Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

129. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)¹

Washington, October 15, 1952.

SUBJECT

• PSB and General Smith’s Proposal

I refer to the memorandum² handed you by the Director of Central Intelligence at the PSB meeting last Thursday, October 9, which outlines General Smith’s recommendation that (in his own words): “The responsibility for guiding policy, for approving projects, and for assessing the results of all covert cold war operations be placed upon the Psychological Strategy Board; and b) the present representatives of the Departments of State, Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff now charged with giving policy guidance to the operating divisions of this Agency (or personnel of equal stature and experience) be grouped as a cold war general staff with the Director of the PSB staff as Chief thereof, and be given additional responsibility of considering proposed projects, of recommending these projects for approval or disapproval by the Board, of periodic evaluation of the conduct of these projects, and of recommending periodically whether they are to be continued or discontinued.” General Smith goes on to say that “The PSB, as presently constituted, has not so far accomplished all of the results which I myself had hoped for.” He believes that the concepts and suggestions he makes in these informal memoranda would make the PSB “a really meaningful body as it would in fact become the device through which all of our major cold war activities are considered and approved.”

A meeting was held in Mr. Frank G. Wisner’s office on October 10 at which were present in addition to Mr. Wisner, Admiral Kirk, General Magruder, Mr. Tracy Barnes, and myself, at your direction. As you know, Mr. Barnes took over a week ago as Assistant Director of the CIA for OPC. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss General Smith’s memorandum and it was thoroughly understood that the meeting was exploratory and that no commitments were expected or would be made until the important suggestions and recommendations in General Smith’s memorandum were thoroughly understood. Admiral Kirk stated that he had had long conversations with General Smith about the latter’s thinking relating to the PSB role in clandestine political warfare. He remarked that he was in general agreement with General Smith. Both General Magruder and Mr. Wisner had also discussed the matter with General Smith and they had clear ideas as to what the latter was driving at. It was generally agreed that the kernel of General Smith’s thought was contained in the sentence starting at the bottom of page 1 of his memorandum which states: “Moreover, under the existing mechanism for providing policy guidance and program approval, the Agency has continued in the position of having to assume too much responsibility and authority for its own good.” He goes on to say that “the rapidly increasing cost of covert operations, coupled with the missing elements of objective review and substantive audit, leave it open to departmental and Congressional criticism.”

During the meeting I took occasion to clarify certain points in General Smith’s memorandum which did not appear to me entirely clear:

1) In speaking of “all of our major cold war activities,” did General Smith confine his recommendations only to political warfare by clandestine means or was he thinking in terms of overt propaganda as well? The answer was that he was thinking only of covert activity.

2) In outlining his concept of the duties of the “advisers and staff officers of the three principals,” it was not clear as to whether these persons would be PSB officials or officials of their respective departments and agencies, i.e., State, Defense, CIA and perhaps the JCS. The answer was that these persons who would backstop the Board members would be representatives of their respective departments and agencies where they would have their offices and perform their functions.

3) When General Smith spoke of his objection to the formal reference of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major departments and the inevitable delays and breaches of security that this process involves, did he mean to shut off the sometimes necessary and fruitful direct working relationships between senior CIA officials and senior State Department officials on the working level? The answer to this question was no, but it was believed that General Smith desired a rigidly controlled, lateral working relationship held to more senior and responsible officials who were in a better position to give the necessary advice and clearances.

General Magruder stated that he was very much in favor of General Smith’s basic concept. He commented that the atmosphere within the Defense establishment relating to clandestine and unconventional activities had changed very greatly over the past two years. These activities at their outset were not clearly understood or appreciated by the Military who took an understandably negative view of mysteries and “unconventionality” which cut across established orthodox channels and straightforward military concepts. These attitudes within the Defense establishment had been greatly ameliorated and now the attitudes of top people within the Services and within the JCS vis-à-vis covert operations reflected much more awareness of the necessity for political warfare and all types of covert activities. He went on to say that, although it was still difficult for any group including a representative of the Secretary of Defense to commit the three Services to logistical support, nevertheless these difficulties could now be met much more easily within the Defense establishment. General Magruder commented that, in his opinion, expeditious clearances for covert activities and Department of Defense “no objection” or “yes, please do the most you can” were now possible as long as the activities did not impinge upon the basic constitutional and legislative powers and authority of the Military establishment.

I think that we should examine very closely General Smith’s concept of the assistant, staff officer, or deputy to support each PSB member. He envisages “highly qualified officers … upon whom the principals could rely completely as their technical advisers and whom their respective Departments would accept in that status. It would be essential that these selected officers would have the competence to speak authoritatively and definitively on the various matters to be considered …” General Smith qualifies this rather startling allocation of authority by stating that: “The selected staff officers would have to be held responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating and checking in their departments.”

