893.00/12–1549
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)
By appointment arranged through his physician, Dr. Frank Meleney, I called on President Li Tsung-jen at the Harkness Pavilion of the Presbyterian Hospital at 6:00 PM. Recalling the reports of Madame Chiang’s entire floor during her stay in the same place, it may be worth noting that President Li occupies a simple single room on the third floor. Dr. Meleney met me at the desk and took me to the room where we found Dr. Kan with Li. Dr. Meleney asked me if I wished him to leave and put the same question in Chinese to President Li. We both told him we had no objection to his remaining. Dr. Kan acted as interpreter.
I began by saying that I greatly appreciated the President’s courtesy in allowing me to call upon him to pay my respects, despite his illness. I said I wished to express my sympathy for his illness and my hopes that he would speedily recover. Li replied that he had long wished to visit the United States but his duty in China had made it impossible. It was hard for him to have left his country during the present difficulties but his health required it. He had looked forward when he visited the United States to meeting all of the leading personalities in our government but I was the first official person he had met and he was very pleased to see me. He continued that he regretted that the troubles of his country had led to the serious situation in the Far East which had led to my trip which he hoped would be successful.
I said that I regretted that it was illness which had brought him to this country. I had, in planning my trip[,] looked forward to meeting him there but appreciated the opportunity he gave me to meet him here before I left in two hours’ time to start my journey. Just as illness had brought him here so it was true, as he suggested, that a great political illness was taking me to the Far East.
President Li said that the Government of China was very much to blame for the unfortunate situation which had developed. They had failed to take the steps necessary to hold the confidence of the people of China and this was the cause of the success of the Communists. He would be glad to answer any questions I wished to ask since he hardly knew where to begin on so large a question.
[Page 631]I said I had no specific questions but would be grateful for any information or suggestions which he cared to give me.
President Li then analyzed the situation in China. Due to the mistakes of the National Government the Communists had at first been able to persuade many people that Communism would afford the solution they sought. The situation was comparable to that twenty-odd years ago when the people similarly rallied around the Kuomintang. But people were rapidly becoming disillusioned. He was receiving frequent reports to this effect. Liberal leaders of the Democratic League and others were sending him word that they had made a mistake in joining the Communists. The manager (?) of the Manchurian railways had escaped and had come to Li to tell him that the Communists were unable to fulfill their promises. He reported that the people of Manchuria were now wishing the Japanese were back since under them they had a little freedom while under the Communists they had none. The Communists used their principle of “struggle” to liquidate great numbers of people. The National Government had been very remiss in not putting land reform into effect. They had many plans but had not carried them into effect. The Communists had started land reform but their method had been to liquidate by “struggle” not only the large landholders but even the humblest peasant who had any land. They charged that all the peasants were capitalists at heart because they sought each year to accumulate something in order to buy more land. The peasants were thus turned against the Communists and would now be ready for and welcome the true reforms which the National Government planned. Unfortunately the Government no longer had any area in which they could carry them out. The Communists were also losing the people by severe taxes and heavy requisitions to feed their armies. Their armies included very many national troops who had been “forced to surrender”. These troops were not trusted but were guarded by Communist troops and were virtual prisoners. Labor too was dissatisfied because the Communists due to lack of foreign trade and the Nationalist blockade were unable to get the raw materials to keep the factories going. All of these elements were ready to rise against the Communists if only they had hope. At present they had none. (The implication was made obvious but there was no direct reference to United States aid.) If this situation were allowed to continue the Communists would in five years or so liquidate all possible leaders.
I thanked President Li for this information and analysis of the situation which I was sure would be very helpful. I was confident that under care of my old friend and doctor, Dr. Meleney, he would soon be well again.
Dr. Kan walked out with me to the elevator and asked if I were going to China. I said I was waiting to arrange my itinerary after I reached Japan, that I would of course like to visit China but did not [Page 632] wish to be another “Ward Case”.15 Neither Kan nor Li mentioned Formosa or the Generalissimo.
Dr. Meleney told me they expect to operate on Monday.