123 Stuart, J. Leighton: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 12—9:04 a. m.]
750. Recent developments seem to make desirable review our policy should I be requested by Acting President34 to accompany him south after breakdown peace negotiations (Deptel 103, January 26). New factors are involved which were not present at time Chinese Government moved to Canton and I and other chiefs of mission of North Atlantic community decided to stay Nanking. Briefly new factors are:
- (1)
- Anticipated invitation this time will come in earnest from Acting President and not technically as it did last January. It is assumed request will not come until Li himself is ready to leave Nanking with his cabinet. With such departure there will fee no national authority left in the capital to which diplomatic corps might be accredited.
- (2)
- While there was no support for Generalissimo and Sun Fo Government last January among people in any thing but peace policy, we must recognize increased stature of and political support for Li Tsung-jen which he might well maintain into resistance phase if forced to defend militarily national territory by deliberate attack from Communists such as crossing Yangtze during peace negotiations.
- (3)
- Treatment of our consular officers by Communist officials in north as well as development of Chinese Communists’ foreign policy in their public pronouncements has in past 6 weeks only added confirmation of their hostility to Occident beginning with USA. If Communists have in all this period refused recognize official status of consular officers, how much less may they be expected to recognize official status of diplomatic corps accredited to another government or have any dealings with it.
Factors which conditioned my recommendations and Department’s decision in January that I remain in Nanking with other chiefs of mission and which are still valid are:
- (1)
- Little possibility of effective military resistance on national scale to Communists once they successfully cross Yangtze in force.
- (2)
- Move of chiefs of diplomatic missions to Canton would undoubtedly strengthen Li’s Government and give its supporters moral encouragement but would not by itself have effect of creating will to resist in south.
- (3)
- Move of chiefs of mission to Canton might have serious repercussions on foreign nationals and interests in Yangtze basin and be considered by Americans remaining here as abandonment by their government of them and their interests.
- (4)
- Presence Diplomatic Corps in Nanking might have salutary effect on Communists when they over-run lower and middle Yangtze cities. It is likely to be embarrassment to Communists.
- (5)
- We might lose friendly relationship with Chinese people by identifying ourselves in move to Canton with political party that has so completely lost public support, particularly should Generalissimo again take over leadership of Government if and when Li’s peace efforts fail. Certainly my transfer to Canton under such circumstances would end for all time any personal influence I might have in Chinese thinking circles and make it impossible for me to ameliorate conditions under which Americans may live in Communist-dominated China.
- (6)
- While recognizing likelihood of being ignored and object of studied slights from local Communist authorities in remaining Nanking, onus for bad relationship would clearly be on Communists which would not be lost on those Chinese who also remain behind.
In reviewing this situation and recommending it for Department’s consideration I have very much in mind heavy responsibility which rests on US Government in decision to leave Nanking with National Government or await Communists. Whatever decision I make will most assuredly be followed by other chiefs of mission of North Atlantic community, and what that group decides will set the pattern for most if not all of rest of corps. It is greatest concern among my colleagues that we follow similar course and particularly that British and ourselves keep in step.
There are three possible courses of action open to me:
- (1)
- That I accept Li’s invitation and follow him in flight to Canton,
- (2)
- That I remain Nanking, regardless of Li’s movements, with other chiefs of mission,
- (3)
- That I be recalled to Washington for consultation at time Li asks me to move south and before occupation Nanking.
I have discussed this problem with Clark and Merchant who have “been in Nanking week end. Clark favors third alternative, Merchant was inclined to second though he has not seen this telegram; Jones35 considers either first or third alternative preferable to second. My personal inclination is to remain in Nanking (second course) for same reasons that brought me to that decision last January and outlined above.
While Acting President has made no suggestion of move or his future plans, I anticipate invitation to Diplomatic Corps as soon as peace negotiations clearly break down. I would be grateful for Department’s guidance earliest.
Sent Department 750, repeated AmEmbassy Canton 244, Shanghai 363, Taipei.