033.1100/9–1049
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)26
Subject: Solution for China as Outlined by General MacArthur to Huber Subcommittee of Congress
Attached hereto is a copy of Despatch No. 625 from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan27 enclosing a summary28 of General MacArthur’s response to a request of the Huber Subcommittee that he outline the measures which he thought necessary in China.
It is believed that in appraising General MacArthur’s suggestions certain considerations outlined below ought to be kept in mind.
[Page 559]In general the specific steps recommended by General MacArthur appear to neglect political forces and objectives in favor of strictly military measures. Military measures ought to be looked upon as a means to achieve political objectives. In this case presumably the immediate political objective would be the establishing of a non-Communist national government in a position of enduring control in China. However, it might be argued that even if the national government were established in control with the help of U.S. military support, the measures suggested by General MacArthur would so arouse the hatred of the Chinese people that the collapse of that government would follow closely upon the withdrawal of U.S. military support.
General MacArthur states that if the following steps are taken immediately, the situation can be saved: (1) issuance of a ringing declaration that the U.S. will support any and everyone who is opposed to communism; (2) placing 500 fighter planes in the hands of some “war horse” similar to General Chennault; (3) allowing volunteers to join such a fighting force without penalty; and (4) assigning surplus ships to the Chinese Navy sufficient to blockade and destroy China’s coastal cities.
With respect to (1) above it may be observed that U.S. resources are not unlimited and that experience has shown that at a time when many aspirations and hopes are sweeping the Far East, a purely negative program of opposing communism is not sufficient to win the popular support necessary if a regime is to survive. U.S. support of groups or regimes unable to marshal internal support is likely merely to dissipate U.S. resources, create anti-Americanism in the areas concerned and pervert the concept of U.S. aid as a marginal increment in assisting indigenous effort to that of U.S. support replacing indigenous effort.
Steps (2) land (3) would amount to direct involvement of the U.S. in Chinese hostilities. In taking these steps, the U.S. would have to assume concurrent responsibility of providing ammunition, replacement parts, supporting personnel for the planes and possibly for U.S. defense of airfields and supply lines. It would commit U.S. prestige to a degree which would make subsequent withdrawal in the case of failure almost impossible. The end result would probably be ever deeper U.S. involvement in hostilities, with the U.S. playing the role that Japan played in the previous conflict, and the Chinese Government in the eyes of the Chinese people, that of the Wang Ching-wei29 puppet government. The commitment of American strength and resources in the resulting Chinese morass would very possibly diminish rather than augment U.S. overall strategic strength. Furthermore, [Page 560] past evidence does not indicate that planes and ships would be a decisive factor in civil hostilities of the type in China. General Barr stated on December 2: “I believe that the formation of an American volunteer group can do little more than delay the eventual defeat of the Nationalist armed forces.” The objective in civil hostilities is to destroy the military strength of the opponent and win support of the civilian population. Air power, by inflicting death and destruction upon enemy armed forces and the civilian population indiscriminately, as would almost certainly occur in China, would probably insure to the Chinese Government, as to the U.S. which would supply the means, the enduring opprobrium of the Chinese people.
It should be noted that, prior to losses through defection and misuse, the Chinese Government enjoyed complete supremacy over the Chinese Communists in terms of naval and air strength. On the basis of past record, there is no reason to believe that the supplying of additional naval vessels, as suggested in (4), would prevent either further defection or further misuse unless the vessels were U.S. manned and operated. It is believed that if the U.S. participated either directly or indirectly in the destruction of the Chinese coastal cities, as called for in (4) above, the good will and friendship of the Chinese people toward the U.S., which has been accumulated over the past century, would be irrevocably destroyed. With respect to the Chinese Government, it is very possible that such drastic measures would in the long run defeat the objective which they sought to accomplish.
General MacArthur points out that the basic objective of Russian policy for generations has been to acquire warm water ports and states that the USSR is now driving for the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. He does not mention the possibility that this drive may bring communism into headlong collision with aroused forces of nationalism in Asia, nor does he mention the possibility that the strength of the drive may be lessened and finally brought to a halt by the vastness of the areas to be traversed, and the almost total absence of any inland means of communications.
Finally it is believed that General MacArthur’s appraisal of the present stature of the Generalissimo as a leader is much too optimistic. Reports from many and varied sources in China indicate that his prestige, except among a limited circle of immediate followers, has largely disappeared. Furthermore, as General MacArthur points out he knows nothing of the art of war. This would not be a serious shortcoming if he recognized his limitations. However, it is a dangerous combination when, as in the case of the Generalissimo, a leader knows nothing of the art of war and yet believes himself a military authority. The resulting unwillingness to seek and abide by the advice of competent [Page 561] military commanders has, in the case of the Generalissimo, been a serious handicap to the Nationalist war effort.
- Drafted by Wallace W. Stuart, of the same Office, and initialed by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office (Freeman); transmitted by Mr. Butterworth with his covering memorandum of October 28 to the Office of the Secretary of State with the statement that “You will recall that reference was made yesterday at the meeting with the Consultants to General MacArthur’s recent statements on China policy to a visiting group of Congressmen.” Notation by Mr. Butterworth: “Seen by the Secretary & returned Nov 4”.↩
- September 10, not printed.↩
- See memorandum of September 5, p. 544.↩
- Head of Japanese-sponsored regime at Nanking, 1940–44.↩