Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

PM Files

Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson ¹ to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] November 27, 1950.

Subject: Views of the AEC on the Current Adequacy of the Technical Features of the United Nations Plan for the Control of Atomic Energy

During the State–Defense study which culminated in the NSC/68,² considerable attention was directed toward the possibilities of, and prerequisites for, securing effective international control of atomic energy. Chapter VIII of NSC/68 concerning International Control is appended as Tab A, the most pertinent section of which states:

“The above considerations make it clear that at least a major change in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that ‛… the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure… their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field.… As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy.’

“In short, it is impossible to hope that an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.”

The narrower but important question of the current technical adequacy of the UN plan was raised during this study. On April 20, 1950, a letter, over your signature, was sent to the AEC, requesting a current evaluation, without regard to political issues, of the UN plan (see Tab B).³

The AEC replied on June 26, 1950, in a letter that was obscure and hardly responsive (see Tab C).⁴ An extreme conclusion that might be drawn from it was that we should no longer support the UN plan. This letter was the subject of my memorandum to you dated August 14, 1950 (see Tab D),⁵ accompanied by a letter to the AEC for your signature, requesting further information and a more precise expression of views. This letter was signed on August 22, 1950 (see Tab E).⁶

The AEC replied to this last letter on September 20, 1950 (see Tab F)⁷ and came to the following conclusions:

• “a. Effective international control of atomic energy on a current and continuing basis after the United Nations plan went into full operation would be technologically feasible.
• “b. The detection of the withholding of fissionable material produced prior to the implementation of the United Nations plan would be more difficult, and the amount of fissionable material which might be withheld without detection would increase as the accumulation of fissionable material increases. This difficulty stresses the need for (1) stages of transition to full control of such a nature as to provide opportunities for obtaining assurances against the withholding of significant quantities of fissionable material and (2) strategic distribution of fissionable material in such a way as to minimize the effects of possible withholding.”

Although much thinking and staff studies have been directed toward the problem of stages and strategic distribution (also called strategic balance and quotas), no specific proposals on these points have been made by the United States for reasons that are best stated in the Third Report of the UNAEC dated May 17, 1948.

“The problems which have not been elaborated in detail, i.e., organization and administration, financing, strategic balance, prohibitions, and enforcement, and the stages of transition from the present situation to one of full international control, are of a different nature. These questions do not affect the basic nature of the problem of control. Some questions, such as stages, which only concern the period of transition to full international control, will be conditional on future technological developments and the conditions of world security. The same considerations apply to the question of the strategic balance to be established in the location of nuclear materials and nuclear reactors between one part of the globe and another. Others, such as organization and administration of the agency—on which inconclusive discussions have recently taken place—and the question of the agency’s finances, depend almost entirely on the existence of prior agreement on the nature and extent of the control system. Indeed, until agreement on the basic principles of control has been reached, the elaboration of proposals to cover these remaining topics would be unrealistic and would serve no useful purpose. On the other hand, given such agreement, solutions to these problems could be worked out.”

The AEC also indicated that it might be desirable, if the opportunity arose, to tighten up certain parts of the plan by strengthening the controls over heavy water, and by naming the appropriate lighter elements as coming under the controls of the international agency, although the general language of the plan had been deliberately chosen to cover both fissionable and fusionable materials.

In expressing these views, the AEC scrupulously limited itself only to the technical aspects of the problem. Quite properly, it did not make any analysis of broader political considerations, such as the political climate, the existing or prospective power relationships between the East and West, and the relationship between atomic energy control and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, which have a great bearing on whether the U.S. can afford to continue its support for the UN plan. The prime political consideration which must be kept in mind, and which is stressed in NSC/68, is that acceptance of effective international control by the Soviet Union would mean a fundamental change in the character of the Soviet system. In fact, if the Soviet Union were to change in this manner, they should be as insistent as we on the effectiveness of the control system. Should this come to pass, there would be ample opportunities for testing their good faith—and of all other nations—during:

(a) The negotiating out of the remainder of the UN plan, particularly on stages and on the distribution of atomic materials and facilities,

(b) The actual implementation of the plan, and

(c) The concurrent implementation of an effective plan for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

Conclusions

1. The United States should continue to support effective international control of atomic energy by continuing its support for the UN plan.

2. The United States should continue to emphasize its view that atomic energy control and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces are integral parts of the over-all problems of collective security and disarmament, and that an essential ingredient of agreement on both plans is agreement on their coordinated implementation.

In connection with this latter point, the Regulation of Armaments Committee (RAC), whose members are the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman of the AEC a member when atomic energy control is involved, is responsible for United States policy in the general field of disarmament. It has recently been inactive because of reorganization within Defense, but it is now preparing to resume its work, with particular emphasis on the interrelationship between atomic energy control and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. Mr. Hickerson is your working deputy on RAC.

This memorandum has been discussed with, and concurred in by, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Nitze.

R. Gordon Arneson

1. Effective November 13, Arneson, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, became Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. He continued to function as Departmental adviser on atomic energy matters.
2. For NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, a Report to the National Security Council by its Executive Secretary, and related documentation, see pp. 126 ff.
3. Ante, p. 66.
4. Ante, p. 79.
5. Not printed.
6. Ante, p. 82.
7. Ante, p. 94.