661.00/8–2250
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Matthews)
Problem
To determine whether and, if so, when the U.S. should directly charge the Soviet Union with the responsibility for the acts of its satellites.
Discussion
This problem has been the subject of considerable discussion in the Department and also in the senior staff of the NSC. It has been discussed with specific reference to the Korean question and more broadly in terms of the examination of possible further aggressive Soviet moves.
Immediately after June 25 it was decided to avoid charging the Soviet Union with responsibility in order to give them an opportunity to “call off the dog” in Korea without much loss of prestige. In retrospect this seems to have been a wise decision. The consideration which inspired it at the time does not, however, seem to have as much validity under present circumstances.
It is argued that the injury to U.S. prestige caused by the military successes of the North Koreans might be mitigated, especially in Asian eyes, if responsibility were placed squarely and openly on the Soviet Union. We have moved in that direction through our statements in the Security Council but we have not yet openly and flatly charged the Soviet Union with responsibility.
On the factual side, it is clear to us that the Soviet Union is responsible. From the propaganda point of view a sufficiently clear case of responsibility could probably be made out. In anticipation of further aggressions by satellites elsewhere on the periphery or in Berlin, it is argued that it might have a deterrent effect if we announced in advance that we would hold the Soviets responsible for attacks by its satellites. On the other hand, it is argued that if we make such a charge we would have to do something about it.
I suggest that we may be unduly sensitive on this last point. The Soviets have charged us with aggression and seem to consider that a normal part of the war of words. I do not think that we have to go to war with the Soviet Union because we accuse them of aggression. On the other hand, an accusation not followed by action might weaken our position and the position of the U.N.
[Page 371]Consideration must also be given to the reactions of our allies if we accuse the Soviet Union. The familiar argument against increasing the tension would be strongly reiterated.
The above are only some of the arguments and considerations. While this paper is admittedly incomplete, it seems useful to circulate it in order that the making of decisions may be in train.
Recommendations
- 1.
- That we proceed along the present line in the Security Council progressively approaching the direct charge of Soviet responsibility without making it.
- 2.
- The direct charge of responsibility should be made if it appeared likely that the U.S. forces will suffer any further serious military reversal.
- 3.
- That a Departmental decision be reached on the broader question outlined in the foregoing discussion as a basis for the Secretary’s discussions with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman next month.1
- For documentation on the September tripartite foreign ministers meeting in New York, see vol. iii, pp. 1108 ff.↩