Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/176

Minutes of the 41st Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, November 16, 1950, 9:15 a. m.

New York, November 16, 1950, 9:15 a.m.

[Extract]
secret

[Here follow a list of those present (46) and discussion of the possible establishment of an International Criminal Court.]

2. Possible consolidation of Atomic Energy Commission and Commission for Conventional Armaments (Deptel 471, November 3).

Mr. Nash explained that discussion of this item was attributable to the President’s speech to the Assembly on United Nations Day, October 24, in which the possibility of establishing a new commission to carry forward the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments was suggested. He noted that up until the time of the President’s address, there was no item on the agenda regarding conventional armaments, although atomic energy had been scheduled for debate directly in plenary session and was expected to come up some time early in December. That was one place where the President’s suggestion, if it came up at all, would arise. There were two other places where it might possibly be mentioned. The first was in connection with the Lie Twenty Year Peace Plan, and the second was in connection with the “Peace Through Deeds” resolution, in which there were provisions relating to disarmament.¹

Mr. Nash explained that suggestions for a single commission had several motivations. One of the primary motives was the desire of the President to bring out in sharp focus the fact that the present armaments program was no choice of our own, but a program we were compelled to adopt because the preferable course of universal disarmament under effective international control had not been followed. The speech had made it clear that we preferred disarmament. This was a psychological motive behind the President’s remarks. It was also thought that it might be possible to make some progress in the disarmament field with the new light the establishment of a single commission might bring to the problem. Another motive was to emphasize that the field of disarmament was a single unit and could not be dealt with piecemeal.

Referring to the history of the two commissions, Mr. Nash recalled that the Atomic Energy Commission was established in January, 1946, while the Commission for Conventional Armaments was not set up until February, 1947. It was our position that the best progress in the initial stages was to be made through separate consideration of the two fields, because the atomic energy problems, in particular, were so unique that there would have been no progress at all were both fields to have been considered together. Mr. Nash believed that the wisdom of this course was illustrated by the fact that a workable plan for the control of atomic energy had been developed. At the same time we had always recognized that the two fields were intimately interrelated. For example, there was some worry that if we had a plan for the control of atomic energy approved by the General Assembly, we would have then had to come up quickly with a plan for the control of conventional armaments before we could surrender our atomic weapons.

Mr. Nash indicated that at the last General Assembly, we had started to lay the groundwork for the statement in the President’s speech by indicating that the time was coming when the two fields had to be brought together and integrated into one overall plan, even though different systems of control would be required. Since that time, the Commission on Conventional Armaments had made progress, and we were now prepared to say that a system of safeguards could be worked out so that we could carry forward on the disarmament plan. It had therefore been concluded that the time was ripe to suggest the appropriateness of bringing the two commissions together, and the President had made the suggestion in his speech. This statement recognized the fact that disarmament is a unit, that it must be universal, and that it must be surrounded by adequate safeguards. The President advanced his idea simply as a suggestion but did not make a specific proposal in order to see what the consensus among other members of the United Nations would be. His suggestion had aroused some interest. Australia had actually gone so far as to prepare a resolution. However, we had discouraged them from submitting it at once on the grounds that it was better to get general views first. Syria, India, Canada, Belgium, France and South Africa had expressed real interest in the suggestion, while the British and Norwegians had had rather a negative reaction. Our present position was more to seek the views of other members on our idea than anything more concrete. We did not now intend to submit a specific proposal in this Assembly.

Mr. Nash noted that the President’s suggestion had given rise to some confusion, including the question whether a change in United States atomic energy policy was involved. In illustration of this fact, he referred to a conversation which he had had with a Belgian delegate. This individual had asked him whether we were coming to the view that inspection alone was sufficient for atomic energy control. Mr. Nash said that he had replied in the negative, that the suggestion did not indicate any change in our position that the best plan was the plan already approved by the United Nations. The Belgian had also asked whether the President’s suggestion indicated an intention on our part to propose a swap between the two fields. He had responded that that was hardly possible. In the third place, the Belgian had inquired whether we regarded the distinction between the two fields as entirely artificial. He had informed him that the proposal had no such significance and that we still believed it was important to maintain a distinction. Mr. Nash noted that there had been some fuzziness in this respect, particularly as regards the question of just what was a weapon of mass destruction. The distinction which needed to be kept in mind and to be discussed was the difference between atomic energy as an instrument of warfare and conventional armaments, restating the necessity for two different systems of control. He believed there would have to be subcommissions to discuss the separate problems involved in each field.

Mr. Nash observed that the political situation seemed no better as regards the possibility of general consideration of disarmament. In this connection he referred to the language in the third item of the Lie Twenty Year Peace Plan which stated the present situation as well as could be done at the present time. This had indicated that any progress at all would help to reduce the cold war tensions and adjust disputes. He observed that there were such enormous technical problems involved that it would take a long time to work out a system of controls, but there was no reason why progress could not be made on a plan as a sort of mental exercise. It might just help a little to relieve tensions to discuss this matter.

Mr. Nash explained that the problem before the Delegation was not one of action, but rather to ascertain the feelings of other members of the Assembly so that when the item was discussed, we could determine what, if anything, should be done at this session. The purpose of his comments had been to ask everybody on the delegation who should pick up any information on this subject, to pass it on so that a proper course of action could be formulated.

Ambassador Austin referred to the approval of the resolution entitled “Peace Through Deeds.” The second paragraph of that resolution, which he read, stated our policies in this field. He observed that in voting, members had wanted to vote separately on paragraph (a), but he had successfully managed to avoid such separate votes. As it turned out, except for the Soviet bloc, all of the members of the United Nations had voted with us on this expression of United Nations principles in this field. Mr. Nash said the same point might be raised in the plenary again, since the question had been asked whether paragraph 2(b) was consistent with the President’s speech. The answer to that was that it was perfectly consistent since nothing in the speech indicated a walking-away from the present plan. Ambassador Austin agreed. He noted that this was psychological warfare to meet the Stockholm Peace Petition. Here again, what we did was subservient to the Korean situation, where we should do nothing to weaken our overall political position. Therefore, it had been determined appropriate to reaffirm the declaration of the last General Assembly.

Ambassador Austin inquired whether there was any objection to continued liaison with other delegations on this matter. There was no objection to this policy.

[Here follows consideration of other subjects.]

1. For documentation on the Lie Peace Plan and the “Peace Through Deeds” Resolution, see vol. ii, pp. 371 ff.