893.01/8–2349: Telegram
The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 23—1:03 p. m.]
265. Difficult to make brief and comprehensive reply to Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m. because of varied authorities and interests found in IC.18 Common to both French, Annamites is conviction that any strong centralized Chinese Government would for geographic, historic and economic reasons regard IC as field for expansion and that super-position Communist ideology will greatly strengthen this urge. Thus all but small minority hardened Communists in Viet Minh fear Chinese aggression.
However, both French and natives split into resisters and appeasers which affects attitude toward possible recognition of Chinese Communist Government. Other factors obscuring all shades Vietnam opinion are desire for independence, hatred of French and suspicion [Page 64] anti-Communist campaign will be used as excuse deny or delay independence.
While both French and vernacular press have in recent months devoted much space to Chinese situation in general and various foreign rumors re recognition policy of Western Powers, there has been little indication of local opinion on merits recognition.
Thus following opinions on reaction of various elements Indochinese public are largely conjecture:
(a) Recognition withheld.
- 1.
- In French opinion generally favorable but with minority, chiefly among business interests critical because of desire save investments and trade, and another small group appeasers fearful withholding recognition might incite invasion IC.
- 2.
- Vietnam opinion (i.e., supporters Bao Dai government and non-Communists in general) also generally favorable because would interpret non-recognition as determination stop spread Communism and support Bao Dai against Viet Minh.
- 3.
- Viet Minh (more exactly Communist and Communist-controlled elements thereof) opinion critical but would hesitate exploit due to general anti-Chinese sentiment.
(b) Recognition by chief powers.
Reaction generally reverse of (a) by all elements.
French official circles are particularly fearful activities and influence Chinese Communist consuls and other officials who would flock to IC after recognition. French criticism would be directed against US for forcing unwise policy on reluctant France. Vietnam opinion would fear recognition meant abandonment of effort stop spread Communism particularly by US and initiation French negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.18a Viet Minh would rejoice and be strengthened in hope eventual victory. Large Chinese minority would rapidly climb on Communist bandwagon, movement already in progress.
(c) Recognition withheld by US but granted by other powers including France.
Such development would greatly confuse public opinion. French officials would defend French action in public but express doubts in private. Certain French, both far right and left, would rejoice at US diplomatic defeat. Others would hope for diplomatic and trade advantages in conjunction British. Vietnam opinion would support US due to suspicion motives French; Viet Minh would be hard-pressed to find line attacking both France and US, Local Chinese in difficult spot.
[Page 65](d) Recognition withheld by US and France but granted by UK and others.
French opinion generally favorable with sharp criticism of British as interested only in profits and saving Hong Kong. Probable interruption of present extremely close relations British-French civil and military officials this area. Vietnam opinion preponderantly favorable. Viet Minh vociferously unfavorable. Local Chinese community somewhat encouraged.
Circumstances of recognition and method presentation to public might influence public opinion particularly in (b).