Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.24/10–2149

Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Bishop, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk), to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)

[Washington,] October 21, 1949.

Subject: Study on Problems Involved in Military Aid to China

In view of the importance of the Asia policy and of the question of assistance to anti-communist forces in China, I believe you will want to read at least the conclusions of the attached study by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee which is an example of the type of plan which the JCS presumably would approve, providing there is first a policy decision of opposition to communism in China.

M[ax] W. B[ishop]

[Annex]

Study on the Problems Involved in Military Aid to China

1. United States military aid to China is only one facet of the larger problem of United States policy toward that country. This policy, in turn, must be regarded as a future major integral element of the undetermined future national policy toward Asia. In view of the fact that a United States policy statement for Asia is now being drafted in the National Security Council and, concurrently, a review of United States policy for China is being conducted in the Department of State, a study on military aid to China in advance of determination of United States policy for Asia must be considered very tentative. In addition, the rapidly deteriorating situation of the Chinese Nationalist Government in China adds to the uncertainties now inherent in the study.

2. The Communists now control much of China although not as much as the Japanese did in 1945. The Communists may be expected soon to extend their control to include practically all of the Chinese coastal area and Hainan and possibly Formosa. However, there is Still a non-Communist area in south China some 500 miles in width and a potential anti-Communist belt in southwest China of even greater depth. These areas now separate southeast Asia from Communist-controlled China. Once China falls, all of Asia would, in all probability, eventually succumb to communism.

3. The control of the Chinese Nationalist Government over the non-Communist areas of China has become so weak that it is now little more than nominal. In addition, the government itself is divided into two major political factions, one headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the other by Acting President Li Tsung-jen. Acting President Li governs south central China and the forces there are commanded by his followers. The provincial governors of all the other non-Communist areas of China, together with the Nationalist air force and the fleet commanders, profess allegiance to the Generalissimo who also controls certain monies of the Nationalist Government as well as the distribution of some military supplies. The situation, however, is ripe for the rise of war lords in the non-Communist areas since these portions of China are no longer controlled by one man or group or by a central government.

4. Non-Communist Chinese forces estimated at 1,210,000 are reported to be distributed approximately as follows:

General Area	Strength
Taiwan, Pescadores	105,000
Hunan, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, Hupeh	175,000
Southern Shensi	150,000
Suiyuan, Kansu, Ninghsia, Tsinghai, Sinkiang	120,000
Szechwan, Sikang	35,000
Yunnan	15,000
Kwangtung	85,000
Fukien	15,000
Chou Shan Archipelago	10,000
Total	710,000

In addition, there are on the order of 500,000 civil troops, provincials, and troops in training.

5. The current main effort of the Communist forces is south along the coast of China. The Communists are also continuing to make progress in Kansu and Tsinghai Provinces in the northwest.

6. The most probable course of action of the Communist armies is to exert maximum military effort to reduce the effectiveness of and to isolate the Nationalist forces from each other in order to defeat them in detail. It is believed, in view of the increasing anti-Communist feeling in China, that the Communist army commanders will advance slowly, regrouping and resupplying fully, and consolidating militarily and politically each new gain to the extent they consider necessary before undertaking further operations.

7. The immensity of China’s economic problem is causing the Communists many difficulties in the areas they have conquered; these difficulties have been increased by the blockade of Communist-held ports by the Nationalist navy, by inexperienced Communist administrators, and by civil disturbances, particularly by peasants. Unrest in the captured port cities is prevalent and over one million persons from Shanghai alone have been moved to rural areas largely unprepared to receive them. Throughout Communist-held China, uncoordinated peasant uprisings have already occurred on a small scale, and banditry and guerrilla activities are on the increase. However, there is no evidence that civil disturbances in rear of the Communist troops have yet affected plans for Communist military advances. Nevertheless, communism has not provided the solution to China’s age-old economic and population problems and disappointment and dissatisfaction with Communist rule is spreading.

8. Nationalist ground forces are now on the defensive everywhere. Nationalist morale is low and defeatism prevails among the commanders and the troops. This attitude of defeatism has followed in the wake of numerous Nationalist tactical failures resulting from such military errors as overextension of lines of communications, failure to take timely action, conflicting orders, failures in mutual support during combat, and the tendency to concentrate in or withdraw to urban areas rather than to the best military positions. Although there are a few competent Nationalist commanders, the military system as a whole has been handicapped by cliques and by political appointees. In addition, the troops, many of them impressed into service, are in general poorly fed, clothed, and paid, all of which have affected their will to fight. Although the Nationalist forces could not conceivably regain the initiative now, they should, in the interests of morale, undertake as early as practicable some offensive operations, even if only of local or of guerrilla type, in order to interfere with the enemy operations, increase the difficulties of Communist control, raise the fighting morale of the anti-Communist forces, and obtain from the Communists by capture arms, equipment, and stores for future operations. However, unless certain essential military supplies are furnished, the feeling of hopelessness will prevail and it will be impracticable for many of the non-Communist forces to launch even local attacks.

