Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

701.4193/4–949

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)

[Washington,] April 9, 1949.

Subject: Status of Foreign Chiefs of Mission at Nanking

Mr. Graves called by appointment this morning to inform me of the British Embassy’s receipt of a telegram from the British Foreign Office regarding a further meeting of the North Atlantic group of chiefs of mission at Nanking. He handed me a paper (attached) containing pertinent excerpts from the Foreign Office telegram and explained that the British continued to maintain the position that the chiefs of mission should remain at Nanking in the event of a breakdown of the negotiations between the National Government and the Communists. He emphasized that it was considered of great importance that a common front be maintained in regard to this question.

In reply to his inquiry, I stated that Ambassador Stuart had not reported the results of this meeting at Nanking but that he was under a standing directive to seek the Department’s instructions in the event that circumstances should warrant reconsideration of this question. I added that the Department’s position in this regard had not changed and that it was still contemplated that Ambassador Stuart would remain in Nanking in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations. I concluded that I would, however, discuss the matter with Mr. Butterworth during the weekend and get in touch with him on Monday to confirm that there had been no change in the Department’s position.

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

1. We consider it to be of great importance that a common front should be maintained in regard to the question of the locale of our representation in China.

2. The probable consequences of premature abandonment of our position at Nanking would be that we would jeopardise our chance of establishing satisfactory relations with a communist dominated China, and we should be abandoning our commercial interests in the areas already over-run by them. The position of our Consulates in communist occupied areas might become intolerable and we might have to withdraw them.

3. In the view of His Majesty’s Government there still remains no prospect that, if the National Government were to move in its entirety to the south, it would be capable of setting up an effective administration which could resist the communist advance. In these circumstances we very much hope that the United States Government will feel disposed to instruct its representative to remain in Nanking subject to discretion being given to withdraw in a case of exceptional emergency.