PM Files
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay) to the President
top secret
Washington, March 1,
1950.
At the time that the Special Committee of the National Security Council,
consisting of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the then
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, submitted its recommendations on
the development of thermonuclear weapons to you for consideration and which
you subsequently approved, the Committee stated that it would submit in
writing at a later date the basis for these recommendations.
Accordingly, the Committee submits herewith the enclosed report1
prepared by the Department of State, with Appendices by the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Department of Defense, as a written record of the basis
for the Committee’s recommendations on the above subject, which were
submitted orally to you on January 31, 1950. The Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, however, approved the enclosed report subject to the
comments in the attached memorandum, dated February 15, 1950.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Chairman of the United States Atomic
Energy Commission (Lilienthal) to the Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)
top secret
[Washington,] February 15, 1950.
At the meeting of the members of the Special Committee on January 31,
1950, recommendations contained in Paragraph 11 of the
[Page 540]
Department of State paper of that date
were approved by the Special Committee, and on the same date by the
President.
At the meeting I expressed orally grave reservations about Recommendation
a; namely: “That the President direct the
Atomic Energy Commission to proceed to determine the technical
feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and rate of effort to
be determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department
of Defense; and that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier
program be undertaken concurrently.”
I expressed hearty agreement with Recommendation b, whereby the President directs a “re-examination of our
objectives in peace and war of the effect of these objectives on our
strategic plans,” and stated that I believed this would be the most
important factor of all in the assignment to the Special Committee and
its recommendations.
At the meeting on January 31 I discussed orally the reasons for my
reservations about Recommendation a. as a course
to be pursued at this time. I have requested of the Executive Secretary
and have received his permission to append to the record of the Special
Committee’s Report and Recommendations a summary of the basis for my
views. Such summary is as follows:
It was my view that the President’s publicly announced decision directing
the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed to determine the technical
feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon would be construed, and inevitably
construed, as a very broad and far-reaching decision respecting the
hydrogen bomb; that such an announced decision by the President would
seriously prejudice the re-examination of our present course, provided
for by Recommendation b.
The central question for the Special Committee it seemed to me was not whether we should recommend proceeding with
the super bomb or recommend against it. The central question, so it
seemed to me, was whether we should not first face up to the weaknesses
in our present national position. I outlined the points of weaknesses
which had occurred to me as a result of discussions during the past few
weeks. The decision to proceed, prior to such a
solid re-examination, would I fear tend to confirm to a degree almost
beyond change our present chief and almost sole reliance upon nuclear
armament. I stated it as my opinion that in our major and almost sole
reliance upon atomic weapons, we are resting our security largely on an
asset that is steadily depreciating for us, i.e. weapons of mass
destruction. The President’s decision, would I feared, tend to make far
more difficult a realistic re-examination of our position and an effort
to find, if possible, some more solid course or series of courses.
