893.00/1–2149: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 22—8:48 a. m.]
166. Our opinion that CCP Politburo is coldly determined to exact from Kmt Government something closely approximating unconditional surrender has not been altered by Mao Tse-tung’s eight-point peace program of January 14.
If we hypothesize that Chinese Communist leaders are convinced Marxians of Leninist persuasion, we believe above judgment is logically tenable. Chinese Communists incidentally in all their theoretical writings stoutly proclaim their Bolshevik convictions. They have acquired from Lenin’s Bolshevik party blueprint for revolutionary action which works. As long as it is pragmatically correct in China, they are not going to deviate radically from it. One cardinal tenet of Bolshevism is that proletarian revolution can be successfully completed only if state apparatus of bourgeois state is thoroughly smashed.
Consequently we interpret CCP list of 43 war criminals proclaimed on Xmas Day as initial step in total liquidation of Kmt Government. We explain fact that CCP has not announced openly its intentions to exact unconditional surrender from Kmt Government and then smash it as simply tactical silence due to likelihood that exhausted populace would not support such an extreme program.
Tide of Communist successes is flowing too rapidly for CCP to need content itself with anything less. Self-confidence of CCP is underlined in Mao’s statement that “situation is extremely clear: PLA need only further deal some heavy blows at remaining Kmt troops and entire reactionary ruling machinery of Kmt will crumble into dust and extinction”. Readiness to “carry revolution to very end” as stated in CCP New Year’s Day message is reaffirmed in Mao’s appeal to “all Comrade commanders and fighters of PLA” that “before Nanking reactionary government accepts and realizes genuine democratic peace, [Page 66] you must not slacken your battle efforts in the least. You must firmly, thoroughly and completely wipe out any reactionaries who dare to resist”. Statements like these buttressing Mao’s eight points give little support to hypothesis that CCP is willing to help bridge chasm separating CCP and Kmt. Most immediate and irreconcilable divergence now is that Kmt wants armistice before beginning peace talks while CCP will not cease fire prior to Kmt capitulation to CCP peace terms.
Mao’s long preamble, which indicts Kmt and American “reactionary” measures and applauds CCP “progressive” measures during past 30 months we look upon as designed more for consumption in CCP-occupied territory than in Nationalist China. Communists now control population of over 200 million war-weary Chinese who have suffered much more than bulk of Nationals [Nationalist] population in southern China. It must be not easy task for Mao to convince these people of necessity to continue war but he does all possible in his preamble by making peace contingent upon Nationals [Nationalists] accepting his terms. Despite fact these terms essentially represent unconditional surrender which means further fighting, Mao still achieves his immediate purpose which is to give impression that CCP is as piously anxious as Kmt to end China’s torment. And in so doing he in no way is deflected from basic Bolshevik program of crushing Kmt state apparatus, beginning with war criminals and thereafter working on downward as far as seems necessary or expedient.
Following is our analysis of Mao’s eight conditions:
- 1.
- Punishment of war criminals is merely borrowed refinement of ancient savagery as expressed in Roman phrase vae victis. None of 43 persons listed is conceivably war criminal except by haughtily intolerant and bigoted CCP standard. Many are men of high integrity and patriotic devotion.
- 2.
- It remains to be seen whether new CCP constitution will be any less “bogus” than that of Kmt to which incidentally CCP objects not so much on grounds of substance as on manner of its ratification.
- 3.
- Abolishment of Kmt’s “legitimacy of traditional institutions” is rather vague but probably refers to formalized procedures of that party and its status as major party in China.
- 4.
- This doubtless refers to abolishment of Kmt armies as independent units and their eventual incorporation into PLA which, of course, is only army operated on “democratic principles” of CCP.
- 5 and 6.
- Confiscation of bureaucratic capital and agrarian reform represent socialistic trends in essential accord with both Three Principles23 and Marxism.
- 7.
- Abrogation of “treaties of national betrayal” of course refers to American treaties and agreements entered into since V-J Day.
- 8.
- Convocation of a new PCC is most important condition from standpoint of American interests. There is good ground to believe [Page 67] that in 1946 CCP delegates sincerely wanted implementation of PCC resolutions,24 sometimes to extent of themselves coming under suspicions of their Yenan comrades. At that time Generalissimo who then had power was more intransigent of two parties. Now that power has been transferred, it remains to be seen how intransigent CCP will itself be in “establishing without participation of reactionary elements a democratic-coalition government to take over power from Nanking Kmt reactionary government and its lower levels of government.” A shadow of things to come was perhaps thrown by North Shensi broadcast of October 5 which announced that Tsinan military control committee had issued proclamation ordering “immediate dissolution of Kmt and all its open and secret Fascist organizations including the San Min Chu I Youth Corps and Secret Police”. This order was directed not at “reactionary elements of Kmt” but at entire party membership in that city.
Sent Department, repeated Moscow 3, pouched Shanghai.