Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

70. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)¹

Washington, May 26, 1951.

SUBJECT

• Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

General Smith’s memorandum of May 8 to the NSC on the above subject² raises a number of not clearly separable problems and issues. In an admittedly arbitrary delineation, the following discussion and recommendations for a Departmental position in the Senior Staff are offered, with an indication, where possible, of the views expressed by General Magruder and Admiral Stevens.³

1. Increased Scope of OPC Operations

The great increase in number and size of projects which OPC has been called on to perform and can anticipate since the approval of NSC 10/2,⁴ and particularly since the Korean war, requires, in General Smith’s view, a reaffirmation by the NSC of its directive to CIA contained in 10/2. He as much as says that the character of the mission for OPC has changed by the change in size and he believes this should be recognized by NSC.

There seems to be no disagreement in the Department or with General Magruder, Admiral Stevens, or CIA itself that there is no alternative but to pursue vigorously the covert operations and to re-affirm the 10/2 in the light of the changes noted by General Smith.

2. Cold War Operations vs. Preparation for Hot War

General Smith points out the gradual but pronounced shift of emphasis in OPC projects from those in support of cold war activities to those involved in the planning and preparation for covert support in the event of war. This presents to OPC a competing claim upon personnel and facilities and General Smith requires further guidance.

The Department would join with General Magruder and Admiral Stevens in believing that we have no course but to pursue both objectives simultaneously. However, the Department would feel that, in the light of the continuing and understandable pressure from the Military for activities in support of a hot war, it is necessary to re-affirm that a fundamental mission of OPC is to promote national policy which has been most recently set forth in the NSC–68 series,⁵ and that therefore primary emphasis must be upon the cold war psychological objectives. This would include the underlying principle that every effort, including psychological, should be made to prevent the coming of a Third World War, while not overlooking the possibility that such a war will break out and we will need to be fully prepared for it.

3. Guidance Mechanism; Support

General Smith directly and indirectly inquires whether OPC should look to the Psychological Strategy Board for guidance and coordination. At the same time he points out that OPC will not be able to fulfill its mission unless it gets more support in terms of personnel and assistance in military and political plans and policies.

The Department would agree with General Magruder and particularly with Admiral Stevens that the PSB was established for just this purpose and it should be utilized to the fullest possible extent. The PSB can and should be called upon for giving or obtaining from the NSC decision where decision is needed, for giving continual guidance, for coordinating the various agencies and for marshalling from the agencies the support required by OPC.

4. Decision and Guidance on Specific Projects

General Smith asks for guidance on a number of specific projects some of which will be in conflict in terms of either the objectives or claims upon personnel or facilities in short supply. Notably General Smith has pointed out that with respect to the problem of support of counter-revolution in the slave states—how much support should be given, when to release it, how much reserve to maintain—presents a conflict in terms of the objectives of the cold war on the one hand, and of preparation for hot war on the other.

Although General Magruder does not address this point, Admiral Stevens points out, and the Department of State would warmly endorse his position, that such problems cannot be answered without further plans and proposals by the CIA and impliedly what the issues are as between the conflicting objectives. This and every other project on which CIA needs specific guidance or decision must be presented in terms of the specific problem to the PSB for coordination, and where necessary presentation to the NSC and the President.

5. Cover Problems

General Smith’s memorandum points out that under the rigid specifications of 10/2, all OPC operations must be carried out in such a way as to remain covert and not disclose the interest of the US Government; that this tends to limit the effectiveness of OPC, particularly in para-military type operations which, on the one hand cannot disguise US Government interest and on the other can be more effectively carried out under quasi-military aegis.

Admiral Stevens suggests and General Magruder would apparently concur that this problem too should be presented in terms of individual projects and specific recommendations thereto to the PSB for resolution. There is no apparent inclination to disagree with General Smith on this.

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

6. Organization

General Smith’s memorandum does not directly address this question but implicit in his approach as well as in the memoranda of General Magruder and Admiral Stevens is the problem of organization for covert activities. The Department would join with Magruder and Stevens in feeling that within OPC and CIA organizational changes, particularly in any distinction between wholly covert type operations and para-military operations, should be handled by CIA itself and should not be of concern to the other agencies except where they may impinge upon the responsibilities of the other agencies or upon the intelligence effort of the Government. On the other hand, with respect to the organizational location of covert operations in the Government as a whole, the Department would agree with Magruder and Stevens that there is no alternative to the present allocation of this responsibility, almost in toto, to CIA–OPC.

