Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.00/1–2149: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, January 21, 1949—5 p. m.
[Received January 22—12:50 a. m.²⁵]

179. Chen Li-fu, who had just returned from Generalissimo, tells us there has been no decision remove Government [to] Canton. De cision awaits outcome peace negotiations. Government is seeking direct contact with Communists so far unsuccessfully. Chen said he envisaged four possibilities:

(1) Cease-fire arrangement permitting Generalissimo and Government retain control south of Yangtze (he admitted this most un-likely);

(2) Retirement Generalissimo with Li Tsung-jen negotiating cease-fire which would permit Government under his leadership retain control south of Yangtze (this he also admitted unlikely);

(3) Generalissimo retiring and Li Tsung-jen seeking coalition government with Communists (while not ruling out this development, he felt it unlikely); and

(4) Continue the fight in Nanking and elsewhere to the bitter end from Taiwan (this he thought the most likely course).

Dr. Chen expressed considerable concern over recent evidences of desire of US for removal Generalissimo. He cited this connection: (1) Drastic reduction and impending withdrawal JUSMAG;²⁶ (2) Our refusal to accede Chinese request for intervention, pointing out that we had not even bothered to consult Soviets before refusing; and (3) Bloom’s²⁷ public demand for removal Generalissimo.²⁸ He could not understand why, if we supported resistance to Communism in China, we undermined publicly those forces resisting Communism in China, thus giving comfort to the enemy. He asked in this regard whether it was true, as Generalissimo had been informed, that we would refuse to give any ECA²⁹ aid to areas under Communist control or to a government with Communist participation. He could not understand why we suppressed such information and publicized things detrimental to Chiang regime.

We explained that:

(1) Original conception JUSMAG was unrealistic in present situation China; that JUSMAG was not being withdrawn, but merely reduced to size more commensurate with present needs, and that it would not be withdrawn so long as Chinese Government remained Nanking and desired its presence;

(2) While we could not speak for our Government we felt confident one of basic reasons for refusal join with Soviets in intervention in China arose out of our most unhappy experience with Soviet cooperation in Germany; that to join with Soviets in intervention in China would give them legitimate and legal basis for obstructing and sabotaging every effort toward improving conditions Chinese people which would be neither in interests of China nor of US;

(3) While we were not aware of the background of Bloom’s statement nor of his reasons therefor, we could assure Dr. Chen that in every instance here we had pointed out to Washington that proposed action might be detrimental to National Government and tend to undermine its authority, action proposed had not been taken. Speaking personally therefore, we said we felt confident that had Department had prior notice of Bloom’s statement and ability to dissuade him from making it, statement would not have been made.

Dr. Chen felt that maybe it was too late for US to intervene effectively in China unless we were willing to come in and practically take over, yet he hoped we would not “wash our hands” of China. If we did not desire a Communist regime in China dominated and directed from Moscow he felt we should support any elements in China resisting Communism and hoped we would do so. We replied that while we could not commit Congress, we felt sure that policy of US was based on resistance to Moscow-dominated Communism in whatever area might be threatened by such domination; that while we could not promise any specific assistance to forces in China resisting Communism, he could always be sure of American sympathy for such action and of such support as might be feasible.

Obviously Dr. Chen, and we believe he represents the position of that small group including Dr. Hu Shih³⁰ who continue to favor no compromise with Communists and who believe that without Generalissimo resistance forces will disintegrate and collapse, is seeking some promises of support from US. We carefully refrained from making any promises, yet sought to encourage continued resistance to Communist domination of China, making it abundantly clear that decision as to ways and means and as to personalities who would lead or not lead rested solely with Chinese.

As indicative of “confusion confounded” which characterizes present China scene is fact that Vice Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister Wu Teh-chen told Australian Ambassador at same time we were talking to Chen Li-fu that Government was moving to Canton, move to be completed by February 1 and that no limitation would be placed either on transportation or housing for personnel, archives and baggage of diplomatic missions. At same time member Legislative Yuan informed us that Yuan would meet in Nanking February 1 with assured quorum and with avowed purpose of discussing peace.

Stuart

25. Text printed from corrected copy received January 24, 2:50 a. m.
26. Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group.
27. Sol Bloom, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
28. For reported statement of January 17, see Congressional Record, Appendix, vol. 95, pt. 12, p. A272.
29. Economic Cooperation Administration.
30. Chinese Minister of Education and Chancellor of National Peking University.