Department of State Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 53D244
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Senator Hickenlooper1 telephoned me this afternoon to ask whether he could come in for a talk. I said that he could come in immediately or I would make an appointment later at his convenience. He came at once and stayed with me for about half an hour.
[Page 488]The Senator said that he was deeply concerned about the course of events and about positions which he would be called upon to take and would like to tell me some of his worries. He said that he would regard our conversation as wholly confidential and would not repeat it or mention me in any way.
The Senator spoke first about the course of events in the Far East. He thought that the misfortunes of the campaign in Korea were undermining our position in Japan, the Philippines and on the continent of Asia and asked whether it was not desirable and necessary to have what he called a diversion in Asia. By this he meant fomenting outbreaks against the Communists in China and possible use of the Army on Formosa to make landings on the mainland. He spoke of a meeting of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate which he had been invited to attend at which General Chennault2 had talked about the possibility of assisting dissension on the mainland. …
The Senator thought that efforts along this line were the most productive open to us. He went on to mention his fears that the defense of Western Europe was impossible and said that General Collins3 in answer to a question from the Senator along these lines at the last meeting of the Committee had left the Senator with the impression that the defense of Western Europe was possible only if everything turned out exactly as we hoped, including efforts by our allies and sufficient time being made available by the Russians. He thought that it was unlikely that this combination of events would occur and was therefore worried that we were wasting our strength.
The Senator thought that in the Middle West isolationism was growing. He stated that he did not agree with the isolationist point of view and that he thought the people of the Middle West quickly lost these views when trouble started. He said that the Middle West had the highest record of voluntary enlistments of any section of the country during World Wars I and II.
I said to the Senator that in thinking about the matters which he had propounded it seemed to me we must always keep in mind who our principal antagonist was. This was the Soviet Union and not China. Therefore it was important not only to increase our own military strength but do everything possible so that we would have an area from which our strength and that of others could be deployed in case of necessity. This led to the importance of the British Isles, Western Europe and certain areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. If we did not make every effort to strengthen and hold these parts of the world, then it seemed likely not only that we would have no platform from which [Page 489] to operate if we had to against the Soviet Union, but that we would turn great potential strength to the other side. I said, in response to his reference to the atomic bomb, that the usefulness of this weapon would be minimized if the Russians were not required to concentrate and put on a big effort in order to attack Western Europe. (The Senator, in reply, tended to be pessimistic about the utility of the atomic bomb.)
So far as the Far East was concerned, I said that we were not overlooking the possibilities of stirring up trouble in China. I spoke of some of the problems which had to be surmounted and of the fact that this was not a matter which lent itself to public discussion. I spoke of the logistical problems which were raised by his suggestion of using the Nationalist forces for an attack on the mainland while the operations in Korea were going forward.
The Senator said that while all that I said was true, it still seemed to him that we were in danger of wasting our strength in Europe and that we should concentrate more in the Far East along the lines he had suggested. I said to him that I thought all these matters required more time for discussion than we had available at the moment and suggested to him that we would be glad to ask him to come down for a few meetings with us at which we could brief him more in detail on particular area problems. He said that he would be glad to do this.
The next move is therefore up to us. I suggest that Mr. McFall talk this over with Mr. Webb, Mr. Rusk, and Mr. Perkins and that we consider having further meetings with Senator Hickenlooper. The Senator’s manner was friendly throughout. My impression was that he was sincere in wishing to impart his worries to me for any comfort which I could give him. He did not appear to take much comfort from what I said.
- Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa; member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.↩
- Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault (ret.), Adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China, 1937–1941; Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, United States Army Air Forces, 1943–1945.↩
- General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army.↩