Subject: Policy Planning Staff Draft Paper on the
International Control of Atomic Energy.4
The attached comments on the subject paper have been prepared at the request
of Mr. Kennan. These comments are directed primarily to the basic premises
and the specific recommendations of the S/P
paper. Inasmuch as the S/P paper was sent to
you in draft form, I thought you might wish to see the comments that I have
felt necessary to make on it.
There are many points of detail both as to fact and as to interpretation
which need to be corrected. I will bring these to the attention of the
Policy Planning Staff in due course.
[Annex]
Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon
Arneson, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of
State (Webb)5
top secret
[Washington,] December 29, 1949.
Comments on Policy Planning Staff Draft Paper on
International Control of Atomic Energy
The following comments are directed to the basic approach and the
recommended course of action in the Policy Planning Staff paper.
In my opinion, the S/P paper is based
primarily on a fundamentally incorrect assumption; namely, that it is
possible to achieve prohibition of atomic weapons and international
control of atomic energy that has any meaning, without a basic change in
Soviet attitudes and intentions, and, in fact, in the Soviet system
itself.
The history of the debates and discussions on international control in
and outside the U.N. have revealed that the Soviet Union not only
refuses to accept those elements which are necessary for effective
control, but, far more important, it refuses to accept any system which
would require it to cooperate with the rest of the world in the
maintenance of peace. The very idea of a cooperative non-Communist world
community is foreign to Marxism, especially as interpreted by the
Soviets. It is almost axiomatic that effective international control of
atomic energy is inconsistent with the Soviet system and Soviet
intentions. So long as this remains true, there can be no solution to
the problem of international control until we find a solution to the
problem posed to the world by the Soviet Union. Any control system in
the field of atomic energy, be it the United Nations plan or some other
scheme, must bring about or await a fundamental change in the Soviet
system. Otherwise, it would fail to accomplish its purpose, however
limited.
The U.N. plan, by putting its emphasis upon effectiveness and security,
meets this criterion. This, in itself, is significant. It should be
noted here that the U.N. plan was never intended to provide absolute
security. What it does offer is a system which would give unmistakable
and adequate warning in cases of violations. This is the minimum that we
can afford to accept. The suggested solution in the S/P paper does not meet the criterion of
opening up the Soviet Union unless the inspection system proposed
becomes so thorough that the iron curtain is effectively shattered. In
this case, the control established would be more onerous than that of
the U.N. plan and equally unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
[Page 3]
It seems to me that before we can move in any other direction than our
present one we must get an answer to the question of just what the
eventual possession of significant quantities of atomic weapons by both
the West and the Soviet Union adds up to. If we can get a reasonably
accurate answer to this question we can then tackle the more difficult
question of what we can do about it, or, in other words, what we can do
about the problem of the Soviet Union. Barring some answer to the second
question, we may be effectively estopped from doing anything regarding
the first that would make any difference at all.
Therefore, I agree with the point made on page 126 that if we do not wish to
see atomic weapons removed from national armaments in the foreseeable
future, barring such a basic change in Soviet attitude as would be
implied through acceptance of the U.N. plan, then our existing position
on international control is adequate. I would add, however, that this
position is also adequate if we do wish to remove
these weapons from national armaments. The assumption, also made on page
126 of the S/P paper, that we can have international
control and prohibition of atomic weapons, even in the light of the
existing Soviet attitude, is, to my mind, completely unfounded.
Until we get an answer to the question of what atomic weapons are really
worth, and in the light of this answer, determine what can be done about
the Soviet Union we should subject the S/P suggestions to the following criteria:
1. Do they jeopardize U.S.
security?
If they do, we would be remiss in our responsibilities in putting them
forward. While there may be some doubts expressed regarding the attitude
of the military and the Congress regarding supporting the U.N. plan if
the Soviets were to accept it, on balance, the chances of acceptance are
good. That cannot be said for any alternate scheme yet advanced,
including the S/P suggestions. (Mr.
Osborn7 has testified in the past before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, and that body had a man on Mr. Osborn’s
staff during the writing of the Second and Third Reports.8 This Committee indicated its approval of the
work being done.)
[Page 4]
2. Is there any prospect of Soviet
acceptance which would involve more than a paper agreement?
If we were to suggest the idea of a moratorium on atomic energy, there is
no reason to believe that the necessary safeguards would be any more
acceptable to the Soviet Union than those in the U.N. plan. Neither is
there any reason to believe that the Soviet Union would accept the
suppression of atomic energy. Such a proposal could also lend substance
to a very damaging charge, already being made, that the U.S. is trying
to deny the use of atomic energy to nations deficient in power.
3. Is the procedure and solution
acceptable to our closest friends, particularly the United Kingdom,
Canada and France?
