90. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council1

NSC 10/5



Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 27, 19512
Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 22, 19513
Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 9, 19514

As of October 23, 1951, the statutory members of the National Security Council approved the recommendations contained in Reference A as amended by the changes contained in Reference C. The Director of Central Intelligence had concurred therein.

Accordingly, the report as amended and approved is enclosed herewith for information and appropriate implementation by all departments and agencies concerned, as indicated therein.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling of this report and that access be limited strictly to individuals requiring the information contained therein to carry out their official duties.

It is further requested that all copies of the reference memoranda be withdrawn and returned to this office upon receipt of this report.

James S. Lay, Jr.
[Page 207]



The National Security Council approves in principle as a national responsibility the immediate expansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2, and the intensification of covert operations designed in general order of emphasis to:
Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, and Communist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer constitute a threat to U.S. security.
Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will to resist Soviet domination.
Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable extent consistent with 1–a above, and ensure availability of these forces in the event of war for utilization in accordance with principles established by the National Security Council, including wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces on a military basis in time of war within active theaters of operations.
The National Security Council directs the Psychological Strategy Board to assure that its strategic concept for a national psychological program includes provision for covert operations designed to achieve the objectives stated in paragraph 1 above.
The National Security Council reaffirms the responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations in accordance with NSC 10/2 and subject to the general policy guidance prescribed therein, and further subject to the approval of the Psychological Strategy Board which shall be responsible for:
Determining the desirability and feasibility of programs and of individual major projects for covert operations formulated by or proposed to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations and the allocation of priorities among these operations.
Coordinating action to ensure the provision of adequate personnel, funds, and logistical and other support to the Director of Central Intelligence by the Departments of State and Defense for carrying out any approved program of covert operations.
The National Security Council requests the Secretary of Defense to provide adequate means whereby the Director of Central Intelligence may be assured of the continuing advice and collaboration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of plans for paramilitary operations during the period of the cold war.
In view of the necessity for immediate decision prior to the coming into operation of the Psychological Strategy Board, the National Security Council authorizes the conduct of expanded guerrilla activities in China, as outlined in the memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence enclosed with the reference memorandum of June 27, 1951 (Reference A), and pursuant to the appropriate provisions of NSC 48/5.7
  1. Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, NSC 10/4 (Document 42) was withdrawn on December 13, after the approval of NSC 10/5. (Memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council, December 13; Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary File, Subject File)
  2. Document 76.
  3. The August 22 memorandum transmitted the JCS views (Document 83?) to the National Security Council.
  4. Document 89.
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  6. Top Secret. Also printed in Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, pp. 437–439.
  7. NSC 48/5, “U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” is printed in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, pp. 3363.