700.00(S)/7–2550
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)
The British Ambassador1 asked to see me and came in at four o’clock this afternoon. He opened the conversation by asking me to read a telegram from the Foreign Office dated July 24. The telegram may be summarized as follows:
[Page 350]The Foreign Office feels that the UK and the US Governments should be considering the possibility of Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggressive action in other places than Korea. The telegram mentioned two factors of importance in connection with a Soviet-inspired attack: (1) whether the USSR Representative was present in the Security Council and thus able to veto action, (2) the degree of help the UK, the US, and other free countries would in any case be ready and willing to afford the country attacked. The telegram went on to say that if such an attack occurred against a country the UK would feel compelled to assist to the full regardless of possible consequences, the UK should presumably give such aid under the aegis of a Security Council resolution (as in Korea) or, if vetoed, under Article 51.
The telegram continued that the real problem arose if there were aggression against a country which the UK was not prepared to aid to the full regardless of consequences (as, for example, Yugoslavia).
The telegram went on to say that if an attack occurred against Yugoslavia and unless strong action was taken by the Security Council as in the Korean case, the effect on the prestige of the United Nations might be disastrous and the whole effect of the prompt action by the Security Council in the Korean case irretrievably lost. It might then be said that the Korean case was not a genuine action but merely a US operation and that the UN had “burned its fingers in Korea and was now chary of taking similar action elsewhere”.
The telegram continued that the Foreign Office felt that the US and the UK should consider the line the two countries should take in such a case in the Security Council or perhaps in the UN. The two countries might, in the light of the foregoing, feel that they should restrain the Security Council or the General Assembly. They might want to consider acting as a restraining influence on the Secretariat to keep it from “running ahead” of the UN. There might be a tendency on the part of the UN to regard Korea as a precedent which must be followed whenever aggression takes place.
After I had read the telegram the Ambassador said that he did not, of course, expect an immediate reply since I would obviously wish to consider this matter before discussing it in detail. He apologized for not having copied this top secret telegram and suggested that I make such notes as I wished, which I did.
I told the Ambassador that I would consider this matter, discuss it with some of my colleagues, and get in touch with him at a later date. I told him that the only comment I would make today was to draw his attention to the fact that the Security Council action in Korea was taken in two resolutions. The first one on June 25 found a breach of the peace, called on the aggressors to cease hostilities and to withdraw to their own territory, called on the UN Commission to observe the cease-fire and withdrawal, called on all members to give every assistance to the UN in the execution of the resolution and not to aid the aggressor. I pointed out that this resolution, taken within a few hours after the news of the attack took place, could have been [Page 351] either a springboard for further action or the final action taken by the Security Council. Fortunately, the US Government decided that it would support and take military action and we thereupon introduced the resolution of June 27 recommending that all members give such military assistance as might be necessary to repel the attack and restore international peace and security in the area.
I suggested that this indicated a somewhat natural division we might take in action in future cases. I went on to say that the Security Council (or alternatively the GA), in my opinion, should make a finding of the breach of the peace and aggression, and take action generally along the lines of the June 25 resolution on Korea wherever aggression occurred. Further action might well depend on the country attacked and what the principal members of the free world were prepared to do about it.
I reminded the Ambassador that these were merely preliminary remarks and that after considering this matter further and conferring with my associates I would get in touch with him further.
- Sir Oliver Franks.↩