Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 38 Series

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret
NSC 38/5

Washington, April 27, 1950.

Draft

Report by the National Security Council on Future Courses of U.S. Action With Respect to Austria

the problem

1. To consider the nature and timing of future United States action with respect to Austria in the light of recent developments of Soviet policy.

analysis

United States objectives with respect to Austria.

2. The major United States objective in Austria is the reestablishment of Austrian sovereignty and independence as agreed in the Moscow Declaration of 1943. The conclusion of the Treaty reestablishing an independent and Western-oriented Austria would go far to prevent:

a. Soviet domination of Austria, which would result in penetration of the East-West “frontier” by a salient extending westward to the Swiss border and permit Soviet control of the principal North-South lines of communication in Central Europe.

b. Partition, which would destroy the Austrian nation and increase the instability of Central Europe.

3. It was determined in October, 1949 to be governmental policy in the United States interest to agree at an early date to an Austrian Treaty on the best terms obtainable. At the same time, it was determined that United States policy should insure, by all appropriate measures prior to the withdrawal of the occupation forces, that the Austrian armed forces are reasonably adequate to maintain internal security (NSC 38/4, “Future Courses of United States Action with Respect to Austria,” approved by the President on November 18, 1949²). To date, the Four Powers have been unable to reach agreement on the terms of the Treaty due to Soviet intransigence. Soviet action in the most recent phase of the negotiations are obviously designed to delay the conclusion of the Treaty, The United States objective in Austria can be furthered by the conclusion of the Treaty and the creation of an adequate security force prior to the withdrawal of the occupation troops. The governments of Great Britain and France agree with these objectives. The Soviet Union must be signatory to the Treaty in order that Soviet military forces be withdrawn under the terms of the Treaty. Any action either by the United States alone, or by the three Western Powers without Soviet participation to negotiate an Austrian Treaty would not be desirable as it would lead to partition of Austria, if not Soviet domination of all Austria, by failing to secure the withdrawal of Soviet military forces.

4. Pending the conclusion of the Treaty, the United States will seek to maintain the authority of the Allied Council and insist on strict adherence to the New Control Agreement of the Allied Commission for Austria (June 28, 1946)³ in order to prevent any unilateral action by the Soviet element threatening the fulfillment of our objectives. It is in the United States interest to strengthen the authority of the Austrian Government, to encourage the present Western orientation of the Austrian Government and people, and to lend all support to their resistance to Soviet pressure.

Soviet objectives and possible courses of action.

5. The major Soviet objective in Austria is estimated to be Soviet-Communist control of all Austria to be achieved by preventing establishment of a free, democratic and Western-oriented Austria. A Western-oriented Austria would penetrate the East-West frontier by a salient extending eastward to the Hungarian border and permit denial to the Soviets of the Vienna communications center. If the Soviets are unable to achieve their major objective they may consider partition as a secondary objective since it would maintain the East-West frontier substantially unchanged. The aggressiveness with which the Soviets will seek to attain either their major or secondary objective in Austria will be determined primarily by their estimate of Western policy with respect to Europe as a whole and secondarily by their estimate of the strength of Western policy with respect to Austria.

6. In terms of these objectives the Soviet authorities are most likely to pursue one or more of the following courses of action:

a. To delay conclusion of the Treaty in order to obtain better terms or to convince the present Austrian Government that it must conclude a bilateral settlement with the Soviet Government granting a privileged position to the latter as the price for the conclusion of the treaty and withdrawal of occupation forces.

b. To intimidate the Austrian Government by kidnappings, recalcitrant action in the Allied Council or other devices, with a view to weakening its authority, or seeking its overthrow and replacement by a group favorable to the Soviet Union.

c. To establish a rump government in the Eastern zone which would claim authority over all Austria.

d. To take military or administrative action either to force the withdrawal of Western forces from Vienna or to partition Austria. Such action might take the following forms:

(1) A general move in Europe involving a simultaneous action in Vienna and Berlin to bar Western access in violation of existing agreements.

(2) Local action in Austria involving a closing of the Eastern zone at the demarcation lines, thus barring the shipment both of supplies for the Western forces in Vienna and Austrian supplies originating outside the Eastern zone.

(3) Prohibition of the shipment of supplies for the Western (forces in Vienna across the Eastern zone to Vienna.

(4) The barring of Western access to Vienna and the taking of such action in Vienna which would prevent the present unified control of all sectors of the city by the Austrian authorities.

e. To maintain the status quo in Austria, but through political devices to attempt Communist infiltration of the Government with a view to the ultimate imposition of a Soviet-controlled government over the whole of Austria.

United States and Soviet capabilities in Austria.

7. By reason both of continued military occupation and their refusal to conclude the Treaty, the Soviet Union is in a position to prevent the fulfillment of the U.S. policy objective of reestablishing an independent Austria.

