711.00/12–550
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Barrett) to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Webb)
Subject: The Current Emergency
From where we sit, the Administration seems in danger of erring very badly in the direction of “Let’s wait and see” and “Let’s not do anything until we are absolutely sure of it”.
Public opinion in this country and abroad is in a very serious condition. In the absence of strong, positive leadership in Washington, the situation is ripe for mountebanks of various sorts to move in and fill the void.
The American people are getting the impression that their Washington leadership is utterly confused and sterile. They are saying, in effect: “Don’t just sit there; do something”.
The people of Western Europe seem, on the one hand, to be frightened to death that we are going to bluster into a general war. On the other hand, we believe, they would welcome a firm U.S. position to the effect that “We are not going to be rushed into any foolish international action; we are going to husband our resources; but we are going into a gigantic mobilization in the belief that it is the one way of preserving the peace.”
[Page 424]We certainly do not advocate sweeping and empty announcements for their propaganda impact alone. But we do feel that if there is ever a time when psychological factors are enormously important, that time is now. Moreover, we know we are bound to embark on a huge mobilization program; hence it should be quite possible to use that fact in a way that will meet the psychological crisis we face. If we move now in this direction, there is a good chance that we can enlist the support of that large segment of the public opinion, here and abroad, that is now in a highly fluid state. If we wait until appropriate officials have worked out every last detail of the things that are going to be done, we very likely will have lost the support of public opinion. We will seem to be trailing badly.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the President assert his leadership promptly. He could do this in a message to Congress, in a simple announcement from the White House, or, preferably, in a fireside talk, within the next two days. The content of that message or talk should be along the following lines:
- (1)
- An analysis of the situation we face and the gravity of it (coupled with whatever grave announcement it may at that time be appropriate to make regarding Korea).
- (2)
- A brief statement of the world situation we face, based on the concept of NSC–68.
- (3)
- A clear and forceful statement to the effect that we are calm and resolute, determined to meet the grave world situation, but also determined not to be rushed into any shortsighted or unwise international moves.
- (4)
- A statement that the President is today declaring a state of national emergency.
- (5)
- A statement that, in the interest of building up the forces to preserve the peace, he is today instructing the appropriate authorities to double the previously planned rate of acceleration of production of Army equipment and Air Force equipment. (This might mean revising schedules so that by December, 1951, we reach the level of production previously planned for December, 1952.)
- (6)
- Announcing simply that the President is instructing the Navy to enlist as rapidly as possible the manpower needed to man 75% (or another appropriate figure) of the usable Navy vessels now in mothballs.
- (7)
- Announcing that he is instructing the control agencies of Government to draft and issue whatever regulations are necessary to facilitate this program, preparing requests for legislation where that is necessary.
- (8)
- Announcing that, at his request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or SecDef) are bringing General Eisenhower back into active service with the assignment of going to Europe, as representative of the [Page 425] Defense Department, to help expedite the planning for united European defense.
- (9)
- Announcing some concrete step (like a weekly conference) to implement true bi-partisanship.
The representatives of the agencies concerned seem to agree that these steps or similar ones definitely could be taken “after the necessary details are worked out carefully”. Many, however, feel that the details should be worked out prior to any announcement.
We contend that it may then be too late. We urge that the President move forthrightly in this direction, giving the agencies concerned orders to work out the details and carry through as speedily as possible.1