I do not believe that this is a workable concept. No State Department official would have the necessary qualifications to fulfill such responsible functions as I believe are envisaged under General Smith’s concept of a “Board of Directors for all covert cold war activities.” I do not think that the Secretary or Under Secretary would consider giving off-the-cuff clearances for highly sensitive political operations without first consulting the most competent persons in the Department of State. Certainly, no staff officer or assistant could or should be clothed with any such power or responsibility as this would cut across basic concepts of departmental handling of policy decisions. If, in any such group as envisaged by General Smith, I or my successor should presume to provide policy clearance in highly sensitive fields of intimate interest to, let us say, EUR, and in which, let us say, NEA has a profound interest, I should certainly be assassinated instanter by the Assistant Secretaries of these two Bureaus, and quite rightly so. It is my opinion that the present mechanism for providing policy guidance to OPC of CIA works pretty well. It is perhaps administratively somewhat unorthodox, but the activity itself is “unconventional” and is not easily fitted into conventional and institutionally correct procedures.

I inquired of Frank Wisner if he thought that General Smith considered that the Department of State was not providing adequate policy guidance under the present mechanism or whether there were long delays in obtaining clearances due to some of the factors set forth in General Smith’s memorandum. Mr. Wisner replied that he did not think that this was in the General’s mind, but rather General Smith’s basic thought was that “no objection” on the part of the Department of State was not sufficient. He rather desired a mechanism which would more closely commit the Department to responsibility for sensitive and exceedingly costly activities directly in the field of foreign policy by other means, i.e., political warfare. I may add that whenever the CIA required a policy decision on an important matter where time was of the essence, such decision has been forthcoming sometimes within a matter of hours. The Deputy Under Secretary is constantly available for these high level decisions which have always been made in the past without their being referred to the lower levels and fought over by relatively junior officials. In other words, it is my view that General Smith’s memorandum in this respect refers primarily to the delays, lack of sufficient logistic support, and security breaches which have been experienced for understandable reasons within the Department of Defense and the JCS.

With regard to the General’s insistence upon this Department assuming more responsibility for these activities, we must, of course, look closely into the degree of authority and control which must be concomitant with such responsibility. As you know, it was the concept of General Marshall, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Lovett and Mr. Kennan, when OPC was set up in the spring of 1948, that political warfare activities of covert means (excluding para-military operations and planning therefor in case of overt hostilities) was of primary interest to the Department of State. The idea was explored of placing such activity directly within this Department, but I believe it was finally decided that the operation should be one step removed from this Department, and it was for this reason that it was placed, faute de mieux, within the framework of the CIA. We are still the Department primarily interested in political warfare by covert means. If this is so, we should accept General Smith’s basic thesis and accept more responsibility but at the same time exercise closer control over operations. I inquired whether General Smith had in mind a “theater commander” concept which would mean that the Department would say “go ahead” and then his organization would take over and all implementation would be considered operational and within his exclusive responsibility. Mr. Wisner replied that this was not in General Smith’s mind as evidenced by the part of the latter’s memorandum where he refers to “periodic evaluation of the conduct of these projects and of recommending periodically whether they are to be continued or discontinued.” This concept would mean a much greater degree of State Department control than is presently exercised. When he took over the CIA, General Smith told the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel Durbrow that he could use perhaps fifty qualified Foreign Service Officers in a delicate operation where political know-how and area expertise is essential. We have never been able to meet this request, and presently there are only three or four qualified Foreign Service Officers serving in OPC of CIA.

As you are well aware, a green light for an operation or a “no objection” is entirely inadequate. My office has endeavored, through the weekly 10/2 representatives forum and by personal contacts with senior operational personnel of the OPC to keep abreast of political warfare operations. This has been difficult and sometimes these operations inevitably get off the beam. It is axiomatic that delicate political operations are about as good as the operators. Perhaps this adds up to the conclusion that if this Department accepts more responsibility, it will mean that senior officers of this Department must themselves devote increasing personal attention to monitoring CIA political warfare activities.

I think that recent events in the Soviet Union fully justify General Smith’s observation that “it is inevitable that cold war operations will continue over a long period of time.” If our conflict with Stalinism, Russian Imperialism, International Communism, or whatever name we give it may more and more assume the pattern of what we call “cold war” over an indefinite period, it seems to me that political warfare by clandestine means will increasingly assume major significance. The NSC in 10/5³ affirmed this conclusion and called for increased scope and magnitude in covert operations. General Smith speaks of the happy combination of personality and experience, the continuity of which is not insured. I would place more stress than he apparently does on his phrase “the continuity of which is not insured.” An institutional arrangement made at this particular juncture and based to some degree on personalities might be dangerous. It might work very well up until January 20, 1953. With regard to the State Department end of General Smith’s concept, I should like to see, if possible, the focal point within the Department providing policy guidance and control for political warfare activities placed upon as high a “professional level” as possible.