Proposed Action

Only Admiral Stevens has suggested what specific action should be taken on General Smith’s memorandum. Even General Smith’s recommendations call for “guidance”, without any indication as to the nature or form of such guidance.

The Department would concur in Admiral Stevens’s specific suggestion that the Senior Staff recommend that the NSC approve a statement of policy with respect to General Smith’s memorandum. In brief, Admiral Stevens recommends that this statement of policy contain the following points:

a. CIA should increase the scope and pace of its cold-war activities without jeopardizing its planning and preparation for covert, hot-war activities.

b. There should be no change in the present Governmental organization for covert activities, but that the newly created Psychological Strategy Board should be fully utilized.

c. (1) Present mechanisms for coordination on planning for hot war are available with elements of the Military Establishment.

(2) The PSB should give the necessary guidance on any conflicts which arise in pursuing the objectives for the cold and the hot war.

(3) The PSB can and should ensure that political and military considerations are applied to covert activities.

(4) All agencies should give fullest possible support to the covert activities and this support should be insured and coordinated through PSB.

d. PSB should be specifically directed (by the NSC and the President) to provide or obtain the guidance required by CIA.

Annex 1

Washington, May 23, 1951.

Memorandum From Brigadier General John Magruder to the Department of Defense Representative on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council (Nash)⁶

SUBJECT

• Scope and Pace of Covert Operations (memo to NSC from Director, Central Intelligence dated 8 May 1951)

1. The Director, Central Intelligence is faced by problems created by the cold war in which our enemy has the initiative and by the fact that our Government as a whole has not adapted itself to the flexibility of action demanded in the circumstances. The Departments of State and Defense in the face of swift and uninhibited manuevers by the Kremlin are still bound by formal traditions of political action and conventional war planning as if peace and war were absolute conditions. CIA alone has been conceived and patterned to exercise relative freedom of action in a world situation which is more akin to war than peace.

2. Nationally we are not mobilized to face the kind of challenge forced upon us by the Kremlin. That challenge obviously cannot be met by the CIA alone, or by the totality of our so-called psychological resources. The Soviets have enlarged the cold war by the coordinated employment actively or potentially of all their resources, orthodox as well as unorthodox.

3. The issues raised by the DCI are not administrative or jurisdictional. They can be understood only in light of the inflexibility of our governmental organization and concepts in facing urgent and unusual requirements. While the orthodox departments think and plan too largely in terms of a D–Day that no man can predict, we deprive ourselves of full resources in fighting a cold war which might be decisive. While our psychological and covert agencies remain a “thin red line of heroes”, there is no authoritative agency geared to ensure them mutual and continuous support from orthodox national forces.

4. The National Security Council cannot serve as this agency. Nor can it solve the problems of CIA by any broad statements of principle or detailed delineation of functions. The Council can, however, urge expedition in the activation of the required agency and ensure its unquestioned authority to solve the major issues raised by the DCI, as well as other varied problems yet to be created by the cold war

5. I refer to the Psychological Strategy Board. When activated this organization, within the terms of the Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951,⁷ can resolve most of the difficulties facing the DCI through its authority to:

(a) Consider on the national level major covert projects coordinated with all other psychological operations.

(b) Give authoritative decision with respect to the necessity and propriety of CIA undertaking major projects requiring resources balanced as between cold war demands and future war plans.

(c) Provide coordination and guidance which will ensure that covert operations at all times are contributory to the attainment of national objectives.

(d) Promulgate programs which will include provisions for such supplementary support as may be required from other departments and agencies, including manpower, money and general logistics.

6. In view of the foregoing considerations, the following comments are pertinent to the Conclusions and Recommendations in paragraph 16 of the basic paper, by sub-paragraphs as numbered therein:

Sub-paragraph a and b. It is useless to belabor the question as to whether or not CIA should continue to be the agency primarily responsible for conducting “covert” operations. This matter has long been debated with the same conclusion. The answer should be affirmative for two reasons: one, there is no other agency of government which can as logically be assigned the responsibility; two, the cold war is on, and the ground lost by any major reorganization at this time would be hazardous. The reasonable concern of the DCI regarding guidance he requires in the stepped-up covert operations can be dispelled by the coordination and guidance forthcoming from the Psychological Strategy Board which should be expected to make logical distribution of responsibilities in the conduct of cold war operations.