As the S/P paper points out, an apparent
by-passing of these countries and the U.N. could be disastrous, and
doubly so, should there be another such “leak” as occurred in the
Smith-Molotov conversations.9 If we
avoid these dangers and do make an approach, it should be on a much
broader base than that of atomic energy. The approach should be on the
general problem of the Soviet Union, and, specifically, it should not,
as the S/P paper suggests, exclude the
problem of conventional armaments. Although the solutions to the problem of atomic energy control and the
problem of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments are
necessarily separate and different, the implementation of both systems must be coordinated. There must
be some redressing of the existing imbalance between the Soviet armed
forces and those of the rest of the world. The U.S. position on this
point has never, to my knowledge, been thought through.
I do not believe that the suggested procedure contained in Part VII
(pages 57-67) and the suggested possibilities in paragraph 6, pages
62-6410
in the S/P paper meet these criteria at
all adequately.
I do not believe that, much as we desire to have atomic weapons really
prohibited, the U.S. should unilaterally renounce this weapon. It is
difficult to see what possible effect this renunciation might have on
the Soviet Union, other than being interpreted as a revelation of
weakness with all its implications. Its effect on Western Europe might
well be disastrous. The same considerations apply to the super-bomb,
although a clear distinction must be drawn between possession and
[Page 5]
use of either atomic or super-bombs.11 This distinction is not always made in the S/P paper.
Taking up seriatim the various possibilities for
sounding out the Soviets as listed under paragraph (6), pages 62-64 of
the S/P paper, I have the following
comments:
“(a) A plan which would be temporary, and in the
nature of a technical and political modus
vivendi, rather than permanent.”
There is no apparent virtue in a temporary arrangement per se. Short of an arrangement embodying the principal
features of the U.N. plan, I cannot envisage any temporary scheme that
would meet the criteria listed above. We could, of course, accept a
temporary truce along the lines of the Romulo and Quaker proposals,12 which would freeze U.S.
supremacy for the duration of the armistice. The Soviets would hardly
accept this idea.
“(b) complete prohibition of atomic weapons of
every sort.”
This has been our goal in international control negotiations from the
beginning. It is provided for in the U.N. plan. The Soviet Union states
that this is its goal also. It is fair to say that the entire U.N.
debate has hinged on this point. If we bear in mind that to all intents
and purposes nuclear fuel is atomic weapons, it becomes obvious that
complete prohibition of atomic weapons is inconsistent with national
possession of nuclear fuel. It is this fact that the Soviet Union
chooses to ignore. Control and prohibition are two sides of the same
coin, or, as Sir Alexander Cadogan13 stated in this
last General Assembly, effective control is prohibition. To talk of
prohibition as distinct from control is technically meaningless.
“(c) the abandonment of large reactors for this
period.”
This idea is not new. It is provided for in the U.N. plan which limits
the production of nuclear fuel to the quantity consistent with known
beneficial uses, including research and development. For example, if
[Page 6]
that plan were accepted now,
Hanford14 would be shut down. At one time the Soviet Union
did not oppose this provision and, in fact, expressed considerable
interest in its corollary, the idea of national quotas for peaceful
uses. Now that it is presumably no longer a have not nation,
Vishinsky,15 in
the last General Assembly stated:
“The requirements of the Soviet Union of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes are tremendous, and the attainments of the Soviet Union in the
utilization of atomic energy for peaceful ends are also tremendous. All
this must be borne in mind when mention is made of quotas and
rationing.…16 At the same time, however, we insist that no one
must prevent us from utilizing atomic energy to the maximum extent for
peaceful purposes.…” He also stated that the U.N. plan was designed to
make impossible the development of atomic energy for peaceful ends. It
seems clear that the Soviet Union would accept no restriction on its
development of atomic energy, i.e., manufacture of nuclear fuel with all
its implications.
“(d) disposition of stocks of dangerous materials
in such a way as to give reasonable assurance against any one-sided
advantage by seizure.”
This, too, is not new, being an integral part of the U.N. plan. The
Soviet Union has not expressed disapproval of this feature and is not
expected to, so long as it is U.S. stocks that are to be redistributed.
I fail to see how we can seriously put this forward except as part of
the U.N. plan. In the context of the proposed temporary modus vivendi, it can only mean an almost
immediate equalization of U.S. and Soviet atomic capabilities, with
little to show in return.
“(e) non-dangerous activities to be left in
national hands, but only on the condition of complete ‘openness’ of
research and development activity.”
This is provided in the U.N. plan, subject to such licensing and
inspection as are deemed necessary by the nature of the research and
development, and the quantities of nuclear fuel used or produced. The
Soviet Union objects to this, as, in fact, they do to any requirement
for real “openness”.
