Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

761.93/12–1649: Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State

Shanghai, December 16, 1949—10 a. m.
[Received December 16—8 a. m.]

5250. Re Contels 4782, November 14 and 5251, December 16.¹⁶ Information reaching Consulate General from many quarters shows rapidly swelling tide Chinese charges and bitterness re Soviet greedy encroachments. Soviet “crimes” now chief topic on tongues our Chinese contacts, many whom literally bursting to tell us latest. Even those closest new regime more and more unreserved, elated in their attacks. One contact through whom we have been regularly supply[ing] SMCC Foreign Affairs Bureau with much material (American papers, press releases, Acheson [and] Jessup statements, Department’s Soviet affairs notes series, etc.) recently urged: “Don’t be afraid of giving them anti-Soviet material; they are glad to get it”.

Selection of more reliable significant items follows. As will be noted, present Chinese ire is direct[ed] especially but by no means exclusively at Russian demands for Chinese foodstocks:

1. Source: … Enraged to find it “definitely true” that North China has shipped many trains of its food to Russia when China’s own food needs great and he himself found people eating grass, bark in very suburbs Peiping. Said authorities sought excuse on grounds China all-dependent on Russia, must do what she wants; and that Siberia has severe famine. Consulate General notes item in Department Bulletin No. 282, December 1, that “Office of Foreign Agriculture Relations says Russia’s 1948–49 crop produced more bread-grain than all four biggest grain countries combined …”¹⁷ Reported having noted that posters put up by Peiping authorities to explain rise food prices as being due demands of armies and newly liberated areas, etc., had superimposed handwriting (scrawled at night) reading: “Price rise is due to food shipments to supply big [garble] (Russians)”. On every side he heard reports of Soviets’ high living in Peiping, Tientsin—insistence on best houses, best clothes, etc. Found whole attitude toward new regime more critical than at Shanghai.

2. Source: American bank manager quoting two Chinese informants … who told him some 2 weeks ago there was pending shipment one million bags wheat flour from Shanghai to Tientsin or further north, which one informant believed “probably destined for USSR as North China people too poor to buy”. Comment: Tientsin postwar has imported up to 300 to 500 thousand bags Shanghai wheat flour monthly from time to time, and rail shipments flour though costly might be undertaken by state trading companies to meet North China shortage. (Note million bags roughly 850 freight cars or 21 trains 40 cars each.)

3. Source: … Last spring Chiaotung University graduating class in railway administration, as result of visit their institution by Lu Cheng-chiao, well-known Communist General [in] Manchuria, recently appointed Vice Minister Railways, eagerly petitioned for trip to Manchuria which Lu duly arranged. Group (63 graduates) left Shanghai about September full enthusiasm for new regime (as personally observed by source). After finishing 2 months’ apprentice study work on Manchurian railways, returned Shanghai December 9 utterly revolted. Source has just seen 3 members of group who reported: (a) Entire group is bitterly against Russians and pro-Russian policies; (b) “whole Manchurian people” similarly minded; (c) every northward train group saw was filled with food for Russia; (d) 5 members of group had watches or pens “borrowed” by Russian rail workers; (e) invitation for group to stay on working Manchuria was rejected to a man. Comment: Consulate General hopes get more on this. While something should be allowed for presumable youthful emotional exaggeration, consider information most significant.

4. Source: … Friend of source returned later November from Manchuria told him that Mukden, Changchun, Harbin authorities collecting of wheat flour stocks there for shipment USSR were being stubbornly opposed by local people who saw no justification for shipments when “China itself short of food”.

5. Source. … Soviets promised return stolen machinery to Manchuria soon as Kmt expelled. Have not done so. Chinese Communists also indignant over greed displayed by Soviets in taking (“according to source’s friend, Minister of Heavy Industries Peking”) 100 percent profit on “the 100,000 tons of steel rails of West German origin” which they sent China, having priced rails at $150 per ton compared half that cost for Soviets. (Press item reported to Department by Consulate General some time ago mentioned USSR as having supplied 500 kilometers of rails to new regime, evidently some time between spring and autumn 1949.) Soviets have not been fulfilling terms three recent barter agreements (one with Manchuria and two “with East China” but “negotiated in Manchuria”), their deliveries to date being mainly confined to paper, some textiles and small quantities machine tools and steel plates. True that Soviets seek monopoly soybean trade and already have it to point where other buyers must approach Moscow rather than China. China thus deprived of both exports and foreign exchange to buy imports from west. (These items tally generally with information from other sources.) As result of Soviet bad faith and rising Chinese opposition, further implementation of pacts is more or less at standstill.

6. Source: … Seems increasingly clear that recent Soviet “cultural” delegation was avid in buying up metals, etc., while in Shanghai and securing Chinese commitments for goods such as bristles for Soviet use or speculative profit with quid fro qua largely vague promises “whose failure to be kept will become plain before long and cause violent Chinese reaction”.

7. Source: … Friend just back from North China, Manchuria with “Shanghai industrial inspection group” says press giving false information re northeast. Dairen population decreasing. People most unhappy under Russian influence.