8. If the Soviets continue for a long period to refuse to conclude the Treaty, it will be increasingly difficult to prevent Soviet pressure on the Austrian Government to sign a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union as the ultimate price for obtaining Soviet acceptance of the Treaty. Similarly, it will be increasingly difficult to convince the Austrian Government that it should not sign a bilateral agreement as a desperate gamble to secure the withdrawal of the Soviet military forces. Such an agreement would in all probability nullify the guarantees of Austrian independence already obtained in the agreed articles of the Treaty and would make Western support of Austria difficult in the post-Treaty period.

9. The United States cannot prevent Soviet attempts to intimidate the Austrian Government or stop the threats against Government leaders in the Eastern zone as long as Soviet military forces are present in Austria.

10. The United States could not prevent the Soviet authorities establishing a rump government in the Eastern zone. In the event it became impossible for the Austrian Government to remain in Vienna, it would in all probability move to the Western provinces and continue to claim authority over all Austria.

11. While the United States could not prevent the Soviets taking administrative or military action to close the Eastern zone at the demarcation lines (NSC 63/1, “United States Policy in the Event of a Blockade of Vienna,” approved by the President on February 17, 1950) in order to blockade Vienna completely the Soviet forces would be required to stop all Austrian transportation of supplies to the city including those originating in the Eastern zone or crossing the Eastern zone from the West and from overseas. A complete blockade would, therefore, present the Soviets with formidable political, economic and military problems. It is not likely that they will attempt such action. It is in the United States interest to remain in Vienna in the face of any threat of a Soviet blockade. The withdrawal of Western forces would mean the abandonment of Vienna to the Soviet military forces, and would constitute a partition of Austria, thus marking a significant political victory for the Soviets. Withdrawal of Western forces in the face of a Soviet threat would mark a major advance of Soviet military control in Europe and would endanger our security interest in Central Europe as well as in Italy and Yugoslavia.

a. In the event that the Eastern zone were completely blocked and Austrian as well as Western supplies barred from Vienna, the United States could not in all probability maintain United States forces at their present level (NSC 63/1). If all efforts fail to break this blockade, it may be impossible to remain in Vienna, but the course of action of the United States should be determined in the light of general U.S. policy designed to meet the Soviet threat and of circumstances then prevailing.

b. In the event that only Western supplies were barred from the city, our forces in Vienna could be supplied by an airlift with great difficulty for a short time in order to strengthen attempts to break the blockade by diplomatic means.

12. In view of the lack of success of the Communist Party in the Austrian elections of 1945 and 1949, the Soviets would apparently have little opportunity in the immediate future of increasing Communist strength in Austria by normal political methods.

Courses of action open to the United States

13. It is in the U.S. interest to continue to participate in the occupation of Austria, pursuant to existing international agreements, and to bring all possible pressure to bear on the Soviet Government to secure the conclusion and implementation of the Treaty. Furthermore, it is in the U.S. interest to preserve the authority of the Austrian Government against Soviet pressure, to prevent a partition of the country, and to continue to seek a Four-Power formula for the reestablishment of Austrian independence.

a. In the face, however, of Soviet policy in the Treaty negotiations and the possible threat of Soviet action in Austria, it is urgent that the Western powers maintain the initiative, both to make Soviet unilateral action more difficult and to contribute to the progressive solution of the Austrian question.

b. It is necessary to focus upon the Soviet Union full blame for the continuing failure to obtain a Treaty. The Western Powers must formulate and carry out a policy which will progressively demonstrate that all efforts are being made to secure Austrian independence, while at the same time, no step is being taken which can be interpreted as weakening the authority of the Allied Council. Measures in such a policy might include:

(1) Appointing civilian High Commissioners as authorized in the Control Machinery Agreement.

(2) Relinquishing occupation controls which do not threaten either the security of the Austrian Government or the occupation forces.

(3) Proposing a Four-Power Declaration, utilizing certain agreed articles of the Treaty, as a substitute for the Treaty. Any step taken should be based on firm tripartite agreement.

14. The maintenance of Austrian unity is important to the United States. Soviet action to destroy that unity or to prevent the maintenance of our forces in Vienna must be carefully examined in the light of the political and military threat to the security interests of the United States. Such a threat would justify the United States taking strong diplomatic steps and effective retaliatory measures, and urging other Western Powers to take parallel action.

conclusions

15. The United States should continue to participate in the Treaty negotiations and make every effort to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion.

16. The United States should continue the action currently being taken to implement the conclusions of NSC 38/4, “Future Courses of United States Action with Respect to Austria”, approved November 18, 1949, with respect to the Austrian security forces.

17. Unless compelled by radically altered circumstances the United States should not undertake to enter into a separate Treaty with Austria without Soviet participation.

18. The United States should make every effort to prevent a partition of Austria and, in the absence of a Four-Power Treaty or agreement establishing Austrian sovereignty, should continue to participate in the Allied Council with a view to extending the authority and jurisdiction of the Austrian Government and reducing unnecessary controls exercised by the occupation forces.