9. The Nationalist navy of some 80 seagoing vessels is believed capable of maintaining under present conditions a reasonably effective blockade of the ports of China from Shanghai to Fukien. Acquisition of spare parts, by one means or another, is essential for the maintenance of these units. The crew of each vessel shares in the prize money from captured blockade running ships. As previously indicated, the navy commanders profess allegiance to the Generalissimo.

10. The operations of the Nationalist air force units stationed on Taiwan are handicapped by inadequate maintenance and supplies. There has been considerable cannibalization of planes in order to continue even limited operations. These units do perform some bombing missions against targets in Communist China and have performed modest though efficient airlift operations. Their primary task, however, is to maintain a blockade of the commercial air traffic to the coast of Communist China. As previously stated, the air force units stationed on Taiwan profess allegiance to the Generalissimo.

11. The United States has been furnishing military aid to China in its struggle against communism during the past several years. The provision of this aid is in consonance with our overall policy of containing communism and our security requirements that China be kept free from Soviet domination, since otherwise all of Asia would in all probability pass into the sphere of the USSR.

12. From the United States military point of view, Soviet domination of Asia would strengthen the over-all strategic position of the USSR at the expense of the non-Communist nations by:

a. Providing the USSR with additional strategic space;

b. Increasing by approximately one-third the military-industrial potential of the USSR;

c. If Japan were included, permitting establishment of a self-sufficient Asian war industry;

d. Weakening United States world leadership, particularly our leadership in the western Pacific;

e. Denying to the non-Communist nations a much needed manpower reservoir of approximately one-half the population of the world;

f. Denying to the United States strategic materials now in short supply in our stockpiles; and

g. Denying to the United States bases on the mainland from which to project our power in a global war. In addition should Japan succumb to Soviet domination, the United States would face neutralization or even capture of some or all of its Asian offshore bases.

13. In view of the present situation in non-Communist China, it appears that there can be little expectation, based on purely military grounds, of regaining much of the ground which has been lost to the Communists, at least for a number of years. It is believed that all that could be done now would possibly be to slow the Communist advance with a view to eventually stopping it. From the military point of view, it would be highly desirable at least to contain communism within north and east central China rather than at China’s southern borders and thus to minimize Communist penetrations from the north into southeast Asia. Military aid alone, regardless of the amount, cannot halt the advance of the Communists in the immediate future. However, if the unrest in Communist-held China continues to grow and if a determined will to resist can be regenerated in the anti-Communists, it might be possible with capable leadership, for the non-Communists to retain footholds in South China which would constitute deterrents to Communist penetration into southeast Asia, as well as to prevent Communist consolidation of all of China. It appears that one of the cheapest and most effective steps which the United States could take toward aggravating the economic problems and unrest in Communist-held China would be aid to anti-Communist forces which are now engaged, or may engage in the future, in interference with the sea and air lines of communication with Communist-held seaports.

14. In the light of the foregoing it is apparent that early provision of United States military aid to China in order to contain communism there would be a gamble. However, it would indicate to Asia and the world that the United States has no intention of abandoning China as the Chinese now apparently believe.

15. From the strategic point of view it is important to maintain non-Communist areas of resistance in China since these would be of value in preventing Communist penetration into southeast Asia and in providing rallying points susceptible for use in future efforts to deliver the country from communism. There is a slight possibility that the people of the “great Western Zone” may establish a belt of resistance there against communism. The population as a whole is anti-Communist. The area is mountainous and contains much defensive terrain. It is believed that the resources of this area are sufficient to sustain life among the indigenous population and provide certain stores in limited quantities for their fighting forces. In this connection, the munitions industry in the area around Chungking manufactured the following munitions in April 1949:

Rifles	10,000
Machine guns	600
Mortars	600
Recoilless guns	12
Small arms ammunition	25,000,000
Mortar shells	200,000
Grenades	150,000

While the chemicals necessary for the explosives in ammunition are locally available, there is not sufficient production of copper, lead, and zinc to meet munitioning needs and these would have to be obtained from foreign sources. The area is deficient in petroleum and transportation facilities are inadequate.