If this statement of the scope and authority of the Psychological Strategy Board should be in question, the National Security Council should recommend in unequivocal terms to the President an interpretation of his Directive which would establish the validity of the concept.

Sub-paragraph c(1). Provisions for joint planning with the armed forces for covert operations in war time exist in the established procedures for the preparation of covert annexes to joint war plans through the mechanism of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the Commander’s Staff in theaters of operations. Unusual adjustments should be provided in PSB programs.

Sub-paragraph c(2). Guidance in the allocation of available resources of CIA for covert operations as between cold war missions and preparations for overt war should be made in the programs promulgated by the PSB.

Sub-paragraph c(3). The PSB should have the authority and responsibility for determining the relative weight to be ascribed to political and military considerations involved in covert operations, and be the arbiter as to whether the operations should or should not be undertaken by CIA.

Sub-paragraph c(4). The administrative and logistical provisions of projects or programs promulgated to operational agencies, including CIA, by the PSB should provide authoritatively for the necessary supplementary support, if required, in types and quantities of personnel, and other administrative and logistical assistance.

Sub-paragraph d. The guidance herein requested is a normal responsibility of the PSB as prescribed in the President’s Directive.

7. It is probably true that the major departments have looked to CIA for accomplishments wholly beyond its capabilities, particularly in available manpower. Furthermore, the same departments, when requested by CIA for assistance in supporting its overload, have been loathe to depart from administrative rigidity and war mobilization objectives in order to aid CIA. The recruitment of types of Americans with talents required by the varied operations of CIA is rendered almost impossible by favorable employment conditions in civil life and the absorption of such types into the armed forces. It is literally impossible for CIA to expand operations unduly unless the armed forces make available manpower in keeping with the tasks imposed. Decision must be made as to whether the manpower demands for war mobilization or cold war operations are to have precedence in a rational division of scarce categories of personnel. If it be assumed that the cold war can be won, then it is rational to divert manpower for psychological operations at a relatively minor charge against orthodox mobilization plans and routine administrative conveniences.

8. Reconsideration should be given to the provision of NSC 10/2 which requires that covert operations be “so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” It is obvious that the international atmosphere and conditions requiring this highly restrictive security provision no longer exist. Publicly announced national policy asserts the determination of the Government to fight Soviet aggression wherever it appears and implicitly by any means necessary. If for no other reason, the magnitude and variety of cold war effort renders the security formula invalid except for genuinely covert operations. Certainly it is not a secret to the enemy that the U.S. Government supports unconventional warfare. We should not accept the handicaps of unduly rigid security measures respecting para-military types of operations beyond those required to obscure our strategy and tactics. The acceptance of this reasoning is important in that it facilitates all administrative and logistical steps in combining overt and covert national resources in pursuing the cold war.

A clear differentiation can be made between two categories of “covert” operations to the first of which the security formula in NSC 10/2 should remain applicable, and to the second of which the formula should be modified. These two categories are:

(a) Covert operations of a political, economic and psychological character, which by their nature remain truly covert and which are employed abroad to influence developments favorable to the United States, and

(b) Operations which, while initially covert, are by their nature designed to create psychical manifestations which cease to be covert, such as, sabotage, support of underground and guerilla movements and para-military activities.

John Magruder

⁸

Annex 2

Washington, May 17, 1951.

Memorandum From the Chief of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Stevens) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council (Wooldridge)⁹

SPDM–208–51

SUBJECT

• Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

1. The action to be taken by the National Security Council on the Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of 8 May 1951, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” hinges on the acceptance or rejection of two propositions which are implied but not discussed in that memorandum. They are:

a. Although global overt war may occur at any time, the possibility that the cold war will continue is sufficiently great to warrant a strong effort in the planning and conduct of the cold war as well as of a hot war.

b. There is a possibility that by the planned use of all our capabilities, including covert ones, we can win the cold war, thereby averting global hot war.

