893.00/7–2749: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 30—12:26 p. m.]
Cantel 829. Following through on thoughts reported Cantel 814, July 24,47 repeated Nanking 540, Shanghai 458, I envisage course of events more or less as follows:
Pai Chung-hsi will conserve his strength and eventually resort to guerrilla tactics in mountainous regions Kwangsi. (Can find no evidence intention Pai put up real battle anywhere; his ammunition is low with no replacement in sight.) Szechuan and Yunnan will fall in comparatively near future, but northwest for some time may maintain autonomy under Ma’s who will also eventually take to hills as guerrillas. (Despite excellent leadership and morale, Ma’s troops have nothing with which fight prolonged battle.) There is already evidence guerrilla activities in Ta Pieh Shan area on Honan–Anwhei–Hupeh border. When Communists have driven Nationalists from mainland to fortress Taiwan, these will be only remaining areas resistance mainland China unless similar elements coalesce some other area. (Even though Kwangtung Provincial Government moves Hainan as planned, do not believe they can hold it for long.) To exacerbate Communist economic problems, Nationalist blockade of mainland will be continued from Taiwan, although we should not lose sight of possibility Communists may one day succeed occupying Taiwan through infiltration and similar tactics.
Communist theory, as I see it, is the negation of deep-seated Chinese tradition. In seeking disruption of family and regimentation, which is inevitable if Communists are to succeed in imposing their theories on country, they will arouse incalculable passions and resistance. As their measures increase in harshness, resentment and resistance will [Page 460] increase and the organized guerrilla forces of resistance in such places as Ta Pieh Shan and Kwangsi may be augmented. There may even come a time when from these forces of resistance there will arise a new leader or leaders capable of taking the offensive against Communism. If we have acted wisely in interim we may be able take advantage that development to serve our purposes.
It seems, therefore, that for some time to come China will be ruled by Communist regime or regimes unfriendly to US. Certainly Communist propaganda, including the statements of its leaders, indicate firm intention to vilify US, inflaming the people toward an active hatred of the US while friendship with the Soviet Union is being fostered by every means. Communist propaganda goes even so far as to proclaim that aid or advice from the western world would not be accepted even if proffered. To accept such aid or advice would be to pervert Communist purity, they say. China will accept, therefore, aid and technical advice only from her friends, the Soviets and Soviet satellites.
If this analysis is founded, could we not profit by Soviet tactics in Western Europe and endeavor manoeuvre Soviets into assuming responsibility for this morass that is China? Why not step aside, remain aloof except possibly for covert support to resistance elements, and let Communists go to Soviets for the aid and technical advice they must have if they are to realize any of their plans, or for that matter, if they are to prevent the port cities from sinking under the blockade into economic collapse and chaos. By holding aloof we would place full burden Communist difficulties on Communists themselves and remove basis their propaganda against American imperialism. At same time a Communist China foundering in morass of administrative inefficiency and economic want might dampen ardor fellow-travelers southeast Asia. If we take no initiative in trying to improve relations with Chinese Communists and if we strike a hard bargain in the case of any request they make of us, they will be forced to carry out their avowed policy and seek their aid from the Soviet Union. Any action along these lines would, of course, require that we bring into line other major trading nations.
There is reason to believe that the Soviets seek to exploit China, not assist her. Even so, everything I read indicates that should Soviets really come to assistance China they can do so only at expense their own economy. Either the Soviets seek to supply Communist China requirements and bog down in the morass or they embarrass Communist propaganda by their failure to do so. The net result may be chaos in China for a long time. Sometimes, however, I shudder at the thought that an unfriendly government might organize efficiently and regiment the tremendous manpower of this country and the longer we can delay the possibility of such a day should be beneficial.
[Page 461]Effect of 100 years of western Christianizing influence on Chinese people cannot be eradicated in a day and there should remain, although temporarily submerged, a good will toward the US that would assist us when the time comes to reassert ourselves positively in China. In the meantime, by continued recognition of Nationalist Government, even though confined to Taiwan, we would have retained friendly vote China in international councils.
Sent Department Cantel 829, repeated Nanking 555, Shanghai 465, Taipei 84.