19. The United States should make every effort to forestall and prevent unilateral Soviet action either forcing a Western withdrawal from Vienna or effecting a partition of Austria, should take all feasible measures to counter any Soviet move designed to achieve these objectives, and urge other Western Powers to take parallel action. Such measures might include, inter alia:

a. Insist in the Allied Council on strict adherence to the Control Machinery Agreement respecting the authority of the Austrian Government and the rights of the occupying powers as established in existing agreements.

b. If the Soviets impose restrictions on Western access to the city, the United States should, in cooperation with the British and French, supply their personnel in Vienna, as well as such minimum requirements for the city as possible, by an airlift as an emergency measure for a limited period. Such action should be considered in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time. (NSC 63/1 contains more detailed consideration of this problem.)

20. Conversations should be initiated at an early date with the British and French to discuss the nature and timing of future action with respect to Austria. In these conversations:

a. The United States should propose:

(1) The publication of a record of the Treaty negotiations to date. Such publication should be appropriately timed in order not to disrupt any current or prospective negotiations on the Treaty.

(2) The preparation of a draft Four-Power Declaration reestablishing Austrian independence which could be proposed if agreement cannot be reached in the present Treaty negotiations. Soviet participation in the proposed declaration would be required in order to provide for the withdrawal of Soviet military forces and to avoid a partition of Austria. A Declaration of this type might contain the following provisions:

(a) Reestablishment of Austria’s independence within her frontiers as they existed on January 1, 1938. (An agreed Article in the Treaty.)

(b) Withdrawal of all occupation forces within 90 days after the coming into force of the agreement. (An agreed Article in the Treaty.)

(c) No reparations shall be exacted from Austria. (An agreed Article in the Treaty.)

(d) Each of the occupying Powers shall relinquish to Austria all German assets and war booty held or claimed by them in Austria. (Contrary to agreed Article 35 of the Treaty.)

(e) Four-Power agreement to respect the independence of Austria within her pre-1938 borders. (An agreed Article in the Treaty.)

(f) A declaration of the participating powers favoring the admission of Austria to the United Nations Organization. (An amplification of the agreed preamble of the Treaty.)

If the Soviets would not accept paragraph (d) in the foregoing plan, the agreed text of Article 35 could form part of the declaration as the settlement of the German assets question. Our position, however, would be strengthened in terms of world opinion if such a proposal were not included.

(3) The taking of immediate steps in Austria to relieve the burden of occupation while retaining sufficient controls not only to assure security of the Austrian Government and of U.S. occupation forces but also to prevent additional advantage to USSR occupation forces.

[The respective positions of the Departments of State and Defense on paragraph 20 a. (4) are as follows. The NSRB has reserved its position on this paragraph.]⁴

Department of State Position

20a (4) “To proceed at a date to be agreed with the British and French and in a manner consistent with the requirements of Austrian security with the appointment by each of the occupying powers of a civilian High Commissioner without prejudice to the present control machinery. If Four-Power agreement cannot be obtained, and consistent with the security requirements, the Western Powers, in concert, should proceed with the appointment of civilian High Commissioners. At the time of the appointment of a U.S. civilian High Commissioner, responsibility for the execution and implementation of U.S. policy in Austria in all fields except those pertaining to military matters will be transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of State.

Agreement with the British and French should be obtained on the following requirements respecting the appointment of civilian High Commissioners:

a. No break should occur in continuity of authority and operations of the High Commissioners in the present quadripartite Allied Council organization during the transfer from military to civilian authority.

a. No situation should be created by the transfer of responsibility which would prevent immediate military action by the United States or by British and French military authorities, if and when required.

c. No impression should be given to the Austrians that they are deprived of military protection by the transfer of responsibility.

United States implementation of any tripartite decision should be carried out with the closest coordination between the Departments of State and Defense.”

Department of Defense Position

20a (4) “To proceed at a date to be agreed and at a time when the requirements of Austrian security permit with the appointment by each of the occupying powers of a civilian High Commissioner without prejudice to the present control machinery. Then if such Four-Power agreement cannot be obtained, and the security situation permits, the Western Powers, in concert, should proceed with the appointment of civilian High Commissioners. At the time of the appointment of a U.S. civilian High Commissioner, responsibility for the execution and implementation of U.S. policy in Austria in all fields except those pertaining to military matters will be transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. Present security conditions do not permit the change from a military to a civilian High Commissioner at this time.

b. The United States should further propose for discussion, the formulation of a common tripartite policy on:

(1) Action which can be taken to enable Western forces to remain in Vienna in the event the Soviets prevent Western access to Vienna;

(2) Action which can be taken in the event the Soviets close the Eastern zone at the demarcation lines to surface traffic;

(3) Action to be taken in event the Soviets force a partition of Austria with a view to determining the future Western position with respect to Austrian independence; and

(4) Determination of future action with respect to reference of the Austrian question to the United Nations.

1. Attached to the source text were a cover sheet and a note of transmission from Lay, stating that the report was being submitted for consideration by the National Security Council at its 56th Meeting on May 4. The note further indicated that the Department of State had set forth reasons in support of a request for a prompt decision. Neither printed.
2. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1190.
3. For the text of the New Control Agreement for Austria, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941–1949 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 614–620.
4. Brackets appear in the source text.