I attach hereto a memorandum addressed to me on October 10 by Mr. Krentz as well as a memorandum I have just received from Mr. Tracy Barnes. I think that both of these memoranda will assist in our study of the problem presented by General Smith’s memoranda.

Robert P. Joyce

⁴

Attachment 1

Washington, October 8, 1952.

Draft Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence Smith⁵

In the field of unconventional and psychological operations the Central Intelligence Agency is an executive and operating agency charged with carrying out projects in support of national policies. These projects include political and paramilitary operations, the general desirability of which have been determined by the senior departments of the Executive Branch of the Government. As an operating agent for these departments, CIA requires more than policy guidance. The actual projects which it proposes to undertake in furthering national policy should be carefully scrutinized before final approval, and the net value of the operations themselves should be periodically assessed by some authority outside the Agency but representative both of it and of the interested executive departments. The mounting cost of these operations makes such prior assessment and continuous audit a matter of great urgency.

Ever since I assumed my present responsibilities I have been trying to arrive at the best method of establishing within the Agency an objective method of project review and analysis, but without really satisfactory results. Moreover, under the existing mechanism for providing policy guidance and program approval, the Agency has continued in the position of having to assume too much responsibility and authority for its own good. Thus, the rapidly increasing cost of covert operations, coupled with the missing elements of objective review and substantive audit, leave it open to departmental and Congressional criticism. The simple fact is that in the field of cold war, vision and imagination are essential, but these two essential qualities must be held under wraps. Otherwise, the number of ways they will conjure up to spend money is really surprising, and the selective judgment of a detached, objective authority must be applied.

It is inevitable that cold war operations will continue over a long period of time. The involve activities which do not lend themselves to precise evaluation and it is impossible to judge in absolute terms the successes or failures of particular programs. Unlike military operations which require the continuous and increasing application of force toward an abrupt and conclusive ending, those in which we engage usually require a fluctuating effort with no clear termination in prospect. For this reason, it is all the more important that they should not be undertaken unless all concerned are satisfied as to their desirability.

The ideal situation would be for all cold war projects to be considered in detail and passed upon by a committee consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence (the present PSB). However, it is not possible for these fully occupied individuals to devote the amount of time necessary for such direct analysis, and they would need competent and fully trusted advisors from their respective staffs in order to be adequately informed. I believe, however, that the three officials mentioned, sitting as the Psychological Strategy Board, can if adequately supported perform these functions without too much additional burden, and they are already doing a good deal of it in an informal way at their weekly luncheon meetings. This, however, is the result of a happy combination of personalities and experience, the continuity of which is not insured. It can be insured only if there is a genuine acceptance of certain essential principles. The first of these is full recognition by the three Board members of the true significance of their role which would be actually to approve, guide, and assess the value of covert cold war operations, as well as to give the policy guidance under which these operations are planned and executed. In this capacity, they would be in effect a board of directors for all covert cold war activities. Second and somewhat more difficult of attainment would be the provision of a few highly qualified officers within the P.S.B. staff upon whom the principals could rely completely as their technical advisors, and whom their respective departments would accept in that status. It would be essential that these selected officers have competence to speak authoritatively and definitively on the various matters to be considered, both in their capacity as advisors and staff officers of the three principals and as representatives of the departments from which they are seconded. Time would be lost and insecurity would result from formal reference of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major departments, since this would have the inevitable result of allowing these matters to get down into the depths of departmental staffs and to be fought over and widely discussed by a large number of relatively junior officials. Hence, the selected staff officers would have to be held responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating and checking within their departments.

The three presently designated representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are all top quality individuals. We could not hope to get and would not want to have better people. It seems to me that the only difficulty is that they are not set up in the proper framework at the present time. They or others of equivalent caliber could serve as the principal advisors and assistants of the two Under Secretaries. I recommend, therefore, that: (a) the responsibility for guiding policy, for approving projects, and for assessing the results of all covert cold war operations be placed upon the Psychological Strategy Board; and (b) the present representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff now charged with giving policy guidance to the operating divisions of this Agency (or personnel of equal stature and experience) be grouped as a cold war general staff with the Director of the PSB staff as chief thereof, and be given the additional responsibility of considering proposed projects, of recommending these projects for approval or disapproval by the Board, of periodic evaluation of the conduct of these projects, and of recommending periodically whether they are to be continued or discontinued.