“(f) No international authority and no veto
provisions.”
This is somewhat obscure. If it means no international body, it is
inconsistent with subsequent provisions for U.N. custody and supervision
over large reactors, nuclear fuel and raw material sources, an
inspection system, periodic observation of non-dangerous activities,
etc. These activities must be carried on by some, presumably a U.N.,
organ. If what is intended is the denial of positive managerial,
research, and development functions on the part of the international
agency, it should be emphasized that such functions make control easier,
would attract more competent personnel, and could mean the difference
between success and failure. It might be noted that even the Soviet
proposals take this factor into account and provide for research by the
international agency in its own laboratories.
[Page 7]
I interpret the “no veto provisions” to mean that the United States
modify or drop the provisions in the U.N. plan on the subject of the
veto. As the S/P paper points out, this
subject has not been recently debated in the United Nations. The real
debate has been on effectiveness of control, which would make
prohibition itself effective. I would emphasize, however, that under the
U.N. plan, with international operational personnel in the large plants,
the veto loses its importance because evasions, violations and seizures
cannot be hidden. In such circumstances, the real question is whether
the law-abiding nations, under Article 51 or some other arrangement,
will take the necessary corrective measures in case of violation. Under
any plan which denies the continuous physical presence of operating
international personnel, the veto, which can be used to delay or to deny
access, becomes very important.
“(g) Stages so arranged that termination of
activity in large reactors, establishment of formal U.N. custody of
large reactors and stocks of nuclear fuels, establishment of U.N.
supervision over raw material sources and prohibition of the weapon,
would all take place simultaneously.”
Now that more than one country has something physical to give up, the
problem of stages may be easier to tackle than in the past. The time and
conditions under which reactors and nuclear fuel, for example, are to be
given up, would be the same for all nations and none would appear to be
placed in an advantageous or disadvantageous position. However, in
establishing any control system, there are a certain irreducible number
of steps, such as signing the treaty, establishing some international
organ, recruiting, training and physically locating personnel, declaring
all materials and facilities, and, finally, turning them over to the
control of the international body in accordance with the terms of the
treaty and as that body acquires the necessary competence to perform its
duties.
I do not see how it would be physically possible to bring into being
simultaneously the various points in paragraph (g) above. Moreover, the establishment of supervision over raw
material sources is not a one-shot affair, but a continuous operation. I
would like to point out, also, that the point on the prohibition of the
weapon is technically meaningless, because the turning over of large
reactors and stocks of nuclear fuel to U.N. custody would remove the
essential ingredient of atomic weapons from nations and would be
prohibition in fact as well as in name.
“(h) an inspection system involving:
- (1)
- a complete showdown on existing operations including full
accounting and verification of raw materials utilized to date,
existing reserve and pipe line stocks, nuclear fuels produced,
etc.;
- (2)
- adequate U.N. observation over all known and declared raw material
sources and facilities for investigation, and if necessary,
observation over all alleged ones;
- (3)
- U.N. supervision of large reactors during deactivation or
dismantling stage, followed by periodic observation over sites of
such reactors;
- (4)
- complete openness of laboratories for serious scientific visitors
on an international scale; and
- (5)
- periodic observation of non-dangerous activities.”
[Page 8]
Point (1) above is contemplated under any system of control so far
advanced and needs no further comment. Point (2) does not go far enough
in that it makes no provision for locating either unknown or undeclared
raw materials sources. The provision in Point (3) for periodic
observation over sites of dismantled or deactivated reactors is either
unnecessary if the reactors are completely removed, or insufficient if
the reactors can in fact be reactivated without much difficulty. Point
(4) is provided for in the U.N. plan. Its requirement for complete
openness of national laboratories is not acceptable to the Soviet Union.
Point (5) may or may not be adequate, depending on the nature of the
so-called non-dangerous activity. In certain reactors, which need not be
very large, it is possible to conduct certain activities surreptitiously
which are not readily detectable and could be dangerous. This is
particularly true if the super-bomb becomes a real possibility.
It would be my recommendation that the United States make a complete
assessment of the role of atomic weapons in the cold war and in a
possible hot war. We should, at the same time, reexamine all
possibilities of bringing the Soviet Union into the community of
nations. If any useful course of action is indicated by the above
studies, we could then make an approach to the Soviet Union on the
broader basis, into which international control would fit.
Pending the results of such studies we should use the existing forum of
the permanent members of the UNAEC as
the point of contact with the Soviet Union. In the closed, informal
sessions of that body we can, without undue risk, put forward desirable
or appropriate explanations, suggestions, or even modifications on such
matters as the veto and stages. This forum also provides a point of
contact for the necessary consultations with our allies and for
detecting or exploiting any changes in the Soviet attitude.
