Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

187. Memorandum of Discussion at the 209th Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, August 5, 1954.

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 209th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 5, 1954

Present at the 209th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1 and 2); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 1 and 2); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Items 1 and 2); the Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency (for Item 5); the Acting Secretary of the Army, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 1 and 2); General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (for Items 1 and 2); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 1 and 2); Elbert P. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda Item 1: Review of Past Activities and the Future Program of the National Security Council, and Item 2: Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956 (NSC 5422/1). Agenda Item 2 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 700–715.]

3. Transmittal of Information and Recommendation for Future Action Concerning Warning Facilities of the Intelligence Community (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 26 and August 4, 1954)²

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this problem. Revised CIA recommendations, entitled “Suggested NSC Action, Item 3”, were distributed, and paragraph 2 of this document was read aloud (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).³

Mr. Allen Dulles said that an effort was being made to improve the intelligence mechanism for providing early warning of a possible attack. An indication center was being set up under the Watch Committee to study all possible items which might alert us to danger. This center would need to have not only foreign intelligence, but also information on U.S. policies which might produce hostile reactions in enemy countries. Mr. Dulles felt that it would be unwise to adopt the formula suggested by the Defense agencies, to the effect that the Watch Committee would be kept informed only of those U.S. policies which in the judgment of the agency passing on the information might bring about hostile enemy reaction.

The President said the only purpose of these arrangements was to get the right information to the people who had to study it. He would not want a lot of inconsequential information to be passed on to the Watch Committee. He suggested that significant information on U.S. policies might be transmitted to the Watch Committee.

The Attorney General felt that the CIA recommendations tended to set up a kind of supervision over the FBI. He requested assurance that adoption of these recommendations would require no change in FBI methods or operations. He asked whether CIA was not now receiving all the information it needed. Mr. Dulles said he did not know, because he did not know what information was being held back.

The President called attention to paragraph 2-c of the CIA recommendations. He said that decision as to withholding information from the Watch Committee should be referred to him only if the Director of Central Intelligence and the other agency involved disagreed. He reiterated his desire that the Watch Committee get all the information that could be of real use to it, and suggested that the CIA recommendations, as amended at the meeting, be adopted subject to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI agreeing on editorial changes not affecting the substance.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted that Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/2⁵ states the following mission of the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee:

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States.

b. Recommended that the President, subject to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, agreeing upon editorial changes not affecting the substance, issue the following directive to all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government:

(1) To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee all significant information and intelligence pertinent to its mission and functions (as defined in DCID 1/2), without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.

(2) To keep the IAC Watch Committee informed concerning significant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U.S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U.S. This information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the NIC who need to know of it in order to perform their functions.

(3) When, in the opinion of an agency or department, overriding considerations affecting the national security exist which justify an exception to (1) or (2) above, the decision as to withholding or delaying the transmission of the information to the Watch Committee shall be taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there is disagreement, referred to the President.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate action.

[Omitted here is Agenda Item 4: Significant Developments Affecting U.S. Security.]

5. Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare, and Foreign Information Activities (NSC Action No. 1183)⁶

Discussion of this question arose in connection with Item 6 below, “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning”.

The President recalled that he had previously emphasized the need for coordination of economic warfare activities (NSC Action No. 1183). It now seemed to him that his previous idea—that we needed a Director of Economic Warfare—had been too narrow. Perhaps we needed a director of unconventional or non-military warfare. Policy decisions in this field should, of course, be taken by the Council, but we also need a mechanism for objective study, for digesting information, and for coordinating implementation. He did not want half a dozen different agencies reporting to the Council on this subject. Perhaps the Planning Board might be supplemented by a special group to study this neglected field.

The President then noted that the Bureau of the Budget is now studying the coordination of economic warfare. He requested the Director, Bureau of the Budget, to broaden this study to include the placing of responsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating economic warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and foreign information.

Mr. Cutler said that a large part of the issue in this field revolved around the question of who would run psychological warfare in the event of war—the military or State. The President said neither one; in time of war these operations would have to be conducted under the general direction of the President.

The National Security Council:⁷

Noted the President’s request that the Bureau of the Budget expand its study regarding the coordination of economic warfare activities pursuant to NSC Action No. 1183, to include the placing of responsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating economic warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and foreign information activities.

Note: The above action subsequently transmitted to the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

6. The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 23 and August 4, 1954; NSC 59/1; NSC 127/1)⁸

Mr. Lay briefed the Council on the background of this problem, calling attention to the OCB recommendations transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 23, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 4. Mr. Cutler felt that the President’s request for the study described in the preceding item did not entirely obviate the need for rescinding NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1, as recommended by OCB. These papers were antique wreckage; they were completely out of date and referred to agencies which no longer existed.

The President said he hesitated to rescind these policies since the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the reference memorandum of August 4, objected to such a course. He thought we could let this antique wreckage stay on the books, even though it was recognized as obsolete, until the Council received a further report on the coordination of economic, psychological and political warfare.

The National Security Council:⁹

Noted that NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 are deemed obsolete, but deferred further action with respect thereto pending receipt of the study described in the preceding item.

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants, on August 6.
2. See Document 186 and footnotes 1 and 2 thereto.
3. Not found, but for substance, see NSC Action No. 1195, below.
4. The following constituted NSC Action No. 1195, August 5. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The directive adopted in NSC Action 1195–b was subsequently approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI with some editorial changes that did not affect substance, and by President Eisenhower on November 30. The approved directive was circulated as NSC 5438 of the same date. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5438)
5. Document 179.
6. In NSC Action No. 1183, taken at its 207th meeting, July 22, the Council noted the President’s request that the Bureau of the Budget prepare recommendations regarding responsibility for coordination of economic warfare activities. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
7. The following constituted NSC Action No. 1197, August 5. (Ibid.)
8. Lay’s July 23 memorandum transmitted the OCB report, dated July 21 (Document 183). For NSC 59/1, March 9, 1950, see Document 2. For NSC 127/1, See Document 123.
9. The following constituted NSC Action No. 1198, August 5, 1954. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) File: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)