188. Memorandum From the Deputy Operations Coordinator in the Office
of the Under Secretary of State (Hulick) to the Under Secretary of State
(Hoover)1
Washington, August 23, 1954.
SUBJECT
I have reduced to writing some ideas contained in the attached memorandum
which I thought I might use in briefing the Doolittle team on covert operations of CIA. I am far from certain, however, in my
own mind, as to whether the two examples I have singled out as
illustrative of where improvement is needed and is actively being sought
are the kind of things you consider as appropriate for the Department to
raise before the Doolittle group.
I should appreciate receiving your guidance on this matter.
As to the list of questions, I discussed these with Frank Wisner. He thought they were
appropriate. He was concerned, however, about the possibility of the
Assistant Secretaries striking a critical note, due to the fact that in
some instances operations have been carried out without their knowledge
but with a higher clearance from you. He hoped that in the morning
briefing it would be made clear to the survey group that there have been
occasions when an operation was cleared only at the top; and that these
instances could give cause for an Assistant Secretary to believe the
operation had had no policy clearance whatsoever.
Attachment2
BRIEFING NOTES
- I.
-
The office of the Deputy Operations Coordinator, directly
responsible to the Under Secretary, performs the functions
called for under paragraph 4 of NSC 5412.3 All covert
operations are cleared in advance with the Department
through this office, which provides the Agency with written
policy guidances. The office consists of three officers, one
responsible for Western and Eastern Europe, one for the Far
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East and South
East Asia and one for the Near and Middle East and Latin
America. Working closely with this office but not physically
located in it are a Special Assistant in the Public Affairs
office of the Department and a Special Assistant for Emigré
matters in the Office of Eastern European Affairs. It
provides a two-way channel of communication between the
substantive offices of the Department and operational
offices of the Agency.
In order to provide maximum security and control over the
coordination of covert operations all personal contact
between officers in the Department and the Agency on
specific projects is supposed to be channeled through this
office. To a very large degree that is now the case. The
exceptions are occasions when the Director of CIA approaches the Secretary or
Under Secretary directly on highly sensitive matters. All
records of written communications are filed in this office.
No copies are permitted to be filed elsewhere in the
Department. While policy guidance is obtained from the
responsible substantive areas, the final guidances in
written form are prepared in this office only.
CIA covert annexes to OCB progress reports on NSC policy papers are presented
to the Under Secretary through this office, which can also
make them available to the State Department members of
OCB Working
Groups.
- II.
- There are two outstanding problems in the field of covert
operations which have not yet been satisfactorily resolved.
- 1.
-
The Free Europe Committee (FEC) and Radio Free Europe (RFE) are powerful
propaganda and psychological political instruments
which are controlled by the Agency and are supposed
to operate under policy guidance from the
Department. The FEC
was created in 1949 as a private organization,
financed partly by private donations and partly by
funds from the Agency, the latter accounting for
about two thirds to three fourths of the money.
The purpose of FEC
was to provide a means of supporting and utilizing
prominent political exiles from communist-dominated
countries without recognizing these groups as
Governments in Exile and to avoid complications for
the Department which maintained diplomatic relations
with the Communist Governments of the countries from
which they fled.
The two major functions performed by FEC are (1) support and
utilization of émigré groups as symbols of
resistance and (2) broadcasts to the peoples of
Eastern Europe through RFE. Both FEC and RFE, which has its base in Munich,
Germany, have grown into very large establishments,
staffed by highly competent people. They produce
their own analysis of developments behind the Iron
Curtain and develop their own programs to influence
the people and cause difficulties for the Communist
regimes.
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While FEC and RFE are supposed to
function within the framework of official US policy
and under policy guidance from the Department, they
have been gradually assuming a degree of
independence of operation, which has created a
control problem. Decisions involving matters of
policy consequence are frequently taken by FEC and RFE without reference to
the Department through the Agency. This is a matter
of real concern which the Department and the Agency
are currently attempting to resolve.
- 2.
-
The second outstanding problem is that of evolving
ways and means of coping more satisfactorily with
the political repercussions when a covert operation
is uncovered. We are deeply involved in many
countries in the use of covert assets to influence
developments in a manner favorable to US objectives.
While each such case must be handled to a large
degree on its own merits, there is a need for
establishing a few basic principles of operation.
Due to a still prevalent lack of knowledge and
understanding of the support role of CIA under NSC 5412 on the part of
some officials, both in Washington and in the field,
there is often a division of opinion as to how such
emergencies should be handled. This division can
freeze initiative and timely action and produce
compromise positions which are not adequate to meet
the problem. The division of opinion, it is
believed, stems in part at least from an underlying
opposition on the part of some officials to covert
operations of CIA.
The solution to this problem must be sought through
an educational process with more briefings in depth
by CIA of State
Department and Foreign Service officers on the task
of CIA and the
manner in which it attempts to discharge its
responsibility. Improvements should also result
gradually through the efforts of this office to
bring about an ever closer coordination between the
Department and CIA,
so that carefully considered policy guidance is
provided in advance by the substantive offices of
the Department for each covert operation in support
of overt policies as defined in the various NSC documents.
On the part of CIA
officials it is necessary that they deal with
complete frankness with this office and leave to its
judgment which officers in the Department are to be
consulted in order to obtain proper policy guidance
for specific covert operations. There is still a
tendency on the part of some CIA officials to be so secretive that
even this office sometimes has the feeling that it
does not know all that it should in order to
discharge its responsibility. In order to establish
the requisite degree of mutual confidence between
the Agency and the Department both sides must
contribute so that the inhibitions and respective
reserves developed on both sides during the early
formative years of CIA gradually fade away.
It is of the utmost importance that all responsible
officials in State and CIA recognize the fact that NSC 5412 provides for
joint CIA-State
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implementation on NSC policies; that use of covert
operations in support of our overt efforts in the
field of foreign policy is an established fact; that
final decision on the timing and nature of such
covert operations rests with the Department; that
when a covert operation goes sour it is a matter of
concern to the US Government and not just CIA; and that problems
arising out of exposed covert operations must be met
and minimized by the joint efforts of CIA and State as a
team.
- III.
- The following are types of questions which might be asked of
the Assistant Secretaries:
- 1.
- Have the Agency’s covert operations been generally
effective in furthering implementation of overt US
policy objectives? If so, can you cite specific
examples?
- 2.
- If there have been instances in which covert
operations have been harmful, do you believe they could
have been avoided? Did they result from failure of the
Agency to coordinate or did they represent coordinated
operations involving a calculated risk?
- 3.
- Are you satisfied that there is proper coordination
and prior policy guidance for all covert operations
conducted by the Agency in your area?