16. The possibility of the people of the “great Western Zone” establishing an effective belt of resistance to Communist forces would depend primarily upon:

a. Development of competent military leaders;

b. Regeneration of the confidence of the people in their ability to oppose successfully Communist aggression and the strengthening thereby of the will of the Nationalist armed forces to fight;

c. Timely receipt from foreign countries of essential military supplies that cannot be provided locally;

d. Cooperation of the nations of southeast Asia;

e. Moral support and public backing from the non-Communist nations of the world; and

f. The continuance of the spread of unrest and instability in Communist-held China.

17. Although transportation facilities in non-Communist China, as well as in China as a whole, are poor, it is practicable for supplies to reach the present non-Communist area by land means within the country from the coast along the Gulf of Tongking and by way of French Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma. Although airlift could be established in the same general areas, there has been a distinct tendency on the part of the Chinese to over-emphasize the use of this type of lift while disregarding the expense and lack of facilities necessary for effective and continued air transport operations. Airlift should therefore be considered as a supplementary means and in general should be limited to emergencies. Some of the routes would be of considerable length. However, they would not be, in general, any longer or more difficult than present lines nor than those used for the supply of Nationalist forces during World War II. Although there is a possibility of land passage of some supplies to the Nationalists through communist-held territory in China, the amount would probably be negligible.

18. There is little indication at this time that the anti-Communists will unite in a determined fight to re-establish a central anti-Communist government. There is a greater possibility that the people in some areas within this belt will act under war lord leadership to resist the Communist armed forces and that the efforts of some of these groups may achieve success.

19. The major questions involved in United States military aid to China are what can be accomplished and whether these accomplishments would be worthwhile. The factors involved in a United States decision regarding military aid to China, short of commitments of our forces, are political as well as military and also include consideration of our national economy and the importance of aid to China relative to other nations in our over-all aid programs. As previously stated, from the strictly strategic point of view, a modest stake in a gamble on the non-Communist elements of China would be worth undertaking provided these elements continue to fight the Communists and to cooperate with us.

20. A modest military aid program for China might be developed along either of the following general lines or a combination thereof:

a. A program of assistance direct to non-Communist fighting forces; or

b. A program of special operations in China.

21. A program of United States military aid direct to non-Communist fighting forces in China might be based on the following general policies:

a. It would be supervised by a senior military officer of general or flag rank, now possessing the confidence of the Chinese anti-Communist leaders, and a relatively small number of experienced officers from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force;

b. The headquarters of the supervisory group would be established at some place other than Taiwan or the capital of the Nationalist Government;

c. The military assistance to be furnished would consist generally of ammunition, demolitions, fuel and maintenance equipment and supplies dependent upon approval of the United States supervisory group.

d. Aid would only be provided for the requirements of operational plans aimed at specific limited objectives which would be prepared and executed by Chinese commanders. These plans, together with lists of equipment and supplies essential to their accomplishment and which the Chinese commanders cannot provide from their own resources, would be reviewed and either approved or disapproved by the Chief of the United States military supervisory group in China;

e. The Chinese commander, who is to be the recipient, would have to make satisfactory arrangements to move the materiel from the United States transfer point to his command before aid is shipped to him;

f. It would be practicable and highly desirable to include plans in Chinese covert operations related to United States aid among those to be reviewed and either approved or disapproved by the Chief of the United States military supervisory group in China. Supervision of these operations should be a responsibility of the Chief of the United States supervisory group and should be accomplished in a manner similar, as far as practicable, to that employed in connection with approved Chinese overt operations.

g. Details relative to the functions and operational procedures … of the United States military supervisory group, in consonance with the broad policies outlined above, should be held in abeyance until after the appointment of the chief of the group; and

h. After his appointment, the chief of the group would be expected to prepare and submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval recommendations covering his proposed detailed plans and procedures for the implementation of the program.

22. The program of United States military aid direct to non-Communist fighting forces in China would be materially assisted if the Chief of the United States supervisory group were promptly informed of all United States government policies, actions, and recommendations with respect to China.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusions^29a

25. Based on the foregoing, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee concludes that:

a. A modest well-directed program of aid to China would now be in the security interest of the United States;

b. The program for aid to China should include aid direct to non-Communist forces as long as this is practicable …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. The Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the JSSC study to the Secretary of Defense on October 6, 1949, with the following statement: “Although this study does not have their formal approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it to be sound background material.”