68. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), the Department of Defense Representative on the National Security Council Senior Staff (Nash), the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the National Security Council Senior Staff (Wooldridge), and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Jackson)1

SUBJECT

  • Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

At the direction of the President you have been designated as a special group of the Senior NSC Staff to consider the attached memorandum on the subject from the Director of Central Intelligence, and to prepare for the Council’s consideration appropriate recommendations with respect thereto.

In performing this function it is anticipated that you will work in close collaboration with your respective principals in order to reflect their views during the staff work, and with the designated representatives of your respective departments and agencies under NSC 10/22[Page 142]in order to realize the advantages of their knowledge and experience in this field.

After allowing time for your study of the attached memorandum, a meeting will be scheduled within the next week or so.

It is requested that extraordinary security precautions be taken in the handling of this project and that knowledge of and access to the attached memorandum and subsequent documents be restricted to the minimum required for adequate staff work. Copies of or extracts from this and subsequent documents should not be made without permission of this office.

James S. Lay, Jr.
3

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Smith) to the National Security Council4

SUBJECT

  • Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

The Problem

1. To obtain more specific guidance from the National Security Council in order to define the projected scope and pace of covert operations in aid of current overt cold-war and of military preparations to meet overt global war, and to insure timely and effective support for such operations.

Pertinent Facts

2. The following facts highlight the need for this guidance and support:

a.
To meet its responsibilities for covert operations, the Central Intelligence Agency has already had to increase its personnel and expenditures to an extent believed to exceed the scope contemplated by the National Security Council when it authorized covert operations in the summer of 1948.
b.
Even more considerable increases will be required in the near future if this agency is to discharge the missions already specifically [Page 143] proposed to it by the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff or undertaken on the initiative of CIA with the approval of such Departments. Still greater increases would be required to accomplish the missions which are apparently envisioned under the NSC 68 series (and of which segments are found in various other NSC papers; e.g., NSC 58/2, NSC 59, NSC 103/1, and NSC 104).5 These increases are beyond CIA’s present administrative support capabilities.
c.
High level policy decisions are required not only on the issue of these increases in themselves, but on the direction and nature of covert operations. For example, to what extent will the United States support counter-revolution in the slave states? A Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, 28 March 1951,6 raises a related issue: The view of the JCS that CIA give maximum emphasis to preparations for the retardation of Soviet advances in Europe beginning on D Day. In view of CIA’s presently limited facilities this request raises the issue of the priorities as between covert-cold-war activities and covert activities to support the military in the event of a general war.

Discussion

3. Pursuant to the provisions of NSC 10/2, CIA has been actively engaged for over two years in the planning and conduct of covert operations in the general fields of activity specifically provided for therein, viz:

a.
propaganda
b.
economic warfare
c.
preventive direct action, including—
(1)
sabotage
(2)
anti-sabotage
(3)
demolition
(4)
evacuation
d.
subversion against hostile states, including—
(1)
assistance to underground resistance movements
(2)
assistance to guerrillas
(3)
assistance to refugee liberation groups
(4)
support of anti-Communist elements in threatened countries
e.
Planning and preparation, in conjunction with the JCS, for the conduct of covert operations in wartime.

[Page 144]

4. Subsequent to NSC 10/2, the NSC 68 series called for an intensification of covert operations in the fields of economic, political and psychological warfare with the purpose of rolling back the perimeter of Soviet power and the ultimate frustration of the Kremlin design. As a result, the covert activities of CIA have been stepped up considerably, even though the policies established by NSC 68 have never been spelled out in terms of a specific covert program directive to CIA.

5. Specifically, the currently stepped-up covert projects of CIA (see more detailed listing at Tab “A”) are being prosecuted in five areas of the world as follows [1 line not declassified]:

Western Europe [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: psychological and labor operations especially [less than 1 line not declassified], organization of stay-behind and resistance groups in all Western Europe [less than 1 line not declassified], political action [less than 1 line not declassified] and a pilot economic warfare operation [less than 1 line not declassified].

Eastern Europe [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: psychological warfare [less than 1 line not declassified]; extensive special political operations [less than 1 line not declassified]; organization of resistance groups in Eastern Europe and the Baltic; and expansion of the [less than 1 line not declassified] underground.

