893.00/8–2649: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:19 p. m.]
2155. Policy proposed paragraphs 13–16 Shanghai’s 2796, July 16, from Cabot20 (repeated Moscow as Department’s circular airgram July 2521) impresses this Embassy Middle East [garble] as sound approach to problem Communist China. Policy of dignified aloofness (and particularly economic detachment) from affairs Communist China would not only have advantages cited in reftel and in Embtel 1620, June 2722 on same subject but would enable US make more concentrated and effective effort promote political and economic stability in important Asian areas where we still have good chance stem [Page 67] Communist tide (India, Japan, southeast Asia and Moslem Middle East). Manchurian developments would seem strengthen case for taking calculated risk of letting Chinese Communists “stew in own juice” (Embtels 2025, August 1323 and 2092, August 1924).
It is recognized that it may be difficult for reasons cited paragraph 11 Shanghai’s 2796 to persuade British and French follow this general policy but believes maximum effort should be made in present negotiations London bring British along with US on concrete program for joint control exports to China (Department’s infotel August 2 [1]25) along lines already operating vis-à-vis iron curtain countries.
I believe important [to] separate problem basic US policy re Communist China from recognition question. By viewing latter as primarily technical matter depending on existence of formally established Chinese Communist regime having effective control over country, and publicizing this as our attitude, we would have advantage following well-established historical precedents (current examples of US realistic recognition policy being ARA26 area practice and established diplomatic relations Balkan satellites), and at same time would avoid expenditures disproportionate energies on what is essentially formalistic and secondary aspect of Chinese Communist problem. I have in mind present difficulties our attempt keep united front on China recognition question and prospective UN representation complications.
Foregoing is of course based on assumption (which appears justified from admittedly incomplete information available here) that Nationalist Government will continue to disintegrate territorially and otherwise at present rapid rate and that Communist regime will quickly fill void.
It may be argued that long-delayed recognition will help sustain morale non-Communist elements and also give US a better bargaining point in eventual negotiations with China Communist regime. I feel that if withholding recognition is only support we can give such elements in forseeable future, it is better not create false hopes which can only lead to bitter disillusionment. Re second point, even should we be able use recognition as apparently effective negotiating weapon for protection US interests China (which is doubtful in view probability other non-Communist governments will not wait for US), I wonder on what basis can be assumed that understandings so reached will be implemented by Mao regime. Recognition “without illusions” at appropriate time would appear sounder course.
[Page 68]This connection believe it worth while engage in hindsight speculation on advantages which might have accrued US if we had extended recognition Soviet regime within reasonable period after success revolution. On optimistic side if US representatives had been in USSR during formative stages creation new state (before solidification of power under Stalin) they might conceivably by their presence have influenced, to at least some extent, course of events in manner more favorable to US interests than was actually possible under US non-recognition policy. (Because of our long-standing cultural and economic ties with Chinese people, more favorable circumstances for exercise such US influence could arise in Communist China than were ever present in Russia). On pessimistic side, established US-Soviet relations early twenties would certainly have enabled US Government and people obtain clearer understanding of profound dangers for Western democratic world implicit in developing Soviet regime. As to presumed benefits to US of agreements under which US eventually recognized USSR in 1933, the record certainly affords weak argument for those who would use long-delayed recognition as a bargaining device in China.
I appreciate that policy toward Communist China formulated on twin bases “dignified aloofness” and “diplomatic recognition” might present certain practical difficulties and even appear superficially contradictory. I believe, however, that long-range benefits of such policy to US and non-Communist world (as roughly depicted herein) are so strong that it would receive wide public approval and support if accompanied by a frank, carefully worked out and appropriately timed public relations program.
Sent Department 2155, repeated Nanking 93, Shanghai 19.
- Vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter VI.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter V.↩
- Post, p. 961.↩
- Vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter VI.↩
- Not printed.↩
- American Republics Affairs.↩