[Annex]
[Extract]
Draft Study Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff
top secret
[Washington,] November 10, 1950.
Annex VIII
NSC 68/1
The Strategy of Freedom2
contents
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Page3
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| Introduction |
1 |
| Part 1—Sources and Nature of the Problem |
5 |
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A. The Basic Situation |
5 |
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(1) The Pattern of Conflict |
5 |
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(2) The Relation of Power and Intention |
7 |
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(3) Redressing the Power Balance |
10 |
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B. The Factors of Complication |
14 |
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(1) Historical Forces as a Source of Difficulty |
14 |
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(2) The Fundamental Dilemmas |
17 |
| Part 2—The Requirements for Effective Action |
22 |
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A. The Qualities to be Sought in the Common
Effort |
22 |
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(1) Confidence and Will |
22 |
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(2) A Sense of Common Purpose |
23 |
[Page 405]
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B. The Burden and Opportunity of Leadership |
27 |
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(1) Leadership and Consent |
27 |
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(2) The Criteria of Leadership |
32 |
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(3) The Role of the American People |
38 |
| Part 3—Channels of Common Action |
41 |
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A. The United Nations |
41 |
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(1) Political Development |
42 |
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(2) Economic Development |
45 |
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B. Regional Organizations |
47 |
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(1) The Range of Problems |
48 |
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(2) The North Atlantic Area |
49 |
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(3) Other Groupings |
53 |
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C. Economic Collaboration and Mutual
Assistance |
57 |
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(1) The Reconciliation of Objectives |
58 |
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(2) The Criteria of Assistance |
60 |
| Part 4—Relations With the Soviet System |
64 |
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A. Approach to the People within the Soviet
Orbit |
64 |
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(1) Relation to the Strategy of Freedom |
65 |
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(2) The Techniques of the Effort |
67 |
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B. The Problem of Negotiation |
70 |
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(1) The Necessity of Receptivity |
70 |
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(2) The Range of Issues |
72 |
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(3) The Necessity of Review of the Issues |
78 |
introduction
The effort called forth to realize the hope for a peaceful resolution of
the world crisis and to provide a basis for victory if such hope fails
requires, in the words of NSC 68—
. . . political and economic measures with which and the military shield
behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design …
by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free
world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring
about an internal change in the Soviet system. …
Again as stated in NSC 68, the
requirements must
. . . include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and
agreed with our Allies and … consonant with our objectives.
The purpose of this annex is to set forth the political and economic
measures entailed in this great undertaking. The military requirements
are dealt with elsewhere. The political and economic elements are
premised on the assumption of adequacy in scope and timing of
[Page 406]
the aspects of the effort
related to the military shield. A second assumption is that the hope to
avoid general war will be realized. It is within the Kremlin’s power to
confound such hope. Should it do so, other patterns of action would
apply. This paper is not intended to be a presentation of them.
The principle pervading the issues is freedom. The hopes of frustrating
the Kremlin design are centered in the strategy of freedom—the term used
here to indicate the political and economic lines of action required.
This strategy calls for the creation and maintenance of strength at the
center, with accompanying action:
- 1.
- To stimulate recognition of and effective resistance to Soviet
imperial ambitions and actions, in all their forms.
- 2.
- To secure reliable allies whose strength, effectively organized
and combined with our own, will deter—or, if necessary,
defeat—Soviet aggression.
- 3.
- To win and hold popular support among all peoples for our
objectives of an international order in which peace and freedom will
be secure.
- 4.
- To make steady progress in the development and strengthening of
the collective institutions necessary to the maintenance of peace
and freedom and the advancement of human welfare.
- 5.
- To foster social and economic conditions which will assist in
achieving the foregoing objectives.
- 6.
- To reduce the opportunities for and dangers of local revolutions
and disturbances which would be adverse to our position and to
encourage local revolutionary situations and disturbances when and
if legitimate popular and national aspirations would be (fulfilled
and the Soviet position would thereby be weakened without offsetting
disadvantages to our own.
- 7.
- By all such steps, to establish the base essential to a process of
accommodation and adjustment by the Soviet Union, recorded from time
to time in the negotiation of agreements corresponding to the
relative decline in the capabilities of the Soviet Union.
In pursuing these political and economic lines of action, we must act
always in the light of the historical forces at work, the circumstances
of the present, and the predictable future. It is not possible to
blueprint a comprehensive course of action far ahead. We must expect the
unexpected—both favorable opportunities which can be exploited and
unfavorable turns which must be countered. We must, therefore, equip
ourselves to act or react promptly, decisively, imaginatively. What can
be provided is a compass and a direction but not a map of the terrain
ahead. The political and economic framework set out is, therefore, not a
pattern of action and decision for the next five years but a guide. It
will need to be revised continuously, and should at no stage be regarded
as a definitive statement of how we will proceed with the tasks
ahead.
[Page 407]
This analysis is divided into four sections: the first relating to the
basic nature of the situation—the source and nature of the difficulties;
the second relating to the precepts which must be applied in the
strategy of freedom; the third concerning problems relating to
particular channels of international collaboration; and the fourth
concerning the problems touching directly upon relations with the
Kremlin system.
[Here follows the body of the report—78 pages.]
