Department of Defense Files
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Souers) to the Council
Washington,
October 19, 1949.
Subject: Study of Chennault Plan by Joint Chiefs of
Staff
References: |
A. Memo for Secretary of Defense from Executive Secretary, same
subject, dated August 25, 1949 |
|
B. NSC 48 and related papers25a |
In accord with the request of the Under Secretary of State in the reference
memorandum,25b the
enclosed memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, which includes the comments
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on various aspects relating to the subject, is
circulated herewith for the information of the National Security
Council.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Souers)
Washington, October 18,
1949.
On 25 August you transmitted to me the request of the Department of
State* for the views of the Department of Defense on the
so-called Chennault Plan which General Chennault had presented to the
House
[Page 557]
Foreign Affairs
Committee. The Department of Defense, after studying this plan, is of
the opinion that the existence of unified resistance to Communist
forces, as assumed in the plan, depends in fact on the development of
several conditions which are not observable at present. Furthermore, the
operational and logistical recommendations of this plan are too vague to
permit detailed military analysis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
commented as follows on various factors relating to the Chennault Plan:
- 1.
- The “great Western Zone” of China, described in paragraph F
(1) of the Chennault Plan, is a mountainous area with much
defensive terrain. The people, many of whom are Moslems, are as
a whole anti-Communist. The natural resources of the area appear
sufficient to sustain life among the indigenous population and
to provide certain stores in limited quantities for their
fighting forces. It is believed that if the people of the “great
Western Zone” of China would unify in a common effort, they
could at least delay the Communists’ advance with the means at
hand. The likelihood of establishing, by concerted action, an
effective belt of resistance to Communist forces would depend
primarily upon:
-
a.
- Development of competent military leaders;
-
b.
- Regeneration of the confidence of the people in their
ability to oppose successfully Communist aggression and
the strengthening thereby of the will of the Nationalist
armed forces to fight;
-
c.
- Timely receipt from foreign countries of essential
military supplies that cannot be provided
locally;
-
d.
- Cooperation of the nations of Southeast Asia;
-
e.
- Moral support and public backing from the
non-Communist nations of the world; and
-
f.
- The continuance of the spread of unrest and
instability in Communist-held China.
- 2.
- Neither the plan nor its logistical support is in sufficient
detail for the relation of one to the other. In view of the
munitions manufacturing capacity in the Chungking area, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff doubt, however, if small arms and light
mortars with ammunition are urgently needed by the Nationalist
forces for defense. In the absence of detailed plans, the need
for the other articles mentioned in the Chennault Plan (pack
artillery, motor transport, communications equipment, planes and
other equipment for air reconnaissance and for army use) cannot
be assessed.
-
- In regard to the matter of the delivery of the materiel
specified the production capacity of the United States is
undoubtedly sufficient to provide these items. However, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that their supply by the
United States in the quantities and categories requested is now
warranted.
- 3.
- With reference to the question of U.S. supervision raised in
paragraph F (3), the degree of United States supervision
required would depend largely upon the size and type of the
Chinese military assistance program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
would not at this time favor adoption for China of the procedure
employed by the United States military mission to Greece nor
would they recommend resumption of the procedure for advisory
activities on a Ministry of Defense level as followed by their
former joint mission to China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel
that United States supervision of military aid is a detail which
can best be considered when the specific practicable operational
plans that are contemplated under the general plan of operations
are known.
I wish to point out that the Department of Defense is actively pursuing
its studies of feasible military means to achieve the objective of
denying to Chinese Communist forces those parts of China still remaining
free from Communist control. The Department of Defense, in this
connection, believes that an NSC decision regarding the U.S. policy for
Asia (NSC 48) would greatly facilitate governmental consideration of
such means.