Near East [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: preliminary exploratory activities [less than 1 line not declassified]; denial of [less than 1 line not declassified] oil fields; psychological and labor operations throughout the Near East.

Far East [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: guerrilla warfare and escape and evasion in [less than 1 line not declassified]; stay-behind preparations [less than 1 line not declassified]; psychological and labor activities throughout the Far East; preclusive buying; [2 lines not declassified].

Latin America [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: preliminary exploratory activities, propaganda, and the establishment of a mechanism for these and other activities on an expanded scale.

Special Projects [dollar amount not declassified]

Emphasis on: National Committee for Free Europe and its agency, Radio Free Europe; training foreign agents in the United States; support [Page 145] of international anti-Communist labor and youth organizations; and the development of outlets for propaganda against foreign targets.

Research and Development [dollar amount not declassified]

Overhead [dollar amount not declassified]

6. [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

7. [7 paragraphs (26 lines) not declassified]

8. The above missions, current and proposed, representing a very considerable number of covert cold-war projects, constitute in themselves a rather extensive preparation to conduct covert operations in support of the military effort in the event of the outbreak of a general war. Nevertheless, they do not comprise the comprehensive cold-war program clearly contemplated by NSC 68. In the absence of a specific detailed plan for conducting a comprehensive cold-war program, it is not possible to make an accurate estimate of manpower, matériel, and money required. Nor, in the absence of detailed overt war plans is it possible to make an accurate estimate of the requirements of full-scale covert operational support of an all-out military effort. Nevertheless, it is possible, on the basis of the requirements of the programs already under way or in the planning stage, to make an informed guess of the general order of magnitude of a covert apparatus capable of supporting either an effort to prevent overt war or an all-out military effort in the event of such war. [1½ line not declassified] (These estimates exclude additional requirements for military personnel and for funds to stockpile and resupply certain standard military items for guerrillas and resistance groups. For further detail see Tab “B”.)

9. Thus, the Central Intelligence Agency is faced with the fact that its covert operations are outstripping its present administrative capabilities. Even an apparatus of the magnitude required to discharge the relatively limited cold war and military support programs, outlined by paragraphs 5 and 7 above, calls for an administrative organization of considerably greater strength than now present in CIA to solve effectively the complex planning and logistical problems involved. Specifically, there would be required a staff comparable to that of a Major Command, procurement and production machinery for those items not properly assignable to the Department of Defense, and additional facilities for: training, security clearances, communications, headquarters office space, and other requisite administrative and logistical services. Without such augmentation the growing magnitude of covert operations will tend to divert an ever increasing share of the time and attention of CIA key personnel from the basic intelligence mission of the Agency, with the attendant risk that such mission will not be adequately accomplished.

[Page 146]

10. Although the cumulation of missions already undertaken by CIA, to say nothing of those now proposed to CIA, may transcend the original intentions of NSC 10/2, the NSC 68 series leaves little doubt that it is our national policy to conduct covert operations on a very large scale. It is the view of CIA that all of these things can and should be done. But before launching CIA into such large activities, a number of high level policy decisions and certain vital assurances are required from the National Security Council. The following paragraphs deal with the qualitative nature of the required guidance.

11. It appears that the Office of Policy Coordination was originally created to be primarily an agency to execute covert support to cold war activities (with planning and preparation for covert support in the event of hot war as an additional responsibility). However, the increasing scope and pace of hot war preparation is tending to overshadow this original purpose. The cold war program (though essentially political in conception) is heavily weighted with military considerations; equally, the hot war preparations (though essentially military in conception) are heavily weighted with political considerations. Because CIA’s present responsibilities cover both current cold war covert operations and certain covert aspects of preparations for hot war, it has perhaps been more immediately aware than other interested agencies of the need for delineation of policies and priorities as between these programs and of the need for more definitive machinery to give both programs politico-military guidance on a continuing basis. The machinery established under NSC 10/2, i.e., the designated representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, has consisted of individuals of the most exceptional qualifications, who have been of the greatest assistance in developing projects. The efforts of these representatives have been augmented by those of an equally well qualified and helpful representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, this machinery was not designed to develop strategic guidance of the order required by the far-reaching policy determination of NSC 68 and other post-NSC 10/2 policy papers.

