Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

661.00/12–1850

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rush)¹

top secret

[Washington,] December 18, 1950.

Subject: Estimates of Moscow–Peiping Time–Table for War

Ref: CA Memorandum July 12, 1950 “Korea and Overall World Situation”²

Defense chiefs are reported* to have advised Congress that total mobilization is not advisable now, but only “limited” expansion, in view of the inability of the military establishment economically to absorb “these sums of money and these accretions of personnel”. This qualification may be acceptable—but obviously only if the Defense estimate of the time factor, vital to preparations for war, is correct. It is indubitably requisite to make the best estimate possible of the probable time when war may be expected to break out, to enable us not only to plan properly for expansion of our existing forces, but to make the best possible deployment of forces in being. General Omar Bradley is quoted in the same report (on testimony before the House Appropriations Committee) as saying that planning was originally based on a 1954 target date, which “we originally thought was the dangerous Period”, but that “The present situation has caused us to move that date down some, so instead of trying to plan on a rising level of production and manpower and getting, ready by 1954 we have had to step that up some for 1952.” It is vital to test any target date, including that of 1952, by all available measures.

Having reference to the estimate in CA’s reference memorandum of July 12, “Korea and Overall World Situation”, that Moscow might plan on war as early as the end of this year, the following factors are outlined as pertinent to the question of the probable time that the Moscow–Peking axis might undertake steps resulting in general war.

Major Indicators:

1) Soviet intransigence in all political fields in 1950.

2) Evident parallel Chinese intransigence, with relative unconcern for (a) national economic welfare, (b) regularization of diplomatic relations with non-Communist States, and (c) membership in the UN.

3) Military moves in European and Asiatic sectors of the Communist camp leading U.S. intelligence to conclude that both the USSR and China are capable of launching war across their frontiers without further notice.

Straws in the Wind:

1) Chinese intervention in Korea, practical refusal to accept a negotiated settlement.

2) Soviet warning regarding “consequences” of re-arming Germany.^†

3) Tenor of Communist propaganda line warning the populations of the USSR and satellite States that the USA plans war, with increased recent emphasis.

4) Communist efforts to isolate “the Anglo-American bloc”.

5) Move to establish a rival to the UN in the form of the “World Peace Council” at Warsaw.

6) Withdrawal of the Chinese Communist delegation from the UN before the official termination of debate; return of Vyshinsky to Moscow.

7) Reported scheduled movement of Soviet armored and tank corps into East Germany.

Factors Operating in Favor of Early Communist Time-Table:

1) Implementation of NATO plans; thwarting of the Sovietization of the UN.

2) U.S. rearmament program.

3) “Dated” character of Soviet arms.

4) Economic distress (which could partially be alleviated by looting of consumption goods per World War II practice), political unrest (aggravating fears of rulers) in Soviet bloc.

5) Decline in strength of Communist parties outside Soviet bloc.

6) Attainment by USSR of neutralizing counter-agent, or balancing agent, to A–bomb.

7) Advantage which would accrue to Communist camp by surprise element in striking substantially ahead of what free countries regard as “Soviet time-table for war”.

8) Present defense posture of free world, particularly, engagement of major U.S. forces in Korea and French forces in Indo-China, and vulnerability of both Japan and Germany (two prime plums) to attack.

Given Existing Factors, Tentative Estimate of Probable Communist Timing:

1) Earliest: December 25, 1950 to January 2, 1951.

2) Medium: early spring, 1951.

3) Latest: post-harvest period, 1951.

Manner of Starting:

If one of the two earlier periods is selected, the issue might be the re-arming of Germany; if the project for arming Germany be dropped, or rejected by the Bonn Government, the “East Germans” might move in the Korean style, in the first instance: in either event, the USSR would assume that the USA might accept the challenge, would calculate the risk—and would act accordingly. The element of surprise would be exploited to its fullest by the Communist strategists.^‡ The nominal cause which would bring war in the latest of the three periods is not now foreseeable.

Addendum:

If war with the USSR need not even so be regarded as “inevitable”, it must in the present circumstances be deemed “probable”, and in the near rather than distant future. Because our time-table is set for 1952 at the earliest, it would patently be desirable to cause a retarding of the Communist time-table if possible. We seem hardly to dispose of military or economic factors, in addition to those now effective, which could be brought fruitfully to bear within the indicated time-limit. Whether the introduction into the equation of a new factor in the form of political negotiations would act as a brake in a situation where neither side gives evidence of being ready to cede substantially, is an open question. It could perhaps be said that a political conference, even if it achieved nothing, would probably not hasten the present trend toward war, and that it would be well to meet war having explored all avenues that might offer themselves for the achievement of a measure of immediate understanding and at least temporary toleration. At worst, we might still gain a short measure of precious time—assuming that while the two sides were talking they would not at any rate be shooting. Under existing conditions, however, by the present estimate, for our defense moves we have left to us only days and hours, not months and years.

3Washington Post, December 15, 1950, p. 2, “Pentagon Opposes Full Mobilization Now.” [Footnote in the source text. For information on the hearings under reference, see the second editorial note, page 420.]

1. Copies of this memorandum were transmitted to Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, to John Paton Davies of the Policy Planning Staff, and to the component offices of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
2. Not printed.
3. The Moscow statement that it “will not tolerate” the re-arming of Germany cannot safely, any more than Peiping’s threat to intervene in Korea if the 38th Parallel were crossed, be assumed to be a bluff. Cf. Abram Bergson’s letter, New York Times, December 17, 1950 (attached) for some cogent reasoning. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding the possible rearmament of Germany, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff. The newspaper clipping has not been reproduced.]
4. Cf. Dr. Vannevar Bush’s comment on Soviet tactics and scruples, quoted by Drew Pearson (Washington Post, December 17, 1950—attached). [Footnote in the source text. The newspaper clipping has not been reproduced.]