Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/186

Minutes of the Fifty-first Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, December 12, 1950, 9:15 a. m.

New York, December 12, 1950, 9:15 a.m.

[Extract]
secret

[Here follow a list of those present (44) and a review by David H. Popper, Delegation Adviser, of work remaining before the General Assembly.]

1. International control of atomic energy (Delga 391).¹

Mr. Nash recalled his previous discussion in the Delegation meeting regarding the motivation of the President’s suggestion for consolidation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments. At that time he had pointed out that the suggestion was in part to test the climate of opinion in the General Assembly and to determine how far members might wish to go in the current session with respect to the consolidation proposal. He reported that after four weeks of testing, it appeared to be impossible to have substantive discussion regarding the possibility of merging the two commissions at this session.

Turning to the draft resolution prepared by Australia (Delga 391), he pointed out that it provided for a committee to study ways and means of bringing the two commissions closer together, even going so far as complete merger. The proposed special committee would be composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada: cosponsors for the Australian resolution were drawn from that group. Mr. Nash reviewed the terms of the resolution. After general hortatory preambular provisions, the resolution recognized the inability, to date, to achieve agreement among nations on the elimination of atomic weapons under a system of effective international control and the regulation of other armaments and armed forces and recalled that a plan had been developed in the Atomic Energy Commission, and approved by the Assembly, for the international control of atomic energy, and that much useful planning work had been accomplished in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Mr. Nash pointed out that this latter provision made clear that it was not intended by this resolution in any way to junk or discredit the work of the past of both commissions. The operative provision of the resolution, as he already noted, provided for the establishment of a committee of 12 to consist of the representatives of the Security Council as of January 1, 1951, together with Canada. He explained that at first it had been expected that Australia would be included, but it had withdrawn because of the fact that its membership would open wide the possibility of including a number of other states on the special committee. Mr. Nash personally felt this limited membership was preferable.

With respect to the plans for discussion in plenary, Mr. Nash explained that Australia would be the first speaker, while the United States was inscribed to be second. We hoped this would get the discussion off on a key which we hoped could be maintained during the entire discussion. The aim was to avoid intensive substantive consideration of atomic energy. If we could get the free nations to rally around this particular resolution, Mr. Nash believed it would set a constructive note for the future.

Mr. Allen noted that other countries, now members of the Security Council, had been approached with respect to sponsoring this resolution. Brazil was without instructions; Yugoslavia had declined, and India was too much occupied with its negotiations with respect to Chinese Communist aggression in Korea to accept. He also reported that he understood the Soviets were extremely annoyed with the Secretariat for not having placed the item on control of atomic energy before the plenary at an earlier date. In answer to a question from Ambassador Austin regarding our negotiations with other countries, Mr. Nash explained that as the primary sponsor of the resolution, Australia had taken on the responsibility for obtaining co-sponsors. The only states not approached directly were China and the Soviet Union. However, he had privately undertaken to speak to the Chinese representative who was agreeable and understood why he was not being asked to co-sponsor the proposal. He noted that the membership of the special committee was not in terms of particular countries, but in terms of the membership of the Security Council. For this reason, no attempt had been made to ask whether a particular country was willing to serve. Ambassador Austin inquired how many countries had seen the draft resolution. Mr. Nash replied that all but the Soviets had been shown the resolution earlier, and that now that it had been tabled, he assumed that all members were aware of its contents.

Senator Cooper, while he thought the plan in the resolution was logical, believed the question might very well be asked as to what there was about the plan that promised any improvement over the present impasse. He wondered if the resolution were just a paper draft or actually offered hope for improvement in the present situation. It seemed to him the Soviets were likely to take this item as an opportunity to launch another propaganda attack based on various recent statements in this country regarding the use of the atomic bomb.

Mr. Nash explained that the United States would try to make it as clear as possible that this proposal was not offered as a solution to the impasse and would pick up the tenor of the President’s speech that the only hope for a solution was a fundamental change in Soviet opinion. This draft was offered as a fresh approach and with a view to going ahead with a discussion of some of the technical aspects of the problem against the day when the present difficult political situation might be resolved. In other words, this was a procedural step which at least would keep the door open. As to the possible use of the item by the Soviets for propaganda, he believed this was a real possibility. At the same time the resolution embraced a proposal which the Soviets had been contending for for five years. If they still believed the two fields of atomic energy and conventional armaments should not be split, this might make an all-out propaganda attack embarrassing. Mr. McKeever² asked whether it was anticipated that the Soviets would reintroduce their proposal for the elimination of the atomic weapon. Mr. Nash thought it was quite possible that they might bring in this proposal plus the old suggestion for a ⅓ reduction in armaments across the board. Mr. McKeever was worried about the possible vote such a proposal might pick up in this Assembly, particularly among the Asiatic states because of their reaction to the President’s brief press statement.

Senator Sparkman agreed that we ought not build false hopes on this item, but he felt that perhaps one reason we might be running second in the propaganda program was our permitting Russia so often to stand out as the great advocate of peace and of a positive program to control armaments. He thought that we missed an opportunity if we did not emphasize as strongly as we could our own desire to see worked out a practical program for the reduction and control of conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Nash replied that in our speech on the point of recalling the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, we would review the plan which the United Nations had approved and, at the same time, point out the speciousness of the Russian plan. This would cover both a constructive side and a rebuttal note. In other words, we did have something concrete to offer in this instance.

Senator Cooper remarked that he also thought the ideas expressed by Senator Sparkman were important to include.

Ambassador Austin inquired whether the Delegation had any objections to the proposal as explained by Mr. Nash as the policy of the Delegation. There were no objections, and he announced it to be the unanimous agreement of the Delegation to proceed along the lines described.

[Here follows discussion of the location of the sixth session of the General Assembly.]

1. Delga 391 from New York, December 8, not printed, contained the text of the draft resolution to be introduced by Australia, the United States, and others. The draft transmitted in Delga 391 was virtually identical with that adopted by the General Assembly (p. 124), with the exception of the last paragraph which read: “[The General Assembly] Decides to establish a committee of Australia, Brazil, UK, China, USSR, France, US, Canada, Netherlands, Turkey, Ecuador, India, Yugoslavia to consider and report to the next regular session of the GA on ways and means whereby the work of the AEC and CCA may be coordinated, and upon the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission.” (320/12–850)
2. Porter McKeever; Public Information Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations; Information Officer, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.