12. An illustration of the need for such strategic guidance is the problem raised by the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as expressed in its memorandum of 28 March 1951, that the Central Intelligence Agency should give top priority to preparations for the retardation of a Soviet military advance across Europe. The responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence under NSC 10/2 are such that he cannot accept this view as controlling without assurance that this military policy will also be consistent with the foreign policy of the United States. Only a National Security Council decision can give this assurance in a matter of such moment. Such a decision will require a determination of relative priorities and of the extent to which the United States is willing to support and follow up on counter-revolution in the slave states. Political [Page 147] and matériel support on a national scale is required to back up and capitalize on any counter-revolution which may be engendered. Only the National Security Council can insure such support.

13. It is true that the covert apparatus needed for the cold war is similar to that needed to support the military effort in a hot war. However, there are numerous important differences in detail and in timing. For example, it is clearly desirable from the standpoint of either cold war or hot war to develop the potential of resistance groups in Eastern Europe. How much of this potential to develop, when to release it, and how much to hold in reserve are problems which can be and are argued differently by the military and by the political experts. Again CIA must seek politico-military guidance at the NSC level to determine where and how to build and utilize its covert assets.

14. Another area requiring such guidance pertains to the question of concealing U.S. participation in covert activities which cannot remain completely covert. The training of indigenous personnel for resistance and guerrilla activity, the mounting of guerrilla operations, all become more difficult to cover as the size of the effort increases and the time for field operations approaches. [3 lines not declassified] Somewhere in the process it becomes pointless to attempt to deceive the enemy on U.S. participation, just as it would have been naive for the U.S.S.R. to expect the U.S. to believe it had no part in supporting and directing the Greek Communist guerrilla operations. Only continuing guidance from the National Security Council level can insure sound decisions in this field.

15. Finally, it is urged that these matters call for immediate resolution by the National Security Council. It requires approximately eighteen months to build the base from which all-out covert operations can be launched. The building of the U.S. covert base and apparatus is not proceeding at the required pace and cannot until the specific determination and guidance discussed above have been issued by the National Security Council.

Conclusions and Recommendations

16. The above discussion leads to the following conclusions which are stated in the form of recommendations to the National Security Council:

a.
That in view of the magnitude issue as well as the guidance needed to give proper direction to stepped up covert operations, the National Security Council initiate a comprehensive review of the covert operations situation.
b.
That this review contain a restatement or redetermination as appropriate of the several responsibilities and authorities involved in U.S. covert operations.
c.
That if the above review results in a reaffirmation of the decision to place covert operational responsibility within the Central Intelligence Agency—the Central Intelligence Agency should be provided necessary support from other agencies of the government to insure the successful discharge of this responsibility including the following specific assurances:
(1)
Adequate provisions for joint planning with the Armed Forces for covert activities and operations in support of wartime military operations, spelling out a clear delineation of authorities, duties and responsibilities.
(2)
Specific guidance for dealing with the military in fields where the same covert apparatus is being developed to engage in high priority cold war missions as well as to be available to the military in the event of overt war.
(3)
More specific provision for insuring that the foreign policy and political considerations which are involved in covert operations are brought to bear on determinations of politico-military significance.
(4)
Specific provisions to insure that the type and quantities of personnel, administrative and logistical support required of other governmental departments and agencies for the prosecution of the covert effort will be forthcoming as necessary.
d.
That where guidance for covert operations is of concern to more than one Department, this guidance be coordinated and issued to the Central Intelligence Agency (and to other participating agencies) by the new Psychological Strategy Board.

Walter B. Smith
7

Tab A8

[2 pages not declassified]

Tab B9

[1 page not declassified]

  1. Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
  2. Regarding NSC 10/2, see footnote 2, Document 42.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  4. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
  5. Regarding the NSC 68 series, see Document 5. For NSC 58/2, “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe,” December 8, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. V, pp. 4254. Regarding NSC 59, NSC 103/1, and NSC 104, see footnote 2, Document 61.
  6. Not found.
  7. Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.
  8. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
  9. Eyes Only.