Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.00/9–349: Telegram

The Conuselor of Embassy in China (Jones) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, September 3, 1949—1 p. m.
[Received September 5—2:43 a. m.]

1994. We believe recent history of China justifies drawing these three conclusions:

1. CCP is here to stay for some time. We must not mistake already apparent widespread dissatisfaction and disillusionment with Communist regime or revolutionary situation which will lead to its early overthrow. CCP has more than 20 years’ experience. It has large, well-disciplined party, large and effective (by Chinese standards) fighting force and more than rudiments of secret police system. It is incomparably stronger than Bolsheviks at time they seized power. It is futile to expect Chinese Communists to be overthrown by economic distress, scattered peasant revolts or diminishing resistance of Kmt. Sun Yat-sen tried and failed for more than decade before organizing revolution successful in overturning decadent Manchurian rule. Corrupt and defeated Russian Empire suppressed abortive 1905 revolts and only disastrous major war weakened it to point of permitting successful revolution against it. Bolsheviks, although beset with calamitous economic conditions, civil war and foreign intervention, yet managed retain power through early years Soviets’ regime. Mussolini and Hitler were only overthrown after invasion of their countries by foreign armies. Seizure of power is extraordinarily difficult task, requiring dogged determination, exacting organizational work and spirit of self-sacrifice. As Marx put it, “revolution is an art”.

2. Any successful resistance movement must be purely Chinese. Any group which must depend for its continued existence upon foreign aid is unlikely to prove savior of China. When conditions are truly ripe for revolution, an indigenous resistance group can find means for its support among masses of discontented population. When it has proved its ability to exist independently and steadily expand its influence, then and only then can our assistance be effective.

3. There is now on horizon no anti-Communist Chinese leader who is suited by temperament or experience to lead successful revolution against CCP. In White Paper²⁷ we admitted failure of Generalissimo and, in effect, washed our hands of Kmt. We doubt whether Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi are suitable leaders of such a movement, although they might conceivably contribute to it (reEmbtel 1922, August 28²⁸). Despite their undoubted sincerity and patriotism, we have little confidence that such men as Ku Meng-yu or Han Li-wu (reCantels 923, August 11 and 912, August 9 to Department) would make successful revolutionary leaders.

It is on these three premises, we believe, that we must base our fundamental policy toward China. Simply stated, that policy should be to prevent China from becoming reinforcement to Soviet power. To achieve this end, we must wait for development of Chinese form “Titoism”, meanwhile doing nothing to encourage growth of strong Communist China. Policy of outright hostility toward rulers of China and overt support of subversive activity against them, while it undoubtedly would hinder consolidation CCP power, would be unlikely to contribute toward detachment of China from USSR because it would conflict with, rather than make use of, Chinese chauvinism.

This policy of awaiting development “Titoism” has disadvantage that at this stage it is largely negative. It will be criticized as lacking force. Yet, as our three premises show, present time is not propitious for positive action on our part. Conciliatory gestures now of economic or diplomatic nature would not only be opposed by large portion of American public but would simply be interpreted by CCP as bearing out Communist theory of inner weakness of USA. It would be explained as having been forced upon US by coming depression and desperate need for markets and raw materials.

Our optimum policy therefore has following quality:

1. Let CCP learn by experience that USSR has little aid to offer, that Soviet friendship is always one-sided, that China will lose much more than it will gain by such association, that it will receive no assistance from US as long as it is satellite of USSR. CCP is going to have to learn these facts the hard way. While CCP is doing this, we may not be able to avoid acrimonious public exchanges over instances of clear-cut discrimination against US interests, but we should endeavor to minimize open clashes to avoid diverting public attention from growing encroachments of USSR. Soviet actions injurious to China’s if [own?] interests must be made to stand out more sharply in contrast to our own proper behavior. We should constantly look for signs of friction between CCP and USSR and seek means to increase it particularly by publicizing Soviet actions which reveal true intention of Kremlin toward China. During this period we should also watch closely for emergence of dynamic revolutionary groups but not be hasty in aiding potential revolutionaries before they have proven in some degree their worth.

2. Let US do nothing to contribute to comfort of new bed which CCP has made for Cima. Short of war or open hostility we can do little now to hurt CCP. However, this is not necessarily true in future. We have many potential weapons: Economic sanctions, abrogation of GATT²⁹ benefits, Taiwan, or Japan policy, diplomatic recognition, UN membership, immigrant remittances, air and sea transportation, loans. Eventually time will come when we can and should use these weapons effectively.³⁰

Sent Department 1994, repeated OffEmb Canton 818, Shanghai 1083.

Jones

27. Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949).
28. Vol. ix, p. 541.
29. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed at Geneva, October 30, 1947.
30. The Secretary of State in telegram No. 1098, September 14, 7 p. m., informed the Counselor of Embassy that his telegram was found to be “most helpful in crystallization of Dept’s views” for discussion in impending conversations with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin); for documentation on those conversations, see vol. ix, pp. 1 ff.