893.01/8–2449: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 24—8:13 a. m.]
2033. Following are principal factors which may be expected influence Philippine public and governmental opinion on question recognizing Chinese Communist regime:
- 1.
- Fear of communism has during past year been reinforced by spread of knowledge that Hukbalahaps are Communist-led and has been sharpened by recent Communist successes on Asiatic mainland (Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m.).
- 2.
- Widespread distrust of the large Chinese colony in the Philippines and of activities in which they would engage after their home areas fall to Chinese Communists. Coupled with this is official realization that Communist-controlled Chinese Embassy at Manila might be expected to direct and protect activities Chinese Communists in Philippines.
- 3.
- Philippine tendency to follow lead of others, and preferably lead of US, in foreign affairs.
- 4.
- Wish of persons in Philippines profiting from trade with China to ensure continuance such trade.
- 5.
- Desire given expression by leftist newsmen that Philippines maintain ties with their Asiatic neighbors on mainland.
- 6.
- Opposition’s pressure on Government to follow an “independent” foreign policy.
We believe that from standpoint Philippine interests, first three considerations are the more compelling. Accordingly, we believe Philippine Government will probably desire withhold recognition for some time and that it will in the main be supported by public opinion in such stand. This would be particularly true if US, UK and France also withheld recognition. If recognition by principal Western Powers including US is forthcoming within reasonable time, Philippine [Page 66] Government and people would probably accept the realities, albeit with some misgivings, and Philippines doubtless would likewise extend recognition. If England and France join with other powers in according recognition while the US shows firm disposition withhold it, Philippine policy of non-recognition would come under strong fire, particularly from critics of the government who might be expected allege that the American dog is wagging the tail of Philippine foreign policy. At same time influence elements desiring engage business as usual would be increasingly felt. US, nevertheless, might be able prevail upon Philippine Government withhold recognition, at least for some time, but efforts due would not necessarily prove successful. This connection Embassy desires point out element of unpredictability posed by fact that President Quirino who is his own Secretary Foreign Affairs is prone make and announce impulsive and ill-considered decisions and to stand by them stubbornly once they have been made public.
I have sounded out Ambassador Romulo19 on this subject, particularly from standpoint implications for UN. He is apprehensive that question will come up there and is keenly aware difficulties likely ensue should another Communist power get seat on Security Council as well as voice in GA. He stated that he intends brief President Quirino on all aspects of the problem and that he himself will cooperate closely with US in UN.
- Philippine representative to the United Nations.↩