8. Source: … Is positively set against accepting post or returning Peiping as long as Soviet dominance prevails. Soviet have advisors in Ministry Justice with great influence (confirmed by source 7) and with other organs. Even Chinese non-Communist leaders, in order see high Communist leaders, must first clear with liaison office which contains Soviet advisors; and none can travel to Peiping from Shanghai unless can prove good reasons to satisfaction that office. Mao Tse-tung has retired to Western Hills to “escape pressures”. Comment: Our sources differ considerably re degree Soviet influence Peiping, most asserting such influence great, but some claiming recent decline. All agree, however, on Soviet’s powerful position Manchuria, and most assert “personal conviction” that Soviets primarily responsible for Ward case.

9. Source: … Issue of whether to recognize Yugoslav recognition was warmly debated in his office, some favoring such recognition on grounds China should have independent foreign policy.

10. Source: … “Everywhere in Shantung” (recently visted by source) as well as Shanghai, people greatly concerned for Soviet encroachments. Chinese now refer to Stalin as “stepfather” with everything that term implies.

11. Source: Several. The signs of increasingly manifested resentment criticism Soviet Union in schools, colleges reported in ConGen telegram 4887, November 22¹⁸ continue. For example, officer of Consulate General informed by Chinese friends in … Law School that professor there, in introducing to his class in comparative court systems the subject of Soviet courts, which authorities now require as main phase of the course (in place of former stress British, American and Chinese systems), said: “It will all sound very nice, but there is no way of checking”. Many more questions now being debated in class than formerly, with large, very vocal non-Communist group no longer browbeaten by pro-Moscow minority.

12. Source: … Soviet efforts to acquire former Czarist Russian bank building at 15 The Bund are being obstinately resisted by local authorities.

13. Source. … Chinese people, including Communist leaders, feel bitterly re Soviet treatment Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang. Mao has been doing best to maintain Chinese influence in Manchuria, Sinkiang. Has managed do something in Manchuria thanks to communication facilities, but remoter Sinkiang much more difficult. Recent attempted plane trip of Sinkiang leaders to Peiping was Mao’s scheme for strengthening ties by showing honor, friendship to Sinkiang patriots most likely stand up to Soviet aggression and by appointing them in their posts. Mao deeply shocked when all killed in plane crash, was first to wire their families. Asked whether he suspected foul play, source admitted at least possibility. Source also stated, as “certain fact”, that Tan Kah-kee “great Chinese industrial patriot”, had actually wept on Mao’s shoulder in complaining to him of Soviet encroachments especially Manchuria, and that Mao comforted him by assurance that “this would be corrected in time”.

Aside from above types of more reliable information, Consulate General has been getting flood of less vouched material. Such includes, for example, reports:

That Chinese delegation to Moscow had interview with Stalin in which he stated bluntly that China and USSR must cooperate even more closely and implied that if every [ever?] Mao Tse-tung should stand in the way of this, it would be duty of Chinese people to liquidate him;

That one million Chinese youths are to go to Russia for training;

That (in keeping with their boastful superiority) “Russians slap better than anyone else” (sarcastic jibe arising from manner in which Soviet movie director Gerasimov is said to have manhandled Shanghai crowds while shooting his pictures);

That no Soviet organs pay any taxes in Manchuria;

That Soviet soldiers constantly rape Manchurian women;

That Russian naval personnel is supervising erection coast defenses for Shanghai and Foochow;

That China (especially north) is being flooded with Soviet agents;

That Soviet technicians are only skilled workmen, with inadequate technical training.

Even such less credible reports derive significance in mere fact of their general and eager circulation and consequent effect in further exciting Chinese feeling.

Almost nothing favorable to Soviets has been heard by Consulate General aside from wholly propagandist press blasts (and, with exception of ultra pro-Soviet Ta Kung Pao, even they show cooling tendency of late). For sake fairness, however, such as we have is summarized:

1. Source: … PPCC delegation member new regime’s Economic Finance Commission, recently returned from North China, Manchuria. Remains strong supporter new regime policies. Told American friend he found Mukden, Dairen people fairly employed, fed, definitely better than under Kmt, 80 percent factories operating thanks partly to Russians, who have supplied steel plates and other materials to keep them going and “are sending machine tools and machines in return for soybeans”. He himself saw “some” Russian lathes. Soviet technicians have only been accepted on contractual conditions: (a) Same wages as Chinese, (b) won’t interfere in politics, (c) will return USSR when job finished. True that Soviets have some influence, but are Socialist nation and only one helping new regime, so only natural. Peiping little dominated by Soviets.

2. Source: … Soviet technicians did good work repairing some railway bridges, “showing up” foreign-trained Chinese engineers.

To recapitulate, great weight of Consulate General’s evidence indicates rapidly developing indignation and obstructionist spirit against USSR, in which Chinese Communists [them] selves seem showing increasing tendency to join.

Sent Department. Department pass Moscow 17.

McConaughy

16. Latter not printed.
17. Omission indicated in the source text.
18. Not printed.