The PSB, as presently constituted, has not so far accomplished all of the results which I myself had hoped for. The concept outlined above would, to a certain extent, change its present character and would make it a really meaningful body as it would in fact become the device through which all of our major cold war activities are considered and approved. The present staff of the PSB would undergo a corresponding change with respect to its composition, functions and responsibilities.

These are general recommendations. If they are favorably considered, they will require detailed analysis and staff action.

Attachment 2

Washington, October 10, 1952.

Memorandum From Kenneth C. Krentz of the Policy Planning Staff to Robert P. Joyce⁶

General Smith’s draft memorandum of October 8⁷ presents a logical and convincing case for the appointment of deputies to the PSB members who would be responsible, each under the aegis of his own department, for formulating policy guidance and evaluation for all covert political and psychological operations. There is little doubt that such a set-up would enable CIA to function more effectively and responsibly in this field and I can see certain advantages from the Department of State’s point of view in that decisions be by a departmental group rather than solely by State with tacit or other concurrence by Defense. However, I can foresee several serious dangers from our point of view unless this project were to be extremely carefully worked out in terms of our own organization.

First, it seems to me that our present small office, functioning for and under the direct control of Mr. Matthews is, while not perfect, a very effective means of pulling together day-to-day operations on the covert side with all the responsible political officers of the Department. We know what is going on and can work very closely with the Assistant Secretaries and their Deputies and are in a position constantly to guide the thinking of working-level people in CIA/opc.

Covert political warfare is so alien to the normal concepts of American government in the past, is so labyrinthine and delicate, that it seems to me maturity of judgment and experience plus the career officer’s intuitive sense of political factors are essential factors in dealing with the problem on the day-to-day working levels of the bureaus. Experience, I believe, will demonstrate that the deputies proposed would in a very short time tend to become involved exclusively in high-level decisions and relationships which would isolate them from the intimate contact with the diverse parts of the Department and CIA, which we now maintain.

To set up a new mechanism within the Department to perform our function seems to me dangerous to our ends. I think particularly the “Secretariat” approach would tend to place these functions in a routine and perhaps an unimaginative context in which I do not believe they can be fitted. I am quite aware that our present set-up is viewed with horror by organizational and managerial eyes. Nevertheless, I believe the nature of the problem requires an unorthodox approach. In other words, if we appoint the deputies to sit in the PSB, I believe they should be supported by practically the same set-up which we now have under Mr. Matthews.

We must also consider that the Deputy Under Secretary for Substantive Affairs is likely always to be a high-calibre substantive officer. Under the vicissitudes of our system this would not necessarily be true for future Under Secretaries.

General Smith says, “It would be essential that these selected officers (the deputies) have competence to speak authoritatively and definitively on the various matters to be considered, both in their capacity as advisors and staff officers of the three principals and as representatives of the departments from which they are seconded (sic). Time would be lost and insecurity would result from formal reference of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major departments, since this would have the inevitable result of allowing these matters to get down into the depths of departmental staffs and to be fought over and widely discussed by a large number of relatively junior officials. Hence, the selected staff officers would have to be held responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating and checking within their departments.”

In the last analysis this becomes a question of individuals. If we were to set this proposal up tomorrow the individuals would be yourself and General Magruder. This would work beautifully because both of you have several years of intimate experience, knowledge of pitfalls, extensive cooperating contacts—built up over several years also through selected individuals—and the requisite qualities of mind for the job. Here also we would run into the violent objection of managers that you cannot rely upon individuals. Any comparably competent officers must be able to take over at any time. I think this is the exception that proves the rule. With the departure of yourself shortly and the possible departure of General Magruder at any time, I have a strong feeling that we might be getting into a very undesirable position. Furthermore, I do not think General Smith’s generalization as to Departmental staffs can be applied to the Department of State as it could to CIA or to the Pentagon. Our substantive staffs are relatively small and highly coordinated in the traditional pattern of Foreign Office operation.

This matter of our own internal set-up should have the most careful consideration before we agree to modifications. This is something which is going to take a large amount of thought and foresight, but my first reaction is that to be successful we should have to maintain something within our own building very similar to what we have now.

I am thoroughly in accord with General Smith’s stresses on the need for constant evaluation of covert programs and auditing even as to detail. Carefully worked out, the mechanism he proposes might be the best means of achieving this.

Kenneth C. Krentz

⁸

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 55 D 339, New Proposals for PSB. Top Secret.
2. Printed below as Attachment 1.
3. Document 90.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5. Secret; Security Information. For text of the October 30 version of this paper endorsed by the Psychological Strategy Board, see Document 135.
6. Secret; Security Information.
7. See Attachment 1 above.
8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.