2. Acceptance of these two propositions means that we play it both ways, for either war or a continuation of the uneasy “peace,” without putting all our eggs in either basket. Although there may be differences of opinion as regards the degree of probability of both of the two above propositions, there seems to be general agreement as to their validity as stated, and consequently as to the desirability of our playing it both ways. This is the only course which seems consistent with our intelligence and the national thinking behind the great bulk of National Security Council papers in recent years.

3. As a result of past experiences, we are better organized to deal with overt war than with the unprecedented situation of a protracted all out cold war. The President’s directive of April 4, 1951, establishing the new Psychological Strategy Board but requiring maximum use of existing agencies, seems to go far towards providing the necessary mechanism. PSB can be expected to function not only as a coordinating agency for guidance, but, when it is unable to reach decisions and provide guidance itself in the light of approved policy, to formulate and recommend in the premises to the National Security Council and the President.

4. A decision to play it for both hot war and a continuation of the cold war gives a definite answer to the basic question raised by the CIA memorandum. CIA should increase the scope and pace of its capabilities and action directed towards the winning of the cold war, but should not jeopardize its effectiveness for hot war, including planning and preparations therefor by so doing. When detailed and specific conflicts in priorities arise, they can and should be settled through the Psychological Strategy Board. CIA is also required to insure that its intelligence activities will not suffer by such an increase in scope and pace, and its internal arrangements should take this into consideration.

5. The extent to which the United States will support and follow up on counter-revolution in the slave states, how much of that potential to develop, when to release it, and how much to hold in reserve, cannot be answered without the development of more concrete plans and proposals to this end. Such plans and proposals are entirely suitable for presentation by CIA to the PSB, which, after study, criticism and coordination, should obtain final decision from the President via the National Security Council. The potential forces for counterrevolution may, with sufficient time and skill in their development, be capable of eventually providing a final solution for the cold war, or, in case hot war intervenes, of raising covert operations from a series of minor conspiracies to the stature of a weapon on a par with land, sea and air forces.

6. [1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

7. Consistent with the foregoing, it is suggested that the following action be proposed to the National Security Council on the specific recommendations of the CIA memorandum:

a. As a result of a comprehensive review of the covert operations situation, the CIA should increase the scope and pace of its capabilities and action directed towards the winning of the cold war, but should not by so doing jeopardize its effectiveness for hot war.

b. Covert operational responsibility should remain as now directed. Although all organizational problems are not completely solved, there is no reason to believe that they cannot be solved within the existing framework. Moreover, the urgencies of the situation will not permit major structural alterations, which would in themselves create new problems. Such clarifications of present broad responsibilities as may be essential should be handled through the PSB.

c. (1) Directives are in existence which appear to make basic adequate provisions for joint planning with the Armed Forces for covert activities and operations in support of wartime military operations. The mechanism of the PSB should be employed for any clarifications which may be necessary.

(2) Specific guidance for dealing with the military in fields where the same covert apparatus is being developed for both cold and hot war purposes should be obtained from the PSB.

(3) The PSB should insure that the foreign policy and political considerations which are involved in covert operations are brought to bear on determinations of politico-military significance. To accomplish this, the PSB has recourse up to the NSC and the President, and down to operating agencies either directly or through the consultant mechanisms that are established by NSC 10/2 and NSC 59/1.

(4) Within the limits of security, all government agencies should be directed to provide appropriate personnel, administrative, and logistic support for the covert effort. The detailed nature of this support should be coordinated through the PSB.

d. The Psychological Strategy Board should be directed to provide or obtain guidance as necessary to the covert effort.

L. C. Stevens

¹⁰
Rear Admiral, USN

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 611.61/5–2651. Top Secret. This memorandum is virtually identical to a draft by Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to Nitze, May 26; ibid., INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, OPC. The difference in attribution has not been explained. Memoranda from Joyce to Nitze of May 18 and May (misdated March) 25, and an unsigned memorandum to Armstrong of May 17 on the same subject, are ibid.
2. See the attachment to Document 68.
3. See Annex 1 and Annex 2 below.
4. See footnote 2, Document 42.
5. See Document 5.
6. Top Secret; Eyes Only. General Magruder was the Department of Defense consultant to the Office of Policy Coordination.
7. See Document 60.
8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
9. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Two copies were sent to Magruder. Admiral Stevens was the Joint Chiefs of Staff consultant to OPC.
10. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.