Subject: National Intelligence Estimate No. 3: Soviet
Capabilities and Intentions.
This national estimate is a condensation of the estimate prepared by the US
and UK intelligence teams last month, with only two changes of substance.
These changes are additions (page 2, para. 10; page 23, para. 63, third and
following sentences) based upon General Smith’s statement to the NSC stemming from the Korean situation;1 they embody no significant
departure from the US–UK estimate.
It is the intention of General Smith, with the Intelligence Advisory
Committee, to keep this estimate under continual review as well as to
prepare particular estimates bearing on immediate situations, both general
and local, which have a bearing on the over-all intentions and
capabilities.
[Annex]
[Extract]
National Intelligence Estimate
top secret
[Washington,] 15 November 1950.
NIE–3
Soviet Capabilities and Intentions
the problem
1. To estimate Soviet capabilities and intentions with particular
reference to the date at which the USSR might be prepared to engage in a
general war.
conclusions
2. The Soviet rulers are simultaneously motivated by
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations related to the
position of the Soviet Union as a world power. Their ultimate objective is to establish a Communist world
controlled by themselves or their successors. However, their immediate
concerns, all consistent with that objective, are:
-
a.
- To maintain the control of the Kremlin over the peoples of the
Soviet Union.
-
b.
- To strengthen the economic and military position and defend the
territory of the Soviet Union.
-
c.
- To consolidate control over the European and Asian satellites
(including Communist China).
-
d.
- To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union, and
to prevent the establishment, in Europe and Asia, of forces capable
of threatening the Soviet position.
-
e.
- To eliminate US influence in Europe and Asia.
-
f.
- To establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.
-
g.
- To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally,
especially to undermine the power and influence of the US.
The Soviet Union will try to pursue these immediate objectives
simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these
objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will
attach greater importance to the first four listed, and in that
order.
3. Inasmuch as the Soviet ultimate objective is
immutable and dynamic, the Soviet Union will continue relentlessly its
aggressive pressures on the non-Soviet world, particularly on the power
position of the Western nations. Consequently there is, and will
continue to be, grave danger of war between the USSR and its satellites,
on the one hand, and the US and its allies on the other.
4. The Soviet rulers could achieve and are achieving the first three of
their immediate objectives (para. 2 a, b, and c) without risk of
involvement in armed conflict with the United States.
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5. Their remaining immediate objectives (para. 2 d, e, f, and g) are improbable of achievement without resort
to armed force, although there are still factors in the situation which
might well lead the Soviet rulers to suppose that, in favorable
circumstances, they might eventually achieve these objectives without
the use of Soviet forces.
6. In pressing to achieve these latter objectives the Soviet rulers will
inevitably impinge upon vital interests of the Western Powers and thus
incur the risk of involvement in a general war through Western
reaction.
7. In the belief that their object cannot be fully attained without a
general war with the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may deliberately
provoke such a war at the time when, in their opinion, the relative
strength of the USSR is at its maximum. It is estimated that such a
period will exist from now through 1954,* with the peak of Soviet strength relative to the
Western Powers being reached about 1952.†
8. From the point of view of military forces and economic potential, the
Soviet Union is in a position to conduct a general war now (i.e., at
least to conduct the campaigns listed in paragraphs 66–68, p. 10), if
the Soviet rulers should consider it desirable or expedient to do
so.
9. Intelligence is lacking to permit a valid prediction as to whether or
when the USSR would actually resort deliberately to a general war. It
must be recognized, however, that a grave danger of general war exists
now, and will exist hereafter whenever the Soviet rulers may elect to
take action which threatens the vital interests of the Western
Powers.
10. Specifically with respect to the Korean situation, to date there is
insufficient evidence to indicate that the USSR intends to commit Soviet
forces overtly in Korea. However, the commitment of Chinese Communist
forces, with Soviet material aid, indicates that the USSR considers the
Korean situation of sufficient importance to warrant the risk of general
war. The probability is that the Soviet Union considers that the US will
not launch a general war over Chinese Communist intervention in North
Korea and the reaction thereto. The principal risk of general war is
through the exercise of Soviet initiative which the Kremlin continues to
hold. The probability is that the Soviet Government has not yet made a
decision directly to launch a general war over the Korean-Chinese
situation. There is a good chance that they will not in the immediate
future take such a
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decision.
At what point they will take a decision to launch
a general war is not now determinable by Intelligence.
Note: The foregoing paragraphs (7–10) represent
the best conclusions that can be reached on the basis of the information
available at this time. The problem of whether and when the USSR may
resort deliberately to general war is under continuing consideration and
will be the subject of future reports as pertinent information is
developed.
[Here follows the body of the report.]
