Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Department of Defense Files

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to the Council

Washington, October 19, 1949.

Subject: Study of Chennault Plan by Joint Chiefs of Staff

References:	A. Memo for Secretary of Defense from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 25, 1949
	B. NSC 48 and related papers25a

In accord with the request of the Under Secretary of State in the reference memorandum,^25b the enclosed memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, which includes the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on various aspects relating to the subject, is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council.

Sidney W. Souers

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)

Washington, October 18, 1949.

On 25 August you transmitted to me the request of the Department of State^* for the views of the Department of Defense on the so-called Chennault Plan which General Chennault had presented to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Department of Defense, after studying this plan, is of the opinion that the existence of unified resistance to Communist forces, as assumed in the plan, depends in fact on the development of several conditions which are not observable at present. Furthermore, the operational and logistical recommendations of this plan are too vague to permit detailed military analysis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have commented as follows on various factors relating to the Chennault Plan:

1. The “great Western Zone” of China, described in paragraph F (1) of the Chennault Plan, is a mountainous area with much defensive terrain. The people, many of whom are Moslems, are as a whole anti-Communist. The natural resources of the area appear sufficient to sustain life among the indigenous population and to provide certain stores in limited quantities for their fighting forces. It is believed that if the people of the “great Western Zone” of China would unify in a common effort, they could at least delay the Communists’ advance with the means at hand. The likelihood of establishing, by concerted action, an effective belt of resistance to Communist forces would depend primarily upon:

a. Development of competent military leaders;

b. Regeneration of the confidence of the people in their ability to oppose successfully Communist aggression and the strengthening thereby of the will of the Nationalist armed forces to fight;

c. Timely receipt from foreign countries of essential military supplies that cannot be provided locally;

d. Cooperation of the nations of Southeast Asia;

e. Moral support and public backing from the non-Communist nations of the world; and

f. The continuance of the spread of unrest and instability in Communist-held China.

2. Neither the plan nor its logistical support is in sufficient detail for the relation of one to the other. In view of the munitions manufacturing capacity in the Chungking area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff doubt, however, if small arms and light mortars with ammunition are urgently needed by the Nationalist forces for defense. In the absence of detailed plans, the need for the other articles mentioned in the Chennault Plan (pack artillery, motor transport, communications equipment, planes and other equipment for air reconnaissance and for army use) cannot be assessed.

In regard to the matter of the delivery of the materiel specified the production capacity of the United States is undoubtedly sufficient to provide these items. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that their supply by the United States in the quantities and categories requested is now warranted.

3. With reference to the question of U.S. supervision raised in paragraph F (3), the degree of United States supervision required would depend largely upon the size and type of the Chinese military assistance program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would not at this time favor adoption for China of the procedure employed by the United States military mission to Greece nor would they recommend resumption of the procedure for advisory activities on a Ministry of Defense level as followed by their former joint mission to China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that United States supervision of military aid is a detail which can best be considered when the specific practicable operational plans that are contemplated under the general plan of operations are known.

I wish to point out that the Department of Defense is actively pursuing its studies of feasible military means to achieve the objective of denying to Chinese Communist forces those parts of China still remaining free from Communist control. The Department of Defense, in this connection, believes that an NSC decision regarding the U.S. policy for Asia (NSC 48) would greatly facilitate governmental consideration of such means.

Louis Johnson

1. The NSC 48 series dealt with U.S. Policy Toward Asia; see the regional compilation in volume vii.
2. See the memorandum from Webb to Souers, August 24, p. 540.
3. Memo for Secretary of Defense from Executive Secretary, subject, “Study of Chennault Plan by Joint Chiefs of Staff”, dated August 25, 1949. [Footnote in the source text.]