893.00B/1–2049
The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)17
Sir: I have the honor to enclose and comment on a memorandum by Consul E. W. Rinden18 summarizing views in regard to Chinese Communist thinking which were recently expressed, during a private discussion of that subject, by a group of Americans and British who have lived for considerable time in “Red China” in connection with medical relief and other philanthropic activities.
The Consulate General concurs in Mr. Rinden’s opinion that the character and experience of these men invest their observations with especial value. So much of the material on the Chinese Communists represents hearsay, professional propaganda, emotional coloring, or, at best, honest but superficial information—covering, for example, a brief tour in Red territory, or statements obtained hurriedly and formally from members of a Communist community with which nothing approaching relations of mutual confidence have been previously developed The observations recorded in Mr. Rinden’s memorandum are those of a group of intelligent Americans and British whose organizational background, principles and strict devotion to impartial humanitarian work ensure a high degree of objectivity. These men have closely associated and dealt with the people and leaders in Communist sections over a considerable period. Through such association and through scrupulous disassociation from politics and from religious proselyting, they seem to have gained the confidence of their Communist communities. Accordingly, they have had real opportunity to study the thinking and ideological inspiration of rank and file members of the Chinese Communist administrative system—not those who make policy, it is true, but those upon whom the regime depends to have policy carried out.
Communist Plans for Shanghai. Of particular interest from the local standpoint is the group’s understanding that the Chinese Communists, mindful of the unfortunate consequences which their delay in entering Tsinan had for that city, are now “actively and systematically” preparing for a quick take-over of Shanghai when the time comes for occupation of this port. The Communists, in the group’s opinion, will do their utmost to protect American as well as other lives and property; though the group feels that the presence here of American marines would seriously exacerbate relations between Americans and the Chinese Communists.
[Page 62]Russian-Marxist versus Western Influence on Chinese Communists. The point of greatest general interest brought out in the memorandum is the group’s analysis of the extent of Russian, Marxist and anti-Western ideological influence on the Chinese Communists. To say that Marxist and “party line” indoctrination is general among the Chinese Communists is to paint but half the picture, in the group’s opinion. Many of the young Communist leaders, through prior attendance at colleges such as Yenching and Ch’ing Hua, are at the same time well grounded in western economic and political theory. They have found it possible to combine Marxist and “capitalist” interpretations and they are more influenced by the latter interpretation. They are much concerned over the need for trade between their regime and America and Britain. It is this type of Chinese Communist who, the group points out, conducts, and is likely to conduct, actual relations with Westerners.
Comment: These observations acquire additional significance when it is considered that they apply to men belonging to the small Party core of Communist-administered China—to those upon whom the regime must depend to preserve its Marxian character through the coming period of enforced rapid expansion when great numbers of unindoctrinated personnel must be suddenly enlisted to keep in motion the complex machinery of government and economic life in the great urban centers and the vast countryside of conquered Kuomintang China. Because of China’s exceptional dearth of educated men, most of this new personnel accepted for administrative, economic and technical posts must inevitably be men from Kuomintang China, whose average orientation, as between Russia and the Western democracies, will of course be even more strongly toward the West than is that of the Western-educated Communist leaders described by the group. In a country of the type of Germany, such a situation could perhaps be quickly corrected by purges and replacements. In China, where educated men are produced in a trickle, it will take many years.
That the supreme Chinese Communist leadership may pledge China’s subservience to Marx and Moscow is one question—possibly already decided. Whether, how soon and how effectively such a pledge can be fulfilled in a country of the character and dimensions of China is quite another question, which may well take decades to determine. The fact that the carrying out of Communist China’s political and economic policies will for long have to be entrusted largely to men who are oriented more along Western democratic lines than along Soviet lines is but one of many difficulties in Moscow’s path.
Another important “headache” will be the disbanding and the compelling or retaining the loyalty of various ambitious field commanders and enormous numbers of other military officers of Kuomintang or [Page 63] regional backgrounds, who have staffed not only Nanking’s forces, but also many of those on the Communist side, and whose permanent career interests could hardly be satisfied with what a Moscow-dominated Marxist regime would have to offer.
Equally important, also, would seem, for example, such factors as:
The indispensability of economic and technical relations with the West to ensure the revival of China’s national economy which the Communists must achieve if they are to escape the fate of the Nanking Government;
The universal Chinese admiration of American products (including the prized and widely advertised arms of the “American equipped” Communist divisions);
Deep-rooted friendship for the United States in many segments of the Chinese population;
Popular antipathy to alien control based on extreme racial and cultural divergence and on rising nationalism;
The immemorial Chinese practice of playing off one foreign power against another;
Pride of the Chinese Communists in their self-made, self-reliant record, as compared with the Russian mothering received by European Communists.
These remarks are not intended as an effort to minimize the threat which the Communists’ military conquest of China poses for the United States and for the democratic cause. They are made, rather, in the thought that political observers are currently tending to over-stress the significance of what they conjecture will be the attitudes or cleavages in attitudes of Mao Tze-tung and a few other top Chinese Communist leaders toward control by Moscow—apparently forgetting that the successful Sovietizing of China depends a great deal on circumstances and forces beyond the fiat of Mao or of any other leader.
The extent to which Moscow will succeed in dominating China must depend on the extent to which it is able to overcome the combination of various unfavorable factors peculiar to the complex China scene. This combination is different and apparently more formidable than any which Moscow has yet surmounted elsewhere. It follows that, from the American standpoint, the opportunities and rewards for study and exploitation of factors helpful toward frustrating Moscow and salvaging something from the situation should be correspondingly greater than in the case of the Soviet satellite states of Europe.
While it is, of course, manifestly impossible to predict the future course of Chinese Communism, and while it is possible that there may evolve a harder core of Chinese Communism which will succeed in dominating the China stage, it is believed that factors such as those mentioned in this despatch and its enclosure will tend to counteract and will in any case delay the development of Communism [Page 64] along Russian lines. In this connection, reference may be made to Dairen’s Report No. 10 of October 15, 1948, to the Department, “Notes on the Chinese Communist Movement Based on Information Provided by a Disillusioned Party Member”.19
Respectfully yours,