Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

186. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Wilson¹

Washington, August 3, 1954.

SUBJECT

• Information and Recommendation Concerning Warning Facilities of the Intelligence Community

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been informed that the Director of Central Intelligence has submitted a memorandum to the National Security Council (NSC)² recommending that the President direct all appropriate departments and agencies of the government to keep the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) Watch Committee informed concerning diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the United States, contemplated or in process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, endangering the security of the United States. The Director of Central Intelligence further recommends that all information and intelligence pertinent to its mission, without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity, be made available to the Watch Committee.

2. The directive recommended by the Director of Central Intelligence is not interpreted to mean that either the Watch Committee or the National Indications Center (NIC) will be furnished U.S. War Plans because under the present policy the United States will not initiate hostilities with the USSR or its allies.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that this directive will make available to the Watch Committee information on operations of a very sensitive nature that should be strictly maintained in a “need-to-know” status to reduce danger of disclosure to a minimum. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that knowledge of such sensitive operations must be provided the Watch Committee if it is to carry out its mission of providing early warning to the United States of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense support the recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence in principle.

4. The method recommended by the Director of Central Intelligence by which the information is transmitted to the Watch Committee and its subordinate organization, the National Indications Center, and the handling of such information by that Committee and Center thereafter requires clarification to make it more precise. Also, to ensure that the Services will not be expected to furnish the Watch Committee with a myriad of small details of operations, the transmission and handling of which would overload the Service organizations as well as the NIC, it is considered that the governmental departments and agencies should be required to furnish the NIC only with the information which they believe to be of sufficient importance to cause military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that you support the recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence as modified by the changes below (changes to the Director of Central Intelligence recommendations indicated in the usual manner):

“Ask the Council to recommend that the President direct all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government:

• “a. To keep the IAC Watch Committee (as established by DCID 1/2) informed , through arrangements with the Director, National Indications Center, on behalf of the Chairman of the Watch Committee, concerning diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U.S., contemplated approved for immediate implementation or in process of execution, which they believe to be of sufficient import that it might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, thus engandering the security of the U.S. This information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the NIC who need to know of it in order to perform their functions.
• “b. To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee through appropriate arrangements with the Director, National Indications Center, on behalf of the Chairman, all information and intelligence pertinent to its mission, without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.”

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that full consideration be given by the NSC to the need for careful development of the method of transmitting and using this information. They consider that this method should be developed by the IAC, which is the agency responsible for the Watch function. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it extremely important that information of action to be taken by the United States not be transmitted until the action is approved for immediate implementation. If a directive on this subject should provide otherwise, the strategic planning of the United States would be given an undesirable dissemination. To further insure against undesirable dissemination, the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff includes a provision that information of an operational nature is for exclusive use within the Watch Committee.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining

³
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret. A covering memorandum from NSC Executive Secretary Lay, August 4, forwarded the JCS memorandum to the National Security Council, in connection with discussion of the warning facilities of the intelligence community at its August 5 meeting. For the discussion at that meeting, See Document 187.
2. Dated July 22. A copy of DCID 1/2 is attached. (National Archives, RG 273, Official Minutes, 1947–1961, 209th Meeting, Box 42)
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Twining signed the original.