893.00/8–449: Airgram
The Chargé in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 14—9:49 a. m.]
A–41. Mr. Yin Jen-chai, Secretary to Premier Yen Hsi-shan and one of the Embassy’s most helpful sources, has provided this office with a confidential copy of the Premier’s proposals for an overall solution to the manifold problems now facing the Central Government. These proposals have been drawn up in the form of a bill entitled: “A Bill to Remedy the Present Situation”, an 8,000-character long product of several weeks’ intensive effort on the part of Yen and his advisors.
[Page 474]Although the exact status of this Bill is not clear, it appears to have been accepted in principle by the Supreme Policy Committee of the Kmt at its first session held in Canton on July 20. Yen’s advisors state that the Bill, the details of which have still not been completed, requires no further approval by any other organ of the Central Government and will be enforced by the various Governmental agencies as conditions develop.
The vagueness of the enforcement procedure is matched, with some few exceptions, by the vagueness of the Bill itself. On the whole, the Bill appears to be nothing more than another general statement of principles or overall plan for “averting the crisis” or “saving the situation”, which have been the distinguishing handiwork of Central Government leaders in recent years of decadence and inaction. These plans to reform, to establish committees and commissions and councils, to reorganize, to regroup, to unite the nation, to improve morale, to stop inflation, to win over the common people, and so on ad infinitum, have been so numerous and so signally ineffective that it will be nothing short of a miracle if Yen’s plan to remedy the situation ever takes concrete shape and is carried out.
Since Yen’s Bill does not yet appear to be either law or a definitive statement of policy, its provisions will not be dealt with in detail here. Very briefly, the Bill consists of four parts:
The first part is a general introduction in which the Premier advances the thesis that Nationalist forces must adopt Communist guerrilla-type tactics of attacking where the enemy is weak or unprepared and overwhelming him by superiority in numbers. This type of mobile warfare would be maintained until a new force could be built up or until a change in the international situation brought foreign aid and cooperation.
The second part explains the different stages at which the Communists succeeded in developing their military might; to wit, during the recent war and taking advantage of Nationalist troops then engaged in fighting the Japanese.
The third part gives the Premier’s estimate of the reasons for Communist successes; namely, their flexible policy of adapting their methods to the particular time and place, popular regimentation, mobile warfare, and liquidation of all classes to the point where everyone is dependent upon the CCP for livelihood and protection.
The fourth part contains the specific proposals on governmental finance and budget balancing, troop readjustments, total warfare, local government authority, foreign policy, education, and so on.
As stated above, even these “specific proposals” are for the most part quite vague. They will, however, be covered in detail in a subsequent report should developments make it worth while.