Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

[Washington,] December 9, 1950.

Suggested Outline for Discussion at the NSC Meeting, Monday, December 11, 1950, 3:30 p. m.¹

1. In an introductory statement the President might say:

a. The military situation resulting from the Chinese intervention in Korea is now considerably clarified.

b. The Attlee talks have given a clearer view of the U.K. position.

c. The President’s purpose in calling this special meeting of the NSC is

(1) to obtain as close agreement as possible on the basic facts of the crisis now facing the United States;

(2) to enable the President to make those decisions necessary immediately and to prepare for the prompt handling of other questions requiring decision.

The President might then call on the Secretary of State for a brief statement of points arising from the Attlee discussions that appear to him to be of greatest significance.

2. Secretary Acheson might then follow with a brief summary

a. Emphasizing the wide area of agreement—

(1) a firm stand in Korea as long as possible and withdrawal only under duress;

(2) no appeasement of the Chinese communists;

(3) no conditions outside of Korea to be attached to any “cease fire” agreement;

(4) continued willingness to talk with and negotiate with the communists;

(5) the necessity of maintaining a vigorous stance in both the Atlantic and the Pacific areas;

(6) the necessity for moving ahead as rapidly as possible with U.S. and European rearmament;

(7) procedure for dealing with raw materials problems;

(8) recognition that the major threat is the U.S.S.R.;

(9) recognition that the threat from this quarter may be more immediate than we had previously thought.

b. Stressing that apart from our differing views on seating the Chinese communists in the U.N. and on the desirability of limited warfare against the Chinese communists, differences between the U.K. and the U.S. positions were largely ones of emphasis.

c. Concluding with emphasis on the importance of maintaining solidarity with the U.K. because of two considerations:

(1) geographic position and substantial real strength which the U.K. can contribute to our own defense;

(2) the influence of the U.K. with the other Commonwealth countries and the rest of the free world generally.

3. The President might then bring up item 2 of the agenda—the situation we now face—and do the following in order:

a. Call on General Bradley for a brief comment on the military situation in Korea.

b. Call on General Smith for a summary appreciation of Soviet intentions, objectives, and probable moves, and the probable imminence of these moves.

c. Ask Secretary Acheson to give any additional comments he might like to make.

d. Ask General Bradley to comment on our military position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., this comment to include:

(1) probable developments during the initial stages were general war to occur in the near future;

(2) an estimate of the time which would be necessary for an improvement in our general military position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.

4. The President might then take up the third item of the agenda—the steps we should take—calling first on Secretary Acheson for an over-all presentation.

5. In making his comments the Secretary might begin with a summary of the preceding discussion of Soviet intention, objectives, and probable moves. (The substance of this discussion might be anticipated to be as given in paragraph 9 of NIE, No. 11, December 5, 1950:2 “The Soviet rulers have resolved to pursue aggressively their world-wide attack on the power position of the United States and its allies regardless of the possibility that global war may result, although they may estimate that the Western Allies would seek to avoid such a development. Further direct or indirect Soviet aggression in Europe and Asia is likely, regardless of the outcome of the Korean situation.”) The Secretary might then proceed in the following order:

A. Main Implication of the Imminent Threat

We are not justified in taking a gamble that the Kremlin is bluffing. The nation should therefore prepare for the contingency of total war with the Soviet Union in the immediate future. If we act with the utmost unity, determination and wisdom the contingency may still be avoided. If it is not, we shall have done our best to prepare for it. We are not morally justified in doing less, for to do less would be to imperil national survival.

B. The Importance of Buying Time if Possible

During the period of military weakness vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. our basic objective must be to survive with honor and to build a platform from which we can subsequently go on to a successful outcome of the life-and-death struggle in which we are engaged with the Kremlin. We must avoid becoming involved in general hostilities with the U.S.S.R. in our present position of military weakness if this is at all possible without sacrificing our self-respect and without endangering our survival.

C. Domestic Preparedness Measures

(1) It would seem wise to approve immediately as an interim program, the JCS recommendation that the 1954 defense targets should be met as rapidly as possible. It is understood that for most of the program “as rapidly as possible” means 1952 or earlier. In light of the estimate of the Council of Economic Advisers’ estimate that such a decision would still not involve a total effort by the United States, urgent consideration should be given to whether there are not additional defense measures which it would be wise to adopt in light of the strategic position of the United States.

(2) We should be prepared to initiate full mobilization at a moment’s notice.

(3) In order to get this program under way with the widest possible national support, it will probably be advisable to declare that the Kremlin threat to the security of the United States has created an unlimited national emergency. This would be preferable to a declaration of full mobilization, but if the order for full mobilization were necessary to obtain a maximum effort, consideration should be given to it.

(4) Thorough and continuing joint review of the world political outlook and our strategic military needs should be begun immediately by the Defense Establishment and the Department of State to the end of achieving the highest degree of coordination between war plans and foreign policy undertakings. The same sort of collaboration as was realized in producing NSC 68 is essential.

D. External Preparedness Measures

(1) So far as possible, Canada and the United Kingdom should fully participate in the accelerated program for building strength.

(2) The United States should not retreat from its commitment to regard aggression against Western Europe (including Berlin) as a casus belli. We should be prepared to assist our NATO allies in continental Western Europe to carry out their roles in the Mid-Term Defense Plan to the extent that such assistance will not interfere with the accelerated defense programs of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom and with the strengthening of other defendable areas essential to the execution of the strategic plan for war with the Soviet Union. In light (a) of the official declaration by the Soviet Union that it will not tolerate the rearming of Western Germany and (b) of the German reluctance to rearm, we should handle with the greatest care our efforts to organize and train Western German military units.

(3) The United States should take all measures which are necessary and possible to prepare such positions in Europe, Africa, and the Pacific as can be held in the event of war and as are necessary to the execution of our strategic plans. We should seek to adjust our positions in other areas in the light of our capabilities.

(4) The importance to the United States of maintaining unity with its allies is now greater than ever. The degree to which other nations and peoples will be induced to associate themselves and work with us will depend not only upon the material assistance that we may be able to provide them but also upon the steadiness, the calmness and the self-possession that is now shown by the Government and the people of the United States. Allies can be won and held by responsible action on the part of the United States. They can be lost by irresponsible talk and erratic national conduct.

E. Political Warfare Measures

(1) Finally, the United States should develop a strong program of political warfare, for this will be an important and possibly a decisive weapon in a war with the Soviet Union. The character, emphasis and intensity of political and psychological warfare programs and campaigns should continually be intimately linked to our political strategy, our strategic war plans and our capabilities. As circumstances warrant, psychological and political warfare campaigns should be undertaken to undermine the Russian people’s loyalty to and support of the Kremlin, to divide the satellites from the Soviet Union, and to exploit the anti-Bolshevik revolutionary potential within the Soviet Empire. To this end, we should immediately mobilize the talents and energies available in the free world in much the same manner as we did in the Manhattan project.

(2) In order to lay the basis for this program, the Kremlin should be continuously identified as the threat to the liberties of all free peoples, as the oppressor of the Russian people and of the peoples it has subjugated, and as a tyrannous oligarchy which drives its satellites to commit aggression against others. The United States should continuously champion the right of all peoples to chose their own form of government and to be secure in their national independence. It should express its political support and, in case of war, military support, for all peoples who are now free and for all peoples who seek liberation from their bondage, including the minority peoples now a part of the Soviet Union.

6. Continuing with the third item on the agenda, the President might then call upon the following for their views as to steps which should be taken:

a. The Secretary of Defense;

b. The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board;

c. Mr. Harriman;

d. The Secretary of the Treasury.

1For text of NIE 11, December 5, “Soviet Intentions in the Current Situation,” printed as a memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, December 2, see vol. vii, p. 1308.

1. At the 74th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 11, the following subjects received consideration: the United States position regarding a cease-fire in Korea; the results of the President’s recent conversations with British Prime Minister Attlee; and the proclamation of a national emergency. Documentation on the first two subjects is presented in volume vii. For additional documentation on the Truman–Attlee talks, see vol. iii, pp. 1698 ff. With regard to the proclamation of a national emergency, the Council took the following action (NSC Action No. 392):

   “[The Council]

   “a. Discussed the situation the U.S. now faces and certain steps which now appear to be necessary, including the possible declaration of a national emergency and probable Soviet reaction thereto.

   b. Agreed to advise the President that the declaration of a national emergency appears necessary in order to enable the U.S. to take the steps required in the interests of national security.

   Note: The action in b above subsequently submitted to the President for consideration.” (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66D95: NSC Actions)