, because of general world security conditions and of conditions in Austria specifically, and because of extensive United States governmental investments and concomitant responsibility in that country, retain at this time its military High Commissioner. They further feel that the United States Military High Commissioner should be retained until definite progress has been made in resolving the ideological conflict between the United States and the USSR.

In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that subparagraph 20a(4), as proposed by the Department of Defense, be approved. For purposes of clarity, however, they suggest that the last sentence of the proposed subparagraph be revised to read as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“Present security conditions do not permit the change from a military to a civilian High Commissioner at this time—on either a quadripartite or a tripartite basis.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The source text was attached to a memorandum of transmission by Lay, dated May 3, not printed, which circulated the Joint Chiefs’ views for the information of the National Security Council
2. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662.
3. For documentation on the status of Berlin, see pp. 818 ff.
4. For documentation concerning the Free Territory of Trieste, see vol. iii, pp